Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–12, Documents on East and Southeast Asia, 1973–1976

277. Memorandum from Jay Taylor of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft), Washington, April 22, 1976.¹ ²

Washington, April 22, 1976

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
INFORMATION

April 22, 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT
FROM: JAY TAYLOR [JT initialed]
SUBJECT: Possible North Korean Initiatives During 1976

At our request, CIA has prepared a memorandum assessing possible North Korean initiatives this year (Tab A). The assessment speculates that Kim Il-sung may feel that longer-term trends are running against his aspirations to unify the country under communist control. At the same time, Kim may sense special opportunities this year to alter these trends because of the continuing lack of a foreign policy consensus in the U.S., the impact of the human rights issue in the Congress, and the complications introduced into the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in a Presidential election year. The CIA assessment makes no attempt to assign orders of probability to possible North Korean actions, but attempts to analyze the possibilities as they must appear from Pyongyang.

The author lists several new political initiatives that North Korea might take, but he believes that limited military actions designed for political and economic effect while more risky are at present possibly more tempting to Kim Il-sung. The evidence for this case rests partly on the interest that North Korea has shown in assessing the lessons of the wars in Indochina and the Middle East. Pyongyang’s studies may have suggested some general conclusions:

• — There is great reluctance in the U.S. to become involved in further conflicts in Asia.
• — Surprise military action can produce a shock effect which brings the issue of noninvolvement to a head within the U.S. Congress and the population at large and forces a review of long-standing commitments.
• — It is possible in areas where great power interests converge to undertake limited military action in the reasonable expectation that the powers will intervene to halt the fighting before it gets out of hand.
• — Until the fighting is stopped, integrated modern air defense systems and well-prepared ground defenses can limit damage from reprisal attacks to forces in the field and fixed installations in the rear.
• — It is possible for a small communist nation to plot its own military and political course while playing on Sino-Soviet rivalries to command essential support from both countries, occasionally against their respective individual interests and desires.

Given these assumptions, Pyongyang could calculate that limited military action against the South, taken in an ambiguous circumstance, could be controlled by the North, would not preclude continued Soviet and Chinese assistance, would provoke fear in the U.S. of another Korean war, would involve the U.S. and the ROK in debate and argument over the proper response, and in the end could cause changes in U.S. policy favorable to North Korea. The author believes that the Northwest Islands are the most vulnerable targets, both militarily and politically.

Pyongyang could reasonably expect that the ROK, rather than attempt to recapture the islands if they were taken by the North, would favor a reprisal directly across the DMZ. This response is in fact the basis of present ROK contingency planning. In this event, we would be faced with an immediate dilemma of whether or not to authorize in our capacity as U.N. Commander such an ROK counterstrike. If ROK forces did move into the DMZ with or without our sanction, the action would be far more visible and would create a much greater stir than the original attack by the North Koreans against the Northwest Islands. Pyongyang could then counterattack in some areas and exploit the pressure of U.S. domestic and world opinion to force a ceasefire in a favorable situation, and to press for direct North Korean-U.S. negotiations.

Planning for the Future

In the event of a North Korean attack on the Northwest Islands, our options would be constrained by the fact that under the War Powers Act it would be difficult for the President to justify direct employment of U.S. forces as no American personnel would be directly threatened. If ROK forces counterattacked elsewhere along the DMZ and North Korea subsequently retaliated, we would encounter serious domestic and Congressional opposition to U.S. involvement. In this hypothetical situation, Japanese public opinion would also probably be least supportive of the involvement of U.S. support bases in Japan.

The political risks for the North in even limited military moves as described above would be serious. The major concern would be that the end result could be the opposite of that intended — the chances of an early U.S. military withdrawal could be reduced. Consequently, it is highly uncertain whether Kim Il-sung will decide to take this course anytime in the near future.

We believe, however, that we should begin looking now at the alternative policies open to us in the event of a limited North Korean military attack as envisioned in the CIA study. We do not believe we should make a decision now on how we would react. But, given the mainly political objectives of such an attack in the near term, we should be prepared with a range of imaginative and flexible responses that could effectively counter Pyongyang’s moves. We should also consider ways to discourage the North from such a strategy.

We have asked Defense to provide us a paper on DOD’s assessment of the vulnerability of the islands and plans for their defense. We intend to follow this up with a request for a State-Defense contingency paper.

Concurrence:
Clint Granger

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea (15). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum and wrote, “Good idea.” Tab A, April 8, 1976, is not attached. It is in the Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122 (National Intelligence Council), Job 91R00884R, Box 31, Intelligence Memorandum: Possible North Korean Initiatives During 1976, NIO M 76–010 C. The Defense papers on the vulnerabilities of the Northwest Islands to attack and on options for their defense are in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for East Asia and the Pacific, Box 10, Korea (17).
2. Taylor summarized a CIA report on possible North Korean initiatives during 1976.