Office of the Historian

401. Telegram HAKTO 11 From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1 2

Peking, February 24, 1972, 0205Z

1. With reference to your message (TOHAK 111) on Bangladesh, your control of situation is greatly appreciated. It is now even more essential that we do nothing since we have reached a general understanding here that will enable us to follow our general game plan but only if we sit absolutely tight until Indian troops are withdrawn. (Please protect strictly.)

[Omitted here are two paragraphs that do not relate to Bangladesh.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President’s Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Also numbered WHP 77.↩
  2. Kissinger stated that agreement had been reached with the Chinese on “our general game plan” and it was essential to do nothing concerning recognition of Bangladesh until the Indian troops were withdrawn from Bangladesh.↩