232. Telegram 6509 From the Embassy in Guatemala to the Department of State1
6509. Subject: GOG Views on Belize.
1. Summary: In wide ranging discussion of Belize issue with Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman, President Laugerud and Foreign Minister Molina expressed cautious optimism about impending talks with UK in Panama. President stated GOG would bring up question at Panama of cession of Belizean territory to Guatemala, which was sine qua non of agreement for Guatemala. President voiced concern about likely Cuban intervention in Belize if UK–GOG negotiations were to fail. However, he stressed GOG desire to seek solution with UK. Shlau-deman noted USG hope for successful outcome to negotiations with UK. With respect to possible Cuban penetration of Belize, Shlaudeman emphasized USG commitment to mutual security in hemisphere. End summary.
2. Assistant Secretary Shlaudeman, accompanied by Chargé, had very useful exchange of views on Belize during call on President Laugerud on September 16.
3. President expressed cautious optimism on forthcoming talks with UK in Panama on September 21–22. He said that if both sides gave way a bit, the Panama meeting should be successful and provide basis for continuation of negotiations. He stated categorically that Guatemala will bring up the territorial issue at Panama. This is most sensitive question of all, GOG realizes, but it is also sine qua non of agreement for Guatemala. Question will not be raised in plenary session because of sensitivity but will be broached directly with Rowlands by FonMinister Molina. In response to questioning by Shlaudeman, President indicated GOG did not necessarily expect immediate response from Rowlands at Panama. GOG will present its proposal on cession of territory by Belize in expectation that UK will study it and come back and make counter proposals. GOG fully realizes it is no longer realistic in [Page 636] this day and age to maintain its claim to all of Belize. At Panama, GOG would give up its claim to the majority of Belize but would put forth a claim to southern portion. There would obviously be a period of bargaining and counter proposals which would ensue. In the last analysis, Guatemala would have to retain a sufficiently large piece of territory in the south to give it unhindered access to the open seas through the Bay of Amatique. It could not accept a situation like Israel found itself in the Bay of Elath, with access to the open sea blocked because of overlapping territorial waters of Honduras and Belize.
4. Laugerud voiced considerable apprehension about Cuba. Said that as long as UK remained in Belize there was no danger of Cuban infiltration, but if UK were to grant independence to Belize without a successful outcome to UK–GOG negotiations, then Castro would not hesitate to offer support to Belize. Castro was involved in Angola, in Southern Africa and elsewhere in Africa and with his 100,000 man army and sophisticated weaponry there was no reason he could not move into Belize a scant 200 miles away. Cuba was already supporting subversion in Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, and it would welcome chance to move into Belize.
5. President noted one of difficult political problems he faces was fact that Guatemala’s Constitution specifically states that Belize is part of Guatemalan national territory and that any retreat from this position involving cession of territory to independent Belize would have to be approved by the Congress and the Council of State meeting in joint session. It was for this reason that a face-saving compromise was necessary for Guatemala. If such compromise did not provide for at least some territory in Belize to be handed over to Guatemala then it would not be politically acceptable to Guatemalan public opinion.
6. President continued that he believed UK was negotiating in good faith and that major problem was with Price government in Belize. It was in everybody’s interest—U.S., UK, and Guatemala—to reach a friendly settlement of the Belize issue, because otherwise there would be a source of permanent tension in the area. Guatemala was likewise negotiating in good faith and hoped for a satisfactory outcome. Nonetheless, if the talks should not succeed and the UK were to grant unilateral independence to Belize, then Guatemala would have no recourse except to take military action against Belize. This, however, was the last thing Guatemala wished to do and it would take all possible steps to avoid hostilities.
7. Shlaudeman noted U.S. hope for a successful outcome to the negotiations. U.S. impression is also that UK is negotiating in good faith and that problem is mainly with Belize. With respect to President’s comments on eventual Cuban penetration of Belize, Shlaudeman em [Page 637] phasized that the USG maintains its commitment to the Rio Treaty and mutual security in the hemisphere.
8. Comment: President was both forceful and articulate in presenting GOG views. He seemed deadly serious about seeking a solution—but one including territorial concession.
9. During subsequent Shlaudeman call on FonMinister Molina Orantes latter made many of same points which President made, similarly in conciliatory tone, although still stressing need for Guatemala of face-saving cession of Belizean territory.
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Summary: President Laugerud told Asisstant Secretary Shlaudeman that while he remained cautiously optimistic about impending talks on the Belize issue, no agreement would be possible without the cession of Belizean territory to Guatemala.
Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D760353–0123. Confidential. Repeated to London, USCINCSO, Mexico City, Belize City, USUN New York, and Tegucigalpa for Shlaudeman. In a September 30 meeting with Department officials, Millington reported that during the Panama talks, September 21–22, the Guatemalan Government had “proposed redrawing the southern Belize/Guatemala boundary along a line just below Stann Creek,” something that the British regarded as “an opening negotiating ploy rather than a serious proposal.” (Memorandum of conversation, October 1, ibid., P850183–2451)
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