Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–11, Part 1, Documents on Mexico; Central America; and the Caribbean, 1973–1976

233. Telegram 262948 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Guatemala¹

Washington, October 23, 1976, 0202Z.

262948. Subject: British Request for Assistance on Belize Dispute. Refs: (A) USDAO/Guatemala msg DTG 211930Z 76, (B) Belize 869.

1. Summary. British Embassy Counselor William Squire called on Dep. Asst. Secretary Luers October 21 for USG diplomatic assistance in restraining GOG regarding Belize prior to UNGA debate. Squire was informed that USG felt such an initiative would be unwise and ineffective under present conditions. Squire repeated British view that territorial concession would not be possible. Next ministerial-level talks will not occur at least until after UNGA debate, at which a “noncontroversial” resolution is expected. Department notes possible lapse in communications between UK and GOG re latest reinforcement of Belize garrison, which reportedly began October 21. End summary.

2. Squire began presentation by reiterating view that domestic British political opinion would make any cession of Belizean territory without Belizean consent “indefensible” in Commons. Squire said HMG had moved to cool the situation down prior to the UNGA session on Belize through démarches to the GOG and Venezuelan authorities. He delivered copy of text of note from FCO Minister of State Ted Rowlands to FonMin Molina, sent to Molina last week (see text below). HMG had also approached GOV within last few days, and found GOV “disposed to be helpful.” Squire then relayed official request from HMG for USG to approach GOG and reinforce UK efforts to forestall any resort to force or other miscalculations before UNGA takes up Belize question.

3. Squire said HMG felt this was necessary because of signs GOG might seriously be contemplating use of force, based on judgment that talks would not lead to acceptable settlement. Squire reinforced this analysis by alluding to unconfirmed reports indicating GOG might commence “systematic military operations” in southern Belize within next month. He offered no elaboration of this point or any evaluation of the source. However, he asserted HMG had to take such signs seriously because of domestic political explosion such developments would provoke.

4. Luers indicated USG believed approaching GOG now would be “unwise” and ineffective. Referring to strong démarche made by the late Ambassador Meloy in 1975, ARA reps pointed out such pressure could only be employed infrequently and in extreme situations if it were to be effective. Such extreme situation does not now obtain, in our view. This was not to say we would be unwilling to be helpful if it became necessary. However, for the present it would be better for GOG and HMG to continue to deal with this issue directly.

5. Luers added view, conveyed to HMG several times over past year, that some concession of land still seemed only way out of Belizean impasse as GOG perceives matter. However, USG recognized difficulty of finding politically viable way to do so. While present HMG negotiation package was impressive, it lacked that “one little ingredient” that might seal an accord; i.e.: an onshore territorial concession of even symbolic, minimal dimensions.

6. Regarding other elements of British view of present situation, Luers offered view that it seemed unlikely GOV would intercede on behalf of Belize versus GOG, given parallel with Guyana dispute. Plan put forward by Torrijos in Panama City September 22 also seemed a mere “pipedream,” with which opinion Squire agreed.

7. On prospects at UN, Squire stated HMG expected George Price would press for a moderate, non-controversial resolution to attract additional support from states which abstained in 1975. He wanted to press for “red-hot” measure at first, but had backed down completely at urging of UK. He would insist on a resolution of some sort. HMG was confident, however, that this would not be provocative. No further ministerial-level meetings would be scheduled until after the UNGA debate. However, an official-level meeting in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, was still scheduled for October 25, to discuss economic issues.

8. Text of letter from Rowlands to Molina follows: Begin quote:

Dear Adolfo

I am sure that we both felt disappointed when we took leave of each other last month. The territorial question is fundamental for both of us and the difference between our perceptions of the problem is very great. I know that we would not be honest with each other if we did not admit this.

On my return I have set in train a reassessment of the possible ways forward now open to us. I hope that you will also be willing to make a thorough review of your position. I should like to repeat that I am prepared to examine any alternative proposals for resolving the problem, but the British Parliament will have to be satisfied that arrangements for Belize’s independence fully reflect the wishes, rights and aspirations of the people of Belize. You have said that, in itself, the treaty cannot be the whole solution. I am nonetheless convinced that treaty arrangements of the kind envisaged do offer the best means of satisfying Guatemalan needs for security after Belizean independence and of providing for future economic cooperation. I welcome therefore your proposal that officials should resume their work on the draft treaty on 25 October. I understand, however, that the Fourth Committee debate on Belize at the UN may now take place at the end of October or the beginning of November. It is therefore unlikely that we could meet again at ministerial level before the UN debate and I hope you agree that it would be undesirable to meet during it. We should therefore give further consideration to agreeing a date for our next meeting when the Fourth Committee debate is over. We shall also then be in a better position to assess the progress made at the official level.

I should like to take this opportunity to put on record that, as you will recall, we both agreed at Panama that neither side would say or do anything which could heighten tension while negotiations are still in train. I wish to confirm that this is HMG’s position. I do hope you will be able also to confirm that this is your government’s position. In this spirit I shall continue to notify you of any military movements which could be misconstrued and I trust that you will do the same.

Meanwhile, I should like to assure you that we shall be making every effort in the weeks ahead to find a solution acceptable to all parties with a view to reaching substantial agreement at our next meeting. Yours sincerely, Ted Rowlands. End quote.

9. Comment. Reassurances by Rowlands respecting notification of any “military movements” seem to conflict with information in ref messages. This suggests that standing arrangements to share military information between HMG and GOG, which pre-existed note to Molina, are not operating fully or opportunely. We would appreciate any further information addressee posts may be able to develop on this matter. End comment.

Kissinger

1. Summary: During a discussion with Deputy Assistant Secretary Luers, British Embassy Counselor C. William Squire requested U.S. assistance in urging restraint by the Guatemalans prior to debates over the Belize issue at the United Nations.

   Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850183–2456. Secret. Drafted by Gowen and cleared by Luers. Reference A, a message from the Defense Attaché’s Office in Guatemala City, was not found. In telegram 869 from Belize City, October 21, the Consulate General reported that the British planned to increase troop strength along the Guatemalan border, in part because new road construction had improved Guatemalan force deployment capabilities, but also “because of recent and anticipated developments.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760395–0977) During the Secretary’s staff meeting on October 26, Shlaudeman reported on the British troop movements, and observed that “The Guatemalans are getting nervous again. A lot of this will depend on how the resolution comes up in the United Nations.” (Ibid., Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 3, Secretary’s Analytical Staff Meetings)