Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972

Documents on South Asia, 1969-1972: Document List

Document 1: Memorandum Prepared by the National Security Council Staff for President Nixon, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

The memorandum, prepared by the NSC staff and sent by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger to Nixon, analyzed the causes underlying the riots occurring in Pakistan and the implications for Pakistani President Ayub Khan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, President's Daily Briefs. Secret. The memorandum is undated but was sent to the President on January 27 by Kissinger under cover of a briefing memorandum that summarized a number of foreign policy issues. Kissinger indicated that he was forwarding the attached memorandum because of the President's interest in Khan. Kissinger's memorandum stated that he had prepared the analysis of the situation in Pakistan, but it was apparently prepared by members of the National Security Council staff. (Ibid.) Kissinger also attached to his memorandum copies of telegrams 284 from Dacca, January 24, 292 from Dacca, and 247 from Karachi, both dated January 25. The telegrams reported on the rioting. (Ibid.)

Document 2: Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, January 29, 1969, 0824Z

January 29, 1969, 0824Z

The Embassy commented on the possibility that Pakistani President Ayub Khan might not stand for reelection.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

Document 3: Telegram 1238 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 5, 1969, 1100Z

February 5, 1969, 1100Z

The Embassy reviewed mounting political unrest in Pakistan and concluded that Pakistani President Ayub Khan's "eventual withdrawal from the political scene must be considered likely.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Jidda, Kabul, Karachi, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, Dacca, Lahore, Peshawar, DIA, and CINCSTRIKE.

Document 4: Intelligence Memorandum No. 612/69 Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, February 6, 1969

Washington, February 6, 1969

The memorandum assessed the politically volatile situation in Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret; No Foreign Dissem

Document 5: Telegram 19762 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, February 7, 1969, 0126Z

February 7, 1969, 0126Z

In a conversation with Secretary Rogers, Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly outlined Pakistan's concerns about reduced economic assistance from the United States and the delay in promised military supplies.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL PAK–US. Confidential. Drafted on February 6 by James W. Spain (NEA/PAF), cleared by William J. Handley (NEA), and approved for transmission by Spain. The conversation took place on February 6. Rogers reported on the conversation in a memorandum that he sent to the President on February 6. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1, President's Daily Briefs, Feb 1–8, 1969)

Document 6: Intelligence Note No. 82 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, February 11, 1969

Washington, February 11, 1969

The note assessed the implications of Pakistani President Ayub Kahn's call for the opening of a dialogue with the political opposition.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

Document 7: Telegram 1439 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 11, 1969, 1058Z

February 11, 1969, 1058Z

Ambassador Oehlert reviewed the protracted effort to arrange for military supplies for Pakistan and urged a "prompt liberalization of policy" to expedite the process.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, New Delhi, Laird, JCS, CINCSTRIKE/USCINCMEAFSA, USCINCEUR, and CINCUSAFE. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House.

Document 8: Telegram 2308 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State and the White House, February 19, 1969, 1114Z

February 19, 1969, 1114Z

Ambassador Bowles took sharp exception to Ambassador Oehlert's proposal to expedite military assistance to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis

Document 9: Intelligence Note No. 117 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, February 20, 1969

Washington, February 20, 1969

INR assessed the situation in Pakistan, where rioting by mobs in the streets created "chaos, in many places approaching anarchy.” Pakistani President Ayub Khan's attempt to foster a compromise with the opposition through a round table conference had apparently collapsed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Telegraphic reports of riots and demonstrations are ibid. Student supporters of former Foreign Minister Zulfiqur Ali Bhutto rioted in Karachi on February 17 following his release from prison. (Telegram 512 from Karachi, February 18; ibid.) The release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from prison on February 22 had the effect of calming passions in East Pakistan and opened the prospect of reviving the round table conference. (Telegram 697 from Dacca, February 22; ibid., POL 29 PAK) President Ayub Khan's announcement on February 21 that he would not be a candidate in the next election also facilitated the revival of negotiations with his political opponents. (Telegram 1832 from Rawalpindi, February 21; ibid., POL 15–1 PAK) The round table conference convened in Rawalpindi on February 26, and Ayub accepted demands for direct elections and a parliamentary system, but negotiations collapsed on March 13 following the withdrawal of Mujibur Rahman over the issue of autonomy for East Pakistan. Telegraphic reports on the round table conference are ibid., POL 12 PAK and POL 23–8 PAK.

Document 10: National Security Study Memorandum 26, Washington, February 21, 1969

Washington, February 21, 1969

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger directed that a study be prepared on military supply policy in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 1–42. Secret; Exdis. Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Agriculture, and to the Chairman of the JCS.

Document 11: Intelligence Note No. 190 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 19, 1969

Washington, March 19, 1969

INR analyzed the implications of a serious food shortage in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AGR 15 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

Document 12: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 20, 1969

Washington, March 20, 1969

Nixon approved a recommendation from Kissinger involving the subsidized sale of food to India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential. Sent for action. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation.

Document 13: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 25, 1969

Washington, March 25, 1969

Kissinger informed Nixon that Ayub Khan had resigned as President of Pakistan after declaring martial law and appointing General Yahya Khan martial law administrator. The principal question, he noted, was whether the people of East Pakistan would accept the change.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret. Sent for information. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it and that a copy was sent to Richard L. Sneider of the National Security Council staff. Ayub's resignation and the establishment of martial law were reported from Rawalpindi on March 25 in telegrams 2954, 2956, 2957 and 2958. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK)

Document 14: Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 27, 1969

Washington, March 27, 1969

Hilaly transmitted a message from General Yahya Kahn to President Nixon in which he explained former Pakistani President Ayub Khan's decision to relinquish power to Pakistan's defense forces, and Yahya's subsequent assumption of the position of martial law administrator. Yahya expressed his commitment to restore democratic rule and a civilian government as soon as possible.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential. Sent to the White House on March 29 under cover of a transmittal memorandum from Acting Executive Secretary John P. Walsh to Kissinger. Nixon returned a reply to Yahya on April 22 in which he wrote: "I wish you well in your efforts as President to restore normal conditions.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69)

Document 15: Telegram 50241 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, April 2, 1969, 2250Z

April 2, 1969, 2250Z

Under Secretary of State Richardson questioned Deputy Martial Law Administrator Admiral Ahsan about the restoration of normal political processes in Pakistan and indicated that the U.S. traditionally reserved judgment in its dealings with authoritarian governments.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 7 PAK–US. Secret; Limdis. Repeated to New Delhi. Drafted by Spain; cleared by Howard B. Schaffer (NEA/INC) and Joseph Sisco (NEA); and approved by Richardson. Vice Admiral Syed Mohammed Ahsan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistani Navy and one of three Deputy Martial Law Administrators appointed by General Yahya Khan, was Pakistan's representative at the funeral of former President Dwight D. Eisenhower. A memorandum of Ahsan's conversation with Nixon on March 31, during which Ahsan offered the assurance that the Pakistani military forces had no desire to perpetuate themselves in power, is ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 1, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 30, 1969. Ahsan subsequently told Spain that he "got the message" that while the U.S. might understand the necessity for martial law in Pakistan, future actions of the martial law administration in governing the country and establishing a timetable for a return to representative government would determine how helpful the United States could be to Pakistan. (Telegram 50354 to Rawalpindi, April 2; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 23–8 PAK)

Document 16: Telegram 4797 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, April 10, 1969, 1049Z

April 10, 1969, 1049Z

Ambassador Bowles urged that positive action be taken on a proposal, which had been under consideration for several years, to establish a binational foundation in India to fund mutually agreed educational, scientific, and cultural activities. The foundation would be funded by excess U.S.-held rupees generated by loan repayments and the sale of PL–480 commodities.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential; Exdis. Public Law 480 was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, enacted July 10, 1954, as amended. (68 Stat. 454) PL–480 was a program of agricultural subsidies to developing countries popularly known as the Food for Peace Act.

Document 17: Telegram 3842 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, April 16, 1969, 1050Z

April 16, 1969, 1050Z

Ambassador Oehlert reviewed the history of U.S. military supply policy for South Asia and argued for a revision to increase supplies to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret; Exdis. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House, Department of Defense, the Departments of the Air Force, Army and Navy, JCS, and CINCSTRIKE.

Document 18: Telegram 4169 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, April 25, 1969, 0845Z

April 25, 1969, 0845Z

The Embassy outlined U.S. policy options in Pakistan and recommended increased economic and military assistance as leverage to encourage progress toward the reestablishment of civilian government and an equitable settlement of the grievances of the eastern wing of the country.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, DIA, Ankara, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, London, New Delhi, Moscow, Peshawar, Tehran, Calcutta, Hong Kong, Kabul, and Kathmandu.

Document 19: Telegram 4275 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, April 29, 1969, 0832Z

April 29, 1969, 0832Z

Ambassador Oehlert reported that the Pakistani Government was offering to consider a continuation on a "smaller and less visible basis" of the U.S. use of the facilities at Peshawar.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 15 PAK–US. Secret; Exdis. Sent with an instruction to pass to the White House. The Department responded on April 30 that Oehlert should not take the initiative in discussing continuation of the operations at Peshawar, and if Yahya raised the issue, Oehlert was instructed to take a non-committal attitude and report to Washington. (Telegram 66922 to Rawalpindi; ibid.)

Document 20: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 16, 1969

Washington, May 16, 1969

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger discussed economic assistance for Pakistan with M. M. Ahmad, the principal economic adviser to President YAHYA.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Harold Saunders, and approved in S/S on June 1. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "version sent State.”

Document 21: Telegram 7466 From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to the Department of State, Paris, May 21, 1969, 1750Z

Paris, May 21, 1969, 1750Z

The telegram reported the results of the Pakistan consortium meeting, May 19–20.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID 9 PAK. Limited Official Use. Joint State/AID message. Sent also to Rawalpindi. Repeated to New Delhi for Spain. The consortium of governments and institutions organized to provide development assistance to Pakistan met in Paris, May 19–20, under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The International Monetary Fund also sent observers.

Document 22: Telegram 7699 From the Mission to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development to Secretary of State Rogers in New Delhi, May 23, 1969, 1922Z

May 23, 1969, 1922Z

The telegram reported the results of the India consortium meeting, May 22–23.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID 9 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Priority. Joint State/AID message. Repeated to the Department of State. The consortium of governments and institutions organized to provide development assistance to India met in Paris, May 22–23, under the chairmanship of the World Bank. The meeting was attended by representatives of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The International Monetary Fund sent observers.

Document 23: Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, May 26, 1969, 0950Z

May 26, 1969, 0950Z

Rogers reported on his conversation with Pakistani President YAHYA during his stop in Pakistan on May 24.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority. Sent as Secto 111/2059. Repeated to Rawalpindi, New Delhi, Kabul, Ankara, Saigon, Bangkok, London, and the mission at Geneva. Rogers visited South Asia following his participation in the SEATO meetings in Bangkok, May 19–23, and prior to his participation in the CENTO meetings in Tehran, May 26–27. He stopped in New Delhi May 23–24, in Lahore May 24–25, and in Kabul May 25.

Document 24: Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, May 29, 1969, 2237Z

May 29, 1969, 2237Z

Rogers met with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on the morning of May 24 during his stop in India to discuss U.S. relations with India and U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Secret; Exdis. Sent as Secto 143/WH 90729 with an instruction to repeat to New Delhi. Rogers sent the telegram from his plane while crossing the Atlantic Ocean from London en route to the United States. The meeting between Gandhi and Rogers took place on the morning on May 24. A copy of Nixon's letter to Gandhi, which commended Rogers to her and emphasized the importance of India and its economic development to his administration, can be found ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 70 D 387, CF 366. The Secretary's meeting with Foreign Minister SINGH was reported to the Department on May 24 in telegram 7246. (Ibid., Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S)

Document 25: Telegram 6484 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, July 2, 1969, 1100Z

July 2, 1969, 1100Z

The Embassy renewed its arguments for limited direct sale of lethal weapons to Pakistan and India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE/CINCMEAFSA, and New Delhi. On July 8 the Embassy in New Delhi commented on the recommendations advanced in telegram 6484 from Rawalpindi as follows: "We must emphasize that any policy change permitting direct sales to Pakistan of lethal end items—even on a severely limited basis—would evoke sharp GOI reaction and severely damage our position in India.” (Telegram 9574 from New Delhi; ibid.)

Document 26: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 10, 1969, 4:37–5:15 p.m.

Washington, July 10, 1969, 4:37–5:15 p.m.

President Nixon and Indian Foreign Minister SINGH discussed relations between the U.S. and India in advance of Nixon's forthcoming visit to India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Saunders on July 12. The meeting was held in the Oval Office of the White House. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files) SINGH was visiting the United States in response to an invitation extended by Rogers in New Delhi on May 24. A summary of SINGH's conversations with Rogers on July 10 and 11 was sent to New Delhi on July 11 in telegram 115492. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69) SINGH also met with Kissinger on July 10. A memorandum of that conversation is ibid.

Document 27: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 16, 1969

Washington, July 16, 1969

Kissinger analyzed a political crisis for Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and the possible effect on Nixon's impending visit to India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Secret. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The Embassy in New Delhi reported on the political crisis on July 15 in telegram 10025, and on July 16 in telegram 10082 (both ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 12 INDIA) On July 19 Gandhi's government issued an ordinance nationalizing 14 of the country's largest banks. The Embassy commented: "By boldness and swiftness of her move on July 19 to nationalize leading banks, Prime Minister Gandhi has achieved leadership of Congress Party and confounded her powerful opponents within that party.” (Telegram 10333 from New Delhi, July 21; ibid.)

Document 28: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 18, 1969

Washington, July 18, 1969

Nixon approved proposals put forward by Kissinger for economic assistance to India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 595, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. I, Jan 69–Sept 69. Confidential. Sent for action. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of both recommendations. Attached but not published at Tab A was a July 3 memorandum to Nixon from Robert P. Mayo, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, entitled "Proposed P.L. 480 Program for India.” Attached but not published at Tab B was a June 23 memorandum to the President from Rogers, entitled "Economic Assistance to India.”

Document 29: Memoranda of Conversation, New Delhi, July 31, 1969, 3–4:45 p.m. and August 1, 1969, 8:30–10 a.m.

New Delhi, July 31, 1969, 3–4:45 p.m. and August 1, 1969, 8:30–10 a.m.

U.S. relations with India were discussed on July 31 in a conversation between the advisers to President Nixon and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, including Kissinger and Indian Foreign Secretary T. N. Kaul. On August 1 Nixon and Gandhi joined the discussion.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. Drafted by Saunders on August 1. The combined memoranda were apparently typed from notes taken by Saunders that were not refined into finished memoranda of conversation. The conversations recorded in this memoranda were also reported to the Department on August 2 in telegram 11040 from New Delhi. (Ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Lot 70 D 387, CF 383) The conversations were held in the Panel Room of the President's Palace in New Delhi during Nixon's visit to India July 31–August 1. The meeting on July 31 was held from 3:00–4:45 p.m., and the meeting on August 1 was held from 8:30–10:00 a.m. Nixon was on a round-the-world trip that began on July 23 with the observation of the splashdown and recovery of the Apollo 11 spacecraft from the deck of the USS Hornet, followed by an overnight stop in Guam. He then embarked on a series of official visits to meet with chiefs of state and heads of government of the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. The President also made an unannounced visit to the Republic of Vietnam, an official visit to Romania, and a brief stopover at Mildenhall Air Force Base in England to meet with Prime Minister Harold Wilson. The President returned to the United States on August 3.

Document 30: Memorandum of Conversation, New Delhi, August 1, 1969, 7:45–8:30 a.m.

New Delhi, August 1, 1969, 7:45–8:30 a.m.

Before the second meeting of advisers, President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with P.N. Haksar, his counterpart in the Indian Government. Haksar suggested that good relations between the U.S. and India depended upon the U.S. willingness to recognize the situation on the subcontinent and cease equating India with Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. No classification marking. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in the Presidential Palace.

Document 31: Memorandum of Conversation, Lahore, August 1, 1969, 2:30–4:30 p.m.

Lahore, August 1, 1969, 2:30–4:30 p.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger explained the Nixon Doctrine and discussed U.S. relations with Pakistan with senior advisers to Pakistani President Yahya. Presidents Nixon and Yahya joined the conversation at the end.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum, but it is similar to the memoranda prepared by Saunders of the conversations in New Delhi on July 31 and August 1. This memorandum was apparently also prepared from the unrefined notes Saunders took during the meeting. The conversation was held in the Governor's House in Lahore during Nixon's visit from August 1–2. According to another record of the meeting between Nixon and Yahya, relations with China were discussed at some length. Nixon said that in any discussion of Asia's future, China could not be ignored. He said that he recognized the need for a dialogue to bring China into the community of nations, but it would take time before the U.S. public accepted that point of view. (Memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, September 2, 1969; ibid., Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I (1970)) According to Kissinger, who was present at that part of the meeting, Nixon also told Yahya that the United States would not be party to any arrangement to isolate China and asked Yahya to convey his feeling to the Chinese at the highest level. (Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 180–181) Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman, who was traveling with the President, recorded in his diary on August 2 that Yahya had made a strong impression on Nixon "as a real leader–very intelligent –and with great insight into Russia-China relations.” He added that Nixon felt that ”Yahya can be valuable channel to China esp.–but also USSR.” (Ibid., Handwritten Journals and Diaries of Harry Robbins Haldeman, H.R. Haldeman Journal, Trips I, February 23, 1969–September 1970)

Document 32: Memorandum of Conversation, Lahore, August 1, 1969

Lahore, August 1, 1969

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger met with Air Marshal Nur Khan to discuss China, Indo-Pak relations, and the question of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1320, NSC Unfiled Material, 1969, 9 of 19. Secret. Drafted on August 7 by Spain. The conversation was held in the Governor's House in Lahore.

Document 33: Memorandum From the Director of the Office of India, Nepal, Ceylon, and Maldives Islands Affairs (Schneider) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Van Hollen), Washington, August 15, 1969

Washington, August 15, 1969

Schneider analyzed a developing political crisis in India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15–1 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer.

Document 34: Telegram 140939 From the Department of State to the White House, Washington, August 20, 1969, 2348Z

Washington, August 20, 1969, 2348Z

The Department assessed Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's victory over her rivals in the Congress Party and concluded that it would improve prospects for political stability in India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 14 INDIA. Confidential. Drafted by Schaffer, cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs Stuart W. Rockwell, and approved by Schneider. Sent with an instruction to pass to San Francisco for Rogers and to San Clemente for Kissinger.

Document 35: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Washington, September 12, 1969

Washington, September 12, 1969

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Eyes Only. [2 pages of source text not declassified.]

Document 36: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Washington, September 15, 1969

Washington, September 15, 1969

Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, 303 Meetings, 1969. Secret; Sensitive. [2 pages of source text not declassified.]

Document 37: Letter From Pakistani President Yahya to President Nixon, Rawalpindi, October 1, 1969

Rawalpindi, October 1, 1969

Yahya requested urgent approval of the sale of 1.7 million tons of wheat under PL–480 to offset a serious food shortage in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. No classification marking. The Consulate General in Dacca underlined the problem of food shortages in East Pakistan on October 10 in telegram 2855 from Dacca. (Ibid., POL 18 PAK )

Document 38: Airgram A–550 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 6, 1969

October 6, 1969

Chargé Spain traced the history and drew the lessons from the experience of the Air Force communications facility at Peshawar.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 21 PAK. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Spain on October 2, and cleared in draft by General Geary and in the political section by Stephen E. Palmer and Alan D. Wolfe. Repeated to New Delhi, Ankara for Handley, Tehran for Minister Thacher, London for Minister Hughes, the Peshawar Air Station for the Commanding Officer, Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, USAFI for Hilbert, CIA for Sheldon, NSA for General CARTER, USAFSS, and DOD/ISA. The 10-year agreement governing the communications facility at Peshawar was not renewed by Pakistan and expired on July 17, 1969. A limited number of U.S. personnel remained after July 17 to effect an orderly turnover of the facility to Pakistan. A brief ceremony effected the turnover on January 7, 1970, rather than on February 28 as anticipated by Spain. (Telegram 001 from Peshawar, January 8, 1970; ibid., DEF 15–10 PAK–US)

Document 39: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 16, 1969

Washington, October 16, 1969

Nixon approved the sale of 1 million tons of wheat to Pakistan under PL–480.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A was an October 10 memorandum from John Hannah to Nixon; attached at Tab B was an October 13 memorandum from Mayo to Nixon; neither is published. The October 1 letter from Yahya to Nixon, attached at Tab C, is printed as Document 37. The President initialed his approval of the recommendation on October 22. On November 13 Nixon sent a letter to Yahya indicating that the United States was prepared to negotiate a PL–480 agreement of 1 million tons of wheat for Pakistan. (Ibid., Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, (1969–1970) )

Document 40: Telegram 175434 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, October 16, 1969, 1713Z

October 16, 1969, 1713Z

Secretary Rogers reviewed Indo-U.S. relations with Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul and warned that Indian recognition of North Vietnam would have a "serious and lasting" negative effect on relations with the United States.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Schneider on October 14, cleared by VAN HOLLEN, Sisco, and James D. Rosenthal (EA/VN), and approved by Rogers. Sent also to Saigon, Rawalpindi, and Paris. The telegram sent to Paris was also numbered Todel 3367. Kaul was in Washington as head of the Indian delegation to the Indo-US Bilateral Talks; see Document 42. The Secretary's meeting at the United Nations with Foreign Minister SINGH on September 29, during which he raised similar objections to the proposed Indian recognition of the North Vietnamese Government, was reported to the Department on October 1 by USUN in telegram 3325. (Ibid,. Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70)

Document 41: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, October 27, 1969

Washington, October 27, 1969

Rogers reported to Nixon that Southeast Asia was the principal focus of bilateral talks held in Washington between U.S. and Indian delegations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, Oct 69–Aug 70. Secret. The bilateral talks were the second round in what were anticipated to be annual talks between the United States and India. The initial talks took place in New Delhi from July 26 to 28, 1968. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, South Asia, vol. XXV, Document 509. A 69-page record of the talks on October 16–17 is in the National Archives, RG 59, Conference Files, 1966–1972: Box 503, Lot 70 D 387, CF 409. The talks were reported to New Delhi in telegrams 177194, 179522, and 180313, dated October 18, October 23, and October 24 respectively. (All ibid., Central Files 1967–69, POL INDIA–US)

Document 42: Analytical Summary Prepared For the National Security Council Review Group, Washington, November 22, 1969

Washington, November 22, 1969

The summary is of a paper prepared in the Department of State in response to NSSM 26 and approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. The paper reviewed U.S. military supply policy toward South Asia and outlined options for consideration by the Review Group.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Secret. This summary is of a paper drafted in the Department of State's Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs in response to NSSM 26 (Document 10), and approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. Sisco, the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group, sent the paper on November 14 to Kissinger, the Chairman of the NSC Review Group. The paper, entitled "U.S. Military Supply for South Asia–Response to NSSM 26,” is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–040, Review Group Meeting, South Asia Military Support Policy, 11/25/69. Saunders sent the analytical summary and the paper to Kissinger on November 19 under a covering memorandum. Kissinger's handwritten note reads: "Hal–The President wants action not study. When are the tanks moving? When will the lawyers decide? Please get me quick answers.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1244, Saunders Subject Files, Pakistan Military and Intelligence, 1/20/69–12/31/69)

Document 43: Minutes of Meeting of the National Security Council Review Group, Washington, November 25, 1969, 3:15–3:55 p.m.

Washington, November 25, 1969, 3:15–3:55 p.m.

Discussion of military supply policy toward South Asia focused on the question of resuming military sales and assistance to Pakistan and the cost to U.S. relations with India of doing so.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, Review Group Meeting, Minutes, Originals, 1969. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For a summary of the paper prepared in response to NSSM 26, see Document 42.

Document 44: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 29, 1969

Washington, November 29, 1969

Nixon approved a recommendation to endorse the sale of 100 U.S.-originated tanks by Turkey to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 623, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. I, 1 Jan 69–30 Nov 69. Secret. Sent for action. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation on December 6.

Document 45: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 21, 1969

Washington, December 21, 1969

Kissinger forwarded Secretary of State Rogers' objections to the sale of tanks by Turkey to Pakistan. Kissinger reiterated his support for the sale.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. The attached memorandum is dated December 18. Nixon did not approve or disapprove the recommendation, but wrote on the memorandum as follows: "K Discuss with me.” On December 23, David Schneider, Country Director for India, sent a letter to Keating about the memorandum that Rogers sent to Nixon. He wrote of Rogers: "We met with him to discuss the proposal and he was quite emphatic in his opposition to it.” He added, however, "the recurrent theme one hears from the NSC staff is that the President ‘wants to do something for Pakistan.'” (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence 1969/1970)

Document 46: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 31, 1970

Washington, January 31, 1970

Kissinger summarized a letter to Nixon from Pakistani President Yahya in which Yahya pressed for a decision on military supply policy. Nixon indicated that he was disposed to respond favorably.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1969–1970). Secret. Sent for information. The attached letter from President Yahya to President Nixon is dated January 19. The December 20 letter to which Yahya responded can be found ibid. The reference to a speech on November 3, 1969, is to Nixon's address to the nation on the war in Vietnam. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909. Nixon underlined the last seven words of point 5 and added the following handwritten instructions in the margin: "1 Let's give them spare parts immediately as basis of keeping the US word. 2 I lean to the Turkish tanks unless it raises too much hell with Congress. I don't care about Indian reaction.” He also wrote on the memorandum: "K–doesn't this show advantage of our letter idea? Let's continue the practice on a selective basis.”

Document 47: Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Richardson to President Nixon, Washington, February 10, 1970

Washington, February 10, 1970

Richardson recommended that the U.S. maintain the embargo on military supplies to South Asia. If, however, Nixon felt he was under an obligation to Pakistani President Yahya, Richardson recommended that military supplies for Pakistan be limited to a one-time exception.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret. Drafted by VAN HOLLEN on February 6, and cleared by Sisco. A typewritten notation on the source text reads: “OBE. See S/S 8019. RLBrown 6/10/70.” For a citation to the paper entitled, "U.S. Military Supply Policy for South Asia,” see Document 42. The enclosures to the memorandum are not printed. In the order in which they are cited, the enclosures are an undated memorandum entitled, "Recent Developments Affecting South Asia Military Supply Policy Issue,” another undated memorandum entitled, "Possible Gestures Toward Pakistan,” and the December 18 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon, printed as an attachment to Document 45.

Document 48: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 20, 1970

Washington, February 20, 1970

Saunders summarized the contending arguments advanced with regard to military supply policy for South Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret. Sent for information. The attached cable is telegram 1333 from Rawalpindi, February 18. (Ibid.) It can also be found ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Ambassador Keating sent a telegram from New Delhi on February 20 making the anticipated arguments against revising the existing arms policy for the subcontinent. (Telegram 1961 from New Delhi; ibid.) Kissinger's handwritten notation on the memorandum reads: "We must move this.” He added: "Let me see my memo.” The memorandum is marked in an unknown hand to indicate that Saunders had the action responsibility to respond to Kissinger's instructions. The memorandum to which Kissinger referred was sent to the President on March 16 and is printed as Document 54.

Document 49: Telegram 29569 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, February 27, 1970, 2153Z

February 27, 1970, 2153Z

The Embassy was instructed to deliver a message from Secretary Rogers to Foreign Minister SINGH concerning India's decision to close five USIS cultural centers. Rogers expressed regret over the decision and asked for evidence to support the allegation that the centers had been engaged in "political and other undesirable activities.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Schneider; cleared by VAN HOLLEN, Sisco, Richardson, and in USIA by Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia David Nalle; and approved by Rogers. The decision by India on February 10 to close five USIS cultural centers was triggered by a Soviet request on December 3, 1969, to open a cultural center in Trivandrum. The Soviet request led to a review of all foreign cultural centers operating in India and a decision to close the U.S. centers in Ahmedabad, Nagpur, Chandigarh, Ranchi, and Varauasi. These were the only such centers operating in cities without diplomatic or consular representation, and they operated on the basis of an understanding reached by former Ambassador Chester Bowles and Prime Minister NEHRU. The Soviet Union sought to establish a cultural center in Trivandrum on the same basis.

Document 50: Telegram 2388 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, March 3, 1970, 1532Z

March 3, 1970, 1532Z

Ambassador Keating reported on a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi on the "not so pleasant" issue of the impending closure of the U.S. cultural centers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to the consulates in Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.

Document 51: Letter From the Indian Chargé d' Affaires (Rasgotra) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 5, 1970

Washington, March 5, 1970

Rasgotra transmitted a letter from Foreign Minister SINGH to Rogers. SINGH explained that the Indian decision to close the U.S. cultural centers was part of an effort to establish a uniform policy with regard to such centers and was not directed against the United States. No suggestion of improper activities on the part of the U.S. was intended.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 73 D 377, India 1970, US Cultural Centers. No classification marking. The text of the letter was also conveyed to the Department from New Delhi on March 5 in telegram 2505. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70)

Document 52: Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant (Haig) and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 7, 1970

Washington, March 7, 1970

Saunders and Haig sent a memorandum to Kissinger, conveying Nixon's reaction to the closure of the cultural centers: "Tell Sisco I'd like to take a stronger line on this. Not to object to closing-but to accept it and close some other facilities which may ‘irritate' them a bit.” Saunders and Haig surveyed the possibilities.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. Haig and Saunders sent the memorandum through DAVID YOUNG of the NSC staff for Kissinger. Attached is a copy of the page of the briefing memorandum with the President's comments.

Document 53: Telegram 34382 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, March 9, 1970, 2152Z

March 9, 1970, 2152Z

Secretary Rogers instructed Ambassador Keating to see Indian Foreign Minister SINGH to ask him to issue a public statement absolving the U.S. of any "political or other undesirable activities" in the cultural centers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by VAN HOLLEN; revised in S by Herbert S. Okun and Rogers; cleared by Sisco, and Alan Carter, Assistant Director for Near East and South Asia (USIA); and approved by Rogers.

Document 54: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 16, 1970

Washington, March 16, 1970

Kissinger's memorandum laid out the options for the question of military supply for India and Pakistan, which in practice related largely to Pakistan. Nixon indicated that he favored continuing the policy of selling replacement parts to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached at Tab A but not published was a January 7 paper, apparently prepared by the NSC staff, entitled, "Issues For Decision.” Attached at Tab B but not published was Secretary Rogers' February 10 memorandum to the President. Both are ibid. Rather than approving or disapproving the recommendation put forward in the memorandum, Nixon responded with handwritten comments in the margins. The thrust of his comments was that he preferred the course of action outlined as option 4. He highlighted the second paragraph of the discussion of option 4 and wrote "OK" next to it. He underscored the first sentence of the following paragraph and wrote next to it, "I agree we do this by all means.” He began his comments under the approval line as follows: "I believe option 4 is less provocative politically in the U.S.–& for that matter in India.” He considered that option 4 plus an increased economic package constituted a substantial gesture in support of Pakistan that he could more easily support politically than the other options detailed in the memorandum. In a handwritten comment in the margin, Kissinger concurred with the President's response: "I think option 4 gives Paks most.” He added an instruction to Haig: "Al–Get note from Hal [Saunders] what it means.” He was apparently referring to a more complete discussion of the implications of adopting option 4 as policy.

Document 55: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 27, 1970

Washington, March 27, 1970

Nixon approved a recommendation that the U.S. accept the closure of the cultural centers by India without complaint, while reserving the possibility of a further response.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. An attached draft of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Saunders and revised by Kissinger. The President initialed the approval line on April 2. Not published is the attached March 17 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon.

Document 56: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Nixon approved a recommended $102.5 million program of economic assistance for Pakistan for fiscal year 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum is undated, but the President's approval of the recommendation is dated April 6. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. Attached at Tab A but not published is Rogers' March 12 memorandum to Nixon on the economic assistance program. Mayo summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in a March 24 memorandum to the President; attached at Tab B but not published. Both are ibid.

Document 57: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, April 13, 1970

Washington, April 13, 1970

Kissinger asked Nixon to clarify his decision on South Asian arms policy. Nixon reaffirmed the sale of spare parts for previously supplied equipment and approved a revision of the embargo on the sale of lethal equipment to allow a "one-time exception" for Pakistan for a limited number of items.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. For the previous memorandum dealing with the supply of arms to South Asia to which Kissinger refers, see Document 54. Nixon checked the first option to indicate his approval of a one-time sale to Pakistan. He added the following handwritten instruction: "Hold until we see whether the Indians will be in a control commission.” Nixon's instruction raised questions as to which control commission he meant, and what he hoped to achieve with regard to India's participation in a control commission by delaying a decision on arms supply to South Asia. Saunders posed these questions in a memorandum he sent to Haig on April 27. Saunders assumed the President was referring to one of the control commissions in Southeast Asia. Haig did not answer the questions but responded with a handwritten note on the memorandum that reads as follows: "Hal–Pres is inclined to move but wants to wait at least until next week.” (Ibid.)

Document 58: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 15, 1970

Washington, May 15, 1970

Eliot reported that the five cultural centers at issue in India would be closed on May 16.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. The May 6 memorandum cited by Eliot is ibid.

Document 59: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Nixon approved a recommended program of $193 million in economic assistance for India for fiscal year 1970.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum itself is undated, but the President's approval of the recommendation is dated May 19. Kissinger initialed the approval line for the President. The Rogers to Nixon memorandum, attached at Tab A but not published, is dated March 20. James R. Schlesinger, Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, summarized the recommendations of the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, and the Bureau of the Budget in an April 30 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Both are ibid.

Document 60: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 21, 1970, 2:30–3 p.m.

Washington, May 21, 1970, 2:30–3 p.m.

Ambassador Farland warned Secretary of Defense Laird that Pakistan was disappointed with the U.S. and was turning increasingly to China and the Soviet Union for military supplies.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 22, Pakistan 1970, 000.1–100. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz and approved by Nutter on May 26. The conversation was held in Laird's office.

Document 61: Letter From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, Nepal, and the Maldives Islands (Schneider) to the Chargé d' Affaires in India (Stone), Washington, May 26, 1970

Washington, May 26, 1970

Schneider informed Stone of the decision made by Nixon to provide military assistance to Pakistan.

Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970. Secret; Eyes Only; Official-Informal. Published from an unsigned copy.

Document 62: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, May 27, 1970, 3:30–4 p.m.

Washington, May 27, 1970, 3:30–4 p.m.

Ambassador Keating warned Secretary of Defense Laird that a decision to provide military assistance to Pakistan would have a "devastating" effect on U.S. relations with India.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 73 A 1975, Box 19, India 1970, 000.1–334. Secret. Drafted by Kravitz, and approved on June 1 by Nutter and on June 5 in Laird's office. The conversation was held in Laird's office.

Document 63: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 11, 1970

Washington, June 11, 1970

Nixon confirmed his decision to make a one-time exception for Pakistan to the arms embargo for South Asia, and he specified the inclusion of tanks and B–57 bombers.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret. Sent for action. Attached but not published at Tab A was the June 4 Rogers memorandum. It can be found ibid. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation, and with check marks on the two succeeding option lines indicated his intention to add tanks and B–57 bombers to the package of armaments recommended by Rogers.

Document 64: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, June 12, 1970, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, June 12, 1970, 11:30 a.m.

Kissinger and Sisco discussed the President's decision to include tanks and B–57 bombers in the one-time exception package for Pakistan. Sisco warned that to do so would increase opposition in the Congress and cause a greater reaction in India.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 65: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, June 12, 1970, 4:40 p.m.

Washington, June 12, 1970, 4:40 p.m.

Sisco and Kissinger discussed the contemplated one-time exception again, and Sisco revised the proposal to eliminate the tanks and change the 6 bombers to 12 interceptor fighters.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 363, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript.

Document 66: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, June 17, 1970, 7:30 p.m.

Washington, June 17, 1970, 7:30 p.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger informed Pakistani Ambassador Hilaly of President Nixon's decision to make a one-time exception to the embargo on arms supplies for South Asia on Pakistan's behalf.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1026, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon–Ambassador Hilaly, 6/17/70. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

Document 67: Telegram 96236 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, June 18, 1970, 2220Z

June 18, 1970, 2220Z

The Department instructed Ambassador Farland to inform Pakistani President Yahya about President Nixon's decision on arms supplies for Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by VAN HOLLEN on June 17; cleared by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Affairs Robert J. Pranger (DOD/ISA), Director of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales Christian Chapman (PM/MAS), William F. Spengler (NEA/PAF), Sisco, David Abshire (H), and Saunders; and approved by Rogers. Saunders sent a draft of the telegram to Kissinger on June 18 under a covering memorandum. A handwritten notation by Saunders on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger revised and cleared the telegram. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70) Telegram 96481 to Rawalpindi, June 18, cited at the conclusion of the telegram, provided Farland with the rationale underlying the policy decision. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)

Document 68: Telegram 5012 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, June 21, 1970, 1353Z

June 21, 1970, 1353Z

Ambassador Farland reported that Pakistani President Yahya was "deeply pleased and appreciative of President's action.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. II, 1 Dec 69–Sept 70. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

Document 69: Telegram 8424 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, July 16, 1970, 1615Z

July 16, 1970, 1615Z

Ambassador Keating reported on a conversation with SWARAN SINGH, the new Minister of External Affairs, in which SINGH said that a U.S. decision to resume military supplies to Pakistan would "greatly impair" his efforts to improve relations between India and the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 ASIA SE. Secret; Exdis.

Document 70: Letter From President Nixon to the Ambassador to India (Keating), Washington, July 17, 1970

Washington, July 17, 1970

Nixon wrote to Keating to explain the rationale behind his decision to provide "at least one package of equipment" to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR–Firyubin–Keating, Jul 70. Secret; Eyes Only.

Document 71: Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to India (Keating), Washington, July 19, 1970, 2:18 p.m.

Washington, July 19, 1970, 2:18 p.m.

Kissinger confirmed the information concerning arms for Pakistan that was sent to Keating in a letter from President Nixon on July 17. He added that India's pending decision on recognition of North Vietnam would "be considered in assessing the timing on Pakistan arms package.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 725, Country Files, Europe, USSR–Firyubin–Keating, Jul 70. Top Secret; Sensitive. Initialed by Haig for Kissinger. The message is undated, but an attached note indicates that it was sent on the date and at the time given. Telegram 112500 to New Delhi is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK.

Document 72: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 22, 1970

Washington, July 22, 1970

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Ambassador Jha discussed prospects for improving relations between the U.S. and India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. II, 10/69–8/70. Secret. A copy was sent to DAVID YOUNG. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office. The time of meeting is not indicated on the memorandum.

Document 73: Telegram 122180 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, July 29, 1970, 2210Z

July 29, 1970, 2210Z

The Department transmitted the text of a letter from Indian Foreign Minister SINGH to Secretary of State Rogers in which SINGH expressed his interest in improving Indo-U.S. relations but warned that a U.S. decision to resume arms sales to Pakistan would have "serious repercussions.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDIA. Limited Official Use; Limdis. Drafted on July 28 by R. Grant Smith (NEA/INC), cleared by M. Gordon Tiger (NEA/INC) and by Craig Baxter (NEA/PAF), and approved by VAN HOLLEN. Repeated to Rawalpindi.

Document 74: Telegram 1569 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, August 17, 1970, 0624Z

August 17, 1970, 0624Z

Ambassador Farland reported from Dacca on severe flooding in East Pakistan that had led Pakistani President YAHYA to postpone national elections from October to December.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The telegram, signed by Consul General Blood, was sent by Farland. Nixon followed Farland's advice. On August 18 Farland was authorized to deliver a letter from Nixon to YAHYA that was virtually identical to the letter proposed by Farland. (Telegram 134524 to Rawalpindi; ibid.)

Document 75: Telegram 7184 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, September 10, 1970, 1125Z

September 10, 1970, 1125Z

President Yahya told Chargé Sober that his decision to postpone national elections until December should not be taken to mean that he was wavering in his determination to restore civilian government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–PAK. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Dacca, Karachi, and Lahore.

Document 76: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, September 24, 1970

Washington, September 24, 1970

Ambassador Farland summarized his conversation with President Nixon during which he reported on Pakistani President Yahya's enthusiastic reaction to Nixon's offer of a one-time exception to the embargo on military sales to Pakistan.

Source: Department of State, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 78 D 98, Military Supply–Pak Requests. Secret; Nodis. Prepared by Farland. For the message delivered by Farland to Yahya on June 20, see Document 67

Document 77: Telegram 160165 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, September 29, 1970, 1809Z

September 29, 1970, 1809Z

The Embassy was instructed to inform the Indian Government that the U.S. intended to make a limited sale of arms to Pakistan as a one-time exception to the arms supply policy established in 1965.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton and Schneider on September 28; revised and cleared by VAN HOLLEN; cleared by Spengler, Chapman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice (H), Saunders, Colonel Gross (OSD/ISA), and Rear Admiral St. GEORGE (DOD/Joint Staff); and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Repeated to Rawalpindi. The Embassy in Rawalpindi was instructed on September 29 to inform Pakistan about the details of the decision to offer a one-time exception to the existing restrictions on military supply. (Telegram 160449 to Rawalpindi; ibid.)

Document 78: Telegram 12174 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, September 30, 1970, 1537Z

September 30, 1970, 1537Z

Ambassador Keating conveyed the decision to allow limited arms sales to Pakistan in a conversation with Acting Foreign Secretary S. K. BANERJI. BANERJI described the issue as "extremely explosive" and expressed regret at the decision.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Under Secretary Johnson called in Ambassador Jha on September 30 and informed him about the decision to offer limited arms sales to Pakistan. Jha protested the decision and anticipated that it would produce a "great deal of unhappiness" in India. (Telegram 161070 to New Delhi, September 30; ibid.)

Document 79: Telegram 7754 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 1, 1970, 1005Z

October 1, 1970, 1005Z

Deputy Chief of Mission Sidney Sober reported on his meeting with Foreign Secretary Alvie and Defense Secretary AHMED to discuss the U.S. offer to sell military equipment to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. The reference to Conte–Long provisions in the telegram is a reference to the Conte–Long amendment to the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment, adopted as section 119 of the appropriations act on January 2, 1968, directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL–90–249; 81 Stat. 936)

Document 80: Telegram 7805 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 5, 1970, 1110Z

October 5, 1970, 1110Z

Pakistani President Yahya indicated that Pakistan would have difficulty financing the military sales being authorized and asked for alternative purchase plans.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

Document 81: Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers, October 9, 1970

October 9, 1970

Sisco summarized the Indian and Pakistani reactions to the decision to authorize limited arms sales to Pakistan.

Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, DTS–Chrons, Oct–Dec 1970. Secret. Drafted by Schneider and cleared by Spengler and VAN HOLLEN.

Document 82: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Nixon approved a $72 million proposed program of PL–480 commodities for Pakistan for fiscal year 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. No classification marking. The memorandum is undated. Transmitted under an October 9 covering memorandum from C. Fred Bergsten of the NSC staff to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger initialed the approval line of the memorandum for Nixon. Attached at Tab A but not published is a September 3 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Johnson to the President, in which he recommended the proposed PL–480 program on behalf of the Departments of State, Agriculture, and the Treasury. Caspar Weinberger, Acting Director of the Office of Management and Budget, concurred with Johnson's recommendation in a September 26 memorandum to the President, attached at Tab B but not published. Also attached was an October 20 memorandum from NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis to Eliot informing the Department of State of the President's decision and instructing the Department not to inform Pakistan until after Nixon had met with Yahya in Washington on October 25.

Document 83: Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya, Washington, October 15, 1970

Washington, October 15, 1970

Nixon's letter conveyed to Yahya the terms of the offer of an arms sale to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, 1969–1970. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to Rawalpindi on October 16 to be conveyed to Yahya prior to his trip to New York for the fall session of the UN General Assembly. (Telegram 170588 to Rawalpindi; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)

Document 84: Telegram 8141 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 16, 1970, 1129Z

October 16, 1970, 1129Z

The initial status report from the Embassy indicated that the "major problem" affecting the U.S. offer to sell arms to Pakistan was the question of whether Pakistan could afford to finance the package of arms being offered.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis.

Document 85: National Intelligence Estimate 31/32–70, Washington, October 20, 1970

Washington, October 20, 1970

NIE 31/32–70 provided a summary of long-term political and economic prospects for India and Pakistan.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R 01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. Submitted by Deputy Director of Central Intelligence R. E. Cushman, Jr. According to a note on the cover sheet, "The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 20, except for the Assistant to the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside of his jurisdiction.”

Document 86: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Nixon approved a recommended $100 million AID program loan to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. An October 22 covering memorandum from Bergsten transmitted the memorandum and attachments to Kissinger for submission to the President. Kissinger wrote on Bergsten's memorandum that the proposed program loan to Pakistan was "approved on basis of oral instruction by President.” Accordingly, Kissinger initialed the approval line for Nixon on October 28. Attached but not published at Tab A was an undated memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Irwin to Nixon recommending authorization for a $100 million program loan to Pakistan. Attached but not published at Tab B was an undated memorandum from Shultz to Nixon, in which Shultz concurred with Irwin's recommendation.

Document 87: Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, New York, October 22, 1970, 2046Z

New York, October 22, 1970, 2046Z

Secretary of State Rogers and Pakistani President Yahya met in New York during the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly. Yahya anticipated that it would take 6 months following the establishment of a constituent assembly based on the general election scheduled for December before a constitution could be drafted and martial law replaced with civilian government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Also designated USUN 2646. Sent with a request to repeat to Rawalpindi, Cairo, and Amman.

Document 88: Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, New York, October 24, 1970, 1900Z

New York, October 24, 1970, 1900Z

Secretary of State Rogers and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi had a sharp exchange in New York growing out of the Indian reaction to the U.S. decision to supply additional arms to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Also designated USUN 2711. Sent with a request to repeat to New Delhi and Rawalpindi. In an October 26 letter to Keating, Schneider described the conversation between Gandhi and Rogers as "a very difficult one,” but he felt that the exchange was colored by the fact that both were tired at the end of a stressful day of meetings and speeches. (Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 51, Eyes Only Correspondence, 1969/1970) Gandhi set the tone for the meeting by declining an invitation from Nixon to attend a dinner the President was hosting in Washington for heads of state attending the General Assembly. (Telegrams 173630 and 176269 to New Delhi, October 21 and 27; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDIA, and ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 596, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 Jun 71) Jha explained that Gandhi's decision related to scheduling commitments on her return trip to India, but Keating saw it as a "studied affront related in large part to our decision to sell arms to Pakistan.” (Telegram 12939 from New Delhi, October 19; ibid., RG 59, Conference Files, Box 519, 1966–1972: Lot 71 D 227, CF 469)

Document 89: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 24, 1970, 6:20 p.m.

Washington, October 24, 1970, 6:20 p.m.

Rogers summarized his conversations with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and Indian Foreign Minister SINGH for Kissinger.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The omissions are as transcribed. For Rogers' conversation with SINGH on the morning of October 24, see Document 92.

Document 90: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 25, 1970, 10:49–11:45 a.m.

Washington, October 25, 1970, 10:49–11:45 a.m.

Presidents Nixon and Yahya discussed relations between the United States and Pakistan and the possibility of Pakistan facilitating secret contacts between the U.S. and China.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 63, Presidential File, Memoranda of Conversation, 1970. Top Secret; Sensitive. The conversation was held in the Oval Office of the White House. A copy of this memorandum of conversation, edited in the NSC for distribution to the Department of State, indicates that Kissinger was present and took the notes on which the memorandum was based. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

Document 91: Telegram 13362 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, October 26, 1970, 1528Z

October 26, 1970, 1528Z

The Embassy reported on the growing public alarm in India over the prospect of increased shipments of U.S. arms to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Confidential. Repeated to London, Rawalpindi, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, CINCSTRIKE, and CINCMEAFSA.

Document 92: Telegram 176436 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India and the Mission to the United Nations, October 27, 1970, 1357Z

October 27, 1970, 1357Z

In the wake of his conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, Secretary of State Rogers had a conversation with Indian Foreign Minister SINGH in which the irritants affecting relations between the U.S. and India were aired at greater length. Both agreed to try to approach future problems with a clean slate.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on October 26 by Sisco and approved by Eliot. Sent to New Delhi eyes only for Keating and to USUN eyes only for Ambassador Charles W. Yost.

Document 93: Telegram 8690 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, November 8, 1970, 0535Z

November 8, 1970, 0535Z

In a conversation with Ambassador Farland, Pakistani President Yahya refined the list of weapons he asked to have included among those the U.S. was prepared to supply as part of the package President Nixon had authorized.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Sent with a request to pass to the White House and Secretary of Defense.

Document 94: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 9, 1970, 2:40–3:20 p.m.

Washington, November 9, 1970, 2:40–3:20 p.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed what could be done to foster improved relations between the United States and India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 546, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. III, Sept 70–30 June 71. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. The conversation was held in Kissinger's office in the White House.

Document 95: Telegram 187199 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, November 15, 1970, 2208Z

November 15, 1970, 2208Z

The telegram transmitted a message from President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya expressing Nixon's concern over the loss of life and property in East Pakistan as a result of a cyclone. Nixon offered U.S. assistance in responding to the disaster.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Also repeated to the Consulate at Dacca. Drafted by Alexander Fuller and Spengler; cleared by Davies, John F. King, Deputy Director of the Office of Press Relations, David J. Waters, Assistant Chief of Protocol for Public Affairs, Saunders at the White House, and in AID by Curtis Farrar (AID/NESA), and Stephen R. Tripp (AID/PRI/DRD); and approved by Sisco. A major cyclone followed by a tidal wave struck East Pakistan on November 12. (Telegram 2116 from Dacca, November 16; ibid.) By November 25, 168,000 deaths had been recorded, and over 500,000 deaths were anticipated. (Intelligence note prepared in INR, November 25; ibid.)

Document 96: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Kissinger outlined the initial steps taken and those under consideration to respond to the disaster in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 334, Subject Files, Items to Discuss with the President, 9 Sept 70–Dec 70. Confidential. Sent for action. A copy of this memorandum in another file indicates that Saunders drafted it on November 16. (Ibid., Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71) Kissinger told Nixon in a telephone conversation on the evening of November 16 that he would give him the proposal for relief assistance to Pakistan "the first thing in the morning.” Nixon responded: "I don't need to see it but I want them to know we care and we care fast.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Document 97: Telegram 14451 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, November 18, 1970, 1147Z

November 18, 1970, 1147Z

Ambassador Keating questioned Indian Foreign Minister SINGH about Indian allegations of U.S. interference in Indian politics.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Nodis.

Document 98: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 19, 1970

Washington, November 19, 1970

Kissinger updated Nixon on the U.S. response to the disaster in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Document 99: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 20, 1970

Washington, November 20, 1970

Kissinger summarized a "delicate" issue relating to U.S. efforts to respond to the disaster in East Pakistan. If the U.S acted on the Embassy's assessment of the needs of the situation, it could contribute to the impression that the Government of Pakistan was not managing the situation effectively.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Confidential. Sent for information. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Document 100: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President's Assistant (Haldeman), Washington, November 20, 1970

Washington, November 20, 1970

Haldeman argued for immediate U.S. assistance to the victims in East Pakistan. He was not concerned about the political sensitivities of Pakistani President Yahya's government: "We have to look humanitarian.”

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 365, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. A notation on the transcript indicates that the conversation took place in the early afternoon. The omissions are in the original transcription. A transcript of Kissinger's conversation with Ambassador Hilaly earlier in the day is ibid.

Document 101: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, November 27, 1970

Washington, November 27, 1970

Kissinger provided a further update of the humanitarian crisis in East Pakistan that, he noted, was being described as "the greatest natural disaster in terms of destruction and danger to life of the century and perhaps of recorded history.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Document 102: Telegram 2417 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, November 30, 1970, 1210Z

November 30, 1970, 1210Z

Ambassador Farland reported from Dacca that relief efforts were proving to be effective in East Pakistan. He added that his information indicated that "few if any of the casualties died as a result of slowness of GOP expeditiously to move relief supplies to disaster victims.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated immediate to Islamabad.

Document 103: Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Acting Secretary of State Irwin, Washington, December 3, 1970

Washington, December 3, 1970

Sisco informed Irwin that the Indian Government had apparently decided to damp down its criticism of the U.S. decision to supply additional arms to Pakistan. He added that the Indians seemed inclined to try to repair the damage done to relations between the United States and India in recent months.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/INS Files: Lot 74 D 17, India 1970, DEF 19, October Decision. Confidential. Drafted by Quainton and cleared by Schneider and VAN HOLLEN. Attached but not published was telegram 14902 from New Delhi, November 27.

Document 104: Intelligence Brief INRB–217 From the Director of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, December 8, 1970

Washington, December 8, 1970

Cline summarized the election results in Pakistan and pointed to potential problems growing out of the election.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 PAK. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the intelligence brief.

Document 105: National Security Study Memorandum 109, Washington, December 19, 1970

Washington, December 19, 1970

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger tasked the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, and AID to prepare a study of U.S. policy options in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret. Copies were sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

Document 106: Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 24, 1970

Washington, December 24, 1970

Saunders and Hoskinson summarized discussions with Pakistan and India over the issue of arms supply to South Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 641, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. I, 1970. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders. Sent for information. Published from an uninitialed copy.

Document 107: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 4, 1971

Washington, January 4, 1971

Nixon approved the provision of an additional 150,000 tons of food grains to East Pakistan for disaster relief.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret. Sent for action. Haig signed for Kissinger. A notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation. Attached but not published at Tab A was a memorandum from Williams to Nixon sent through Kissinger for the President on December 23 under a covering memorandum from Eliot. Attached but not published at Tab B was the proposed press release. Not attached at Tab C was the draft letter. The Pakistan Relief Committee was established on November 26 and chaired by former Ambassador Robert Murphy.

Document 108: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, January 14, 1971

Washington, January 14, 1971

Rogers argued against extending credit to Pakistan for the purchase of arms.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis.

Document 109: Telegram 944 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 1, 1971, 1235Z

February 1, 1971, 1235Z

Pakistani President Yahya addressed the developing movement for independence in East Pakistan and said that he did not intend to preside over the dissolution of Pakistan. Ambassador Farland assured him that it was U.S. policy to respect the unity and integrity of Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Secret; Exdis; Eyes Only for Assistant Secretary Sisco. In telegram 930 from Islamabad, February 1, Farland reported that he had met with President Yahya on January 29 in Yahya's home to "talk about things in general.” (Ibid., POL 15–1 PAK)

Document 110: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, February 2, 1971

Washington, February 2, 1971

Rogers suggested that Nixon approve the aid program for India proposed for FY 1971 without waiting for the results of the NSSM exercise that was examining U.S. policy options in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret. Drafted on January 26 by Quainton and revised on January 29 in S/S by James L. Carlson. The attached February 2, confidential memorandum from Rogers to Nixon was also dated February 2 and was classified confidential. There is no indication that Nixon approved or disapproved the options on the attached memorandum.

Document 111: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, February 3, 1971

Washington, February 3, 1971

Kissinger informed Rogers that President Nixon had approved the recommendation that the one-time exception military arms sale to Pakistan be conducted on a cash basis. He also instructed that Pakistan's credit requirements for non-lethal arms sales be sympathetically considered.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Farland was informed of the President's decisions on February 5 and instructed to convey them to President Yahya. (Telegram 20428 to Islamabad; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK)

Document 112: Telegram 21111 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, Washington, February 8, 1971, 1742Z

Washington, February 8, 1971, 1742Z

The telegram conveyed a letter from Secretary of State Rogers to Indian Foreign Minister SINGH in which Rogers took exception to an allegation by SINGH that the United States was interfering in election campaigns taking place in India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 14 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton on January 26; cleared by Schneider, VAN HOLLEN, Sisco, Deputy Assistant Secretary Colgate Prentice, and Coerr; and approved by Rogers. Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky visited New Delhi January 7–18.

Document 113: Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Hilaly) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, February 8, 1971

Washington, February 8, 1971

Pakistani President Yahya requested the U.S. to use its good offices to mediate in a mounting dispute with India over an Indian airliner hijacked in Kashmir.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. No classification marking. The two men who hijacked the plane were members of the National Liberation Front for Jammu and Kashmir. They threatened to blow up the plane unless India released 30 political prisoners held in Kashmir. (Telegram 130 from Lahore, February 1; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) India subsequently demanded that Pakistan pay compensation for the loss of the plane, extradite the hijackers to India, and accept responsibility for the incident. (Aide-mémoire delivered to the Department of State by the Pakistani Embassy, February 12; ibid., POL INDIA–PAK) On February 24 the Embassy in New Delhi reported troop movements on both sides of the border between India and West Pakistan growing out of the hijacking incident. (Telegram 2759 from New Delhi; ibid., AV 12 INDIA) Additional documentation on the incident is ibid.

Document 114: Telegram 1291 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 12, 1971, 0755Z

February 12, 1971, 0755Z

Ambassador Farland argued strongly that unless Pakistan was afforded credit terms to help finance the weapons offered under the one-time excerption, the undertaking would prove to be "an exercise in futility.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis.

Document 115: National Security Study Memorandum 118, Washington, February 16, 1971

Washington, February 16, 1971

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, on behalf of the President, instructed the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA to prepare a contingency study examining the options open to the U.S. in the event of a movement toward secession in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda, Nos. 104–206. Secret; Exdis. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 116: Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Yahya, Washington, February 17, 1971

Washington, February 17, 1971

Nixon responded to Yahya's request for U.S. mediation in Pakistan's dispute with India over a hijacking incident. He noted that the U.S. Government had discussed the incident with the Indian and Pakistani Governments but suggested that a multilateral approach to mediation through the International Civil Aviation Organization might prove more fruitful.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1971). No classification marking. On February 23 Yahya wrote to Nixonagain and, citing the effects of the prohibition of overflights of Indian territory on contacts between the two wings of Pakistan, reiterated his request that Nixon take a personal interest in the dispute. (Ibid.)

Document 117: Telegram 29201 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, Washington, February 20, 1971, 2101Z

Washington, February 20, 1971, 2101Z

The Department reiterated the reasoning behind the decision that all arms sales to Pakistan be made on a cash basis.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on February 19 by Spengler; cleared by VAN HOLLEN, Schneider, and Senior Regional Adviser James H. Boughton (NEA/RA), PM/MAS, and DOD/ISA; and approved by Sisco.

Document 118: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 22, 1971

Washington, February 22, 1971

Kissinger assessed the political tensions in Pakistan that were raising questions about the continued viability of the state, and which were compelling the U.S. to "walk a very narrow tightrope.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 624, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. III, 1 Oct 70–28 Feb 71. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon underlined the last sentence of the sixth paragraph from "Counsel General" to the end and added the following handwritten comment in the margin: "Good.” In the following paragraph, he underlined the part of the third sentence that reads: "more neutral stance toward Rahman, who is basically friendly toward the United States" and wrote in the margin: "not yet–correct–but not any position which encourages secession.”

Document 119: Telegram 1660 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 25, 1971, 1200Z

February 25, 1971, 1200Z

Ambassador Farland reported on Pakistani President Yahya's concern and pessimism over the political crisis developing in the country. Farland repeated that the U.S. felt it was important to maintain the unity of Pakistan, and Yahya encouraged Farland to go to Dacca and make the same point to Awami leader Mujibur Rahman.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated priority to the Consulate at Dacca.

Document 120: Telegram 1664 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 25, 1971, 1226Z

February 25, 1971, 1226Z

Ambassador Farland explained to Pakistani President Yahya that the one-time-exception arms package could not be financed on a credit basis, and he reported that Yahya was "saddened and depressed.” Yahya noted that his Government was without the necessary funds to take full advantage of the offer, but he said that he would find the money to buy the armored personnel carriers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

Document 121: Telegram 540 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, February 28, 1971, 0824Z

February 28, 1971, 0824Z

Ambassador Farland reported on his meeting with Awami leader Mujibur Rahman in Dacca. Mujib expressed his personal friendship for the U.S. as well as that of the "people of Bangla Desh.” Farland found that Mujib favored a form of confederation rather than the separation of East Pakistan, but he insisted that "his people" be accorded their rights and not be kept in a "colonial status.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore.

Document 122: Editorial Note

Document 123: Memorandum From the Staff Secretary of the National Security Council (Davis) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard), Washington, March 3, 1971

Washington, March 3, 1971

Davis circulated to members of the Senior Review Group the response to NSSM 118, a contingency study that examined the policy options available to the United States in the event of a move by East Pakistan to secede.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–053, SRG Meeting, Pakistan, 3/6/71. Secret; Exdis. Keith Guthrie signed for Davis. Also sent to Irwin, JCS Chairman Moorer, and CIA Director Helms. A copy of the contingency study in the Department of State files indicates that it was prepared by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia and forwarded to Kissinger on March 2 by Sisco, who was serving as chairman of the group. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US) The Senior Review Group meeting scheduled for March 3 was held on March 6.

Document 124: Telegram 697 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, March 10, 1971, 1205Z

March 10, 1971, 1205Z

Awami leader Mujibur Rahman sent a message to the Consulate General to ask if the U.S. would be willing to indicate to Pakistani President Yahya its preference for a political solution to the crisis.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, and priority Bangkok for Farland.

Document 125: Telegram 959 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, March 28, 1971, 0540Z

March 28, 1971, 0540Z

The Consulate General in Dacca began its report on the crisis on March 28 as follows: "Here in Dacca we are mute and horrified witnesses to a reign of terror by the PAK military.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated priority to London, Bangkok, New Delhi, Karachi, Lahore, Calcutta, CINCSTRIKE, CINCPAC, and MAC.

Document 126: Telegram 978 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, March 29, 1971, 1130Z

March 29, 1971, 1130Z

The Consulate General reported on the continuing "crackdown" in Dacca by Pakistani army units, which seemed targeted in particular upon Hindus.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated priority to Bangkok, New Delhi, London, Karachi, Lahore, Calcutta, CINCPAC, CINCSTRIKE, and MAC.

Document 127: Telegram 986 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, March 30, 1971, 0905Z

March 30, 1971, 0905Z

The Consulate General's report on the crisis on March 30 described the killing of students and faculty at Dacca University.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated priority to Bangkok, London, New Delhi, Calcutta, Karachi, Lahore, CINCPAC, CINCSTRIKE, and MAC.

Document 128: Telegram 2954 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, March 31, 1971, 1245Z

March 31, 1971, 1245Z

The Embassy analyzed the crisis in East Pakistan for historical perspective and concluded: "deplorable as current events in East Pakistan may be, it is undesirable that they be raised to level of contentious international political issue.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, London, and New Delhi.

Document 129: Telegram 58039 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca, Washington, April 7, 1971, 0014Z

Washington, April 7, 1971, 0014Z

This telegram, drafted by Assistant Secretary of State Sisco and cleared by the senior leadership of the Department of State, USIA, and AID, responded to the charge made by the staff of the Consulate General that the U.S. had failed to condemn what it viewed as atrocities in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on April 6 by Sisco; cleared by Irwin, U. Alexis Johnson, Eliot, Macomber, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Press Relations Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Director Henry Loomis (USIA), and Maurice Williams (AID); and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Islamabad, Karachi, and Lahore.

Document 130: Telegram 1249 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, April 10, 1971, 1508Z

April 10, 1971, 1508Z

The staff of the Consulate General expanded on their objections to the U.S. response to the crisis in East Pakistan first outlined on April 6 in telegram 1138 from Dacca.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent with a request to pass to Islamabad.

Document 131: Special National Intelligence Estimate 32–71, Washington, April 12, 1971

Washington, April 12, 1971

SNIE 32–71 assessed prospects for Pakistan in light of the emerging civil war.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations in the Departments of State and Defense, and NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the FBI, who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction.

Document 132: Paper Prepared by the National Security Council's Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia for the Senior Review Group, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

The paper assessed the crisis in East Pakistan and its impact on U.S. relations with Pakistan. It also weighed U.S. interests in South Asia and outlined policy options for dealing with the crisis.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–054, SRG Meeting, Pakistan and Ceylon, 4/19/71. Secret. On April 16 Sisco sent this paper under a covering memorandum to Kissinger in his capacity as chairman of the NSC Review Group for use by the Senior Review Group at its April 19 meeting. (Ibid.)

Document 133: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 25, 1971

Washington, May 25, 1971

Eliot conveyed to Kissinger, for circulation to the members of the WSAG, a contingency study prepared in the Department of State assessing the policy options for dealing with the escalating crisis in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1–1 INDIA–PAK. Secret. This memorandum and, apparently, the attached study, were drafted by Quainton and cleared by Schneider and Sisco.

Document 134: Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 26, 1971

Washington, May 26, 1971

Hoskinson summarized Indian policy toward the crisis in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting, India-Pakistan, 5/26/71. Secret; Exdis.

Document 135: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 26, 1971, 10:38–10:44 a.m.

Washington, May 26, 1971, 10:38–10:44 a.m.

Nixon and Kissinger discussed a letter that had been received from Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and another to be sent to Pakistani President Yahya.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 505–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 136: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m.

Washington, June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m.

Nixon and Kissinger discussed Ambassador Keating and his view of India and the building crisis in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 512–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 137: Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to India (Keating), Washington, June 15, 1971, 5:13–5:40 p.m.

Washington, June 15, 1971, 5:13–5:40 p.m.

Keating gave Nixon and Kissinger his appreciation of the developing crisis in South Asia in the course of briefing them on their impending meeting with Indian Foreign Minister SINGH.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Keating, Oval Office, Conversation No. 521–13. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 138: Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Indian Foreign Minister (Singh), and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, June 16, 1971, 2:58–3:41 p.m.

Washington, June 16, 1971, 2:58–3:41 p.m.

In a discussion of mounting tensions on the subcontinent, SINGH sought to emphasize the "tremendous problem" created for India by the influx of refugees from East Pakistan. Nixon counseled patience while the U.S. provided additional funds to deal with the refugees and used quiet diplomacy to try to mediate a settlement in Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, SINGH, Kissinger, and Sisco, Oval Office, Conversation No. 523–2. No classification marking. Ambassadors Keating and Jha were also present.

Document 139: Memorandum of Conversation, New Delhi, July 7, 1971

New Delhi, July 7, 1971

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Defense Minister Jagjivan Ram discussed Ram's perception of the threat posed by China to India. Kissinger said that the U.S. would take a "grave view" of any Chinese move against India. The conversation concluded with a discussion of what might be done to improve relations between the U.S. and India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted on July 12. Published from an unsigned copy. The meeting was held in Ram's office. Kissinger left Washington on July 2 for what was publicly described as a fact-finding trip to South Vietnam, Thailand, India, and Pakistan. The trip included secreta secret visit to China, undertaken during Kissinger's visit to Pakistan, following his stop in India. He returned to Washington on July 11.

Document 140: Study Prepared in Response to National Security Study Memorandum 133, Washington, July 10, 1971

Washington, July 10, 1971

In response to NSSM 133, the study assessed U.S. policy options in South Asia in light of the crisis in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–058, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 7/23/71. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Quainton. A cover sheet bears the date July 9, but drafting information indicates that it was drafted on July 10. The study was drafted for the Senior Review Group and approved by a State/Defense/CIA ad hoc committee. The cover sheet and a table of contents are not published.

Document 141: Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland), Washington, July 28, 1971, 4:21–4:54 p.m.

Washington, July 28, 1971, 4:21–4:54 p.m.

Farland briefed Nixon and Kissinger on the developing crisis in Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Farland, Oval Office, Conversation No. 549–25. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 142: Paper Prepared for the Senior Review Group, Washington, July 29, 1971

Washington, July 29, 1971

This "Scenario For Action In Indo-Pak Crisis" was prepared in the Department of State in response to an instruction from the Senior Review Group.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–058, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 7/30/71. Secret; Exdis. This scenario was prepared in response to an instruction to the Department from the Senior Review Group on July 23 to draft a paper outlining what the U.S. perceived as a desirable outcome to the crisis developing in East Pakistan. The instruction called for a paper that could serve as "a scenario for discussions with the Pakistanis, the Indians and possibly the Russians.” (Ibid., Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971) Drafted by Quainton and used by the Senior Review Group at their meeting on July 30. Because of a typographical error, the drafting date on the paper is given as June 29. The attached paper on humanitarian relief, cited in the scenario, is not published.

Document 143: Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Williams) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September 3, 1971

Washington, September 3, 1971

Williams reported to Rogers on his trip to Pakistan and offered his recommendations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK. Secret. Rogers transmitted the memorandum to Nixon on September 13 under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Tabs A–D are not published.

Document 144: Memorandum Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, September 22, 1971

Washington, September 22, 1971

The memorandum assessed the first 6 months of the crisis in South Asia and suggested possible outcomes.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 570, Indo-Pak Crisis, South Asia, 1/1/71-9/30/71. Secret. SNIE 32–71 is Document 131. The May 28 memorandum cited in footnote 2 has not been found.

Document 145: Telegram 9833 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, September 28, 1971, 1039Z

September 28, 1971, 1039Z

Ambassador Farland made the case that the U.S. policy of seeking to maintain leverage with the Government of Pakistan had helped to "defuse or ameliorate the crisis.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Karachi, Dacca, and Lahore. Sent with a request to repeat to other posts as desired.

Document 146: Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), British Foreign Secretary Douglas-Home, and the British Ambassador to the United States (Cromer), Washington, September 30, 1971, 4:10-5:31 p.m.

Washington, September 30, 1971, 4:10-5:31 p.m.

Nixon, Kissinger, and DOUGLAS-HOME shared their assessments of developments on the subcontinent and agreed to maintain close contacts in dealing with Prime Minister Gandhi concerning the crisis.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, DOUGLAS-HOME, and Cromer, Oval Office, Conversation 582–9. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 147: Telegram 10043 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 4, 1971, 1230Z

October 4, 1971, 1230Z

The Embassy reported that the combined efforts of the Government in Islamabad and the army in East Pakistan had "failed to halt anarchy in the countryside, to undercut support to Mukti Bahini, or to restore East Pakistan government to its pre-March level of muddling-through incompetency.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Kathmandu, Lahore, London, Madras, New Delhi, Tehran, USUN, and the US Mission in Geneva.

Document 148: Telegram 186578 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, October 12, 1971, 1837Z

October 12, 1971, 1837Z

Secretary of State Rogers commended Ambassador Farland on his assessment of the developing crisis in Pakistan. Rogers suggested that Farland continue to stress to Pakistani President Yahya the importance of dealing leniently with MUJIB.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 PAK–US. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted on September 29 by Laingen; cleared by VAN HOLLEN, Sisco, and Irwin; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Dacca, Lahore, and Karachi.

Document 149: Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 4, 1971

Washington, November 4, 1971

Advisers to President Nixon and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed the building crisis in South Asia while Nixon and Gandhi met Assistant Secretary of State Sisco said Yahya Khan had accepted the idea of a unilateral military withdrawal and was prepared under certain conditions to open a dialogue with Bangla Desh representatives. T. N. Kaul responded skeptically to both suggestions.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 919, VIP Visits, India, PM INDIRA GANDHI Visit, Nov. 1971. Secret. Sent for information. Saunders initialed for himself and Hoskinson. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Kissinger saw it.

Document 150: Conversation Among President Nixon, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the President's Assistant (Haldeman), Washington, November 5, 1971, 8:51–9:00 a.m.

Washington, November 5, 1971, 8:51–9:00 a.m.

Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman discussed Nixon's conversation the previous day with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, and agreed on the approach to take in the meeting he was scheduled to have with her later in the day.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haldeman, Oval Office, Conversation 615–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 151: Memorandum for the President's File, Washington, November 5, 1971

Washington, November 5, 1971

President Nixon and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed international developments but not the crisis in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 2, Memoranda for the President, Beginning October 31, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Apparently drafted by Kissinger. The meeting was held in the Oval Office at 11:20 a.m.

Document 152: Memorandum From the Deputy Administrator of the Agency for International Development (Williams) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, November 5, 1971

Washington, November 5, 1971

Williams reported to Rogers on his recent trip to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Nodis. Sent through S/S and initialed by Eliot. A stamped notation on a copy of this memorandum in White House files indicates the President saw it. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. VIII, Nov–Dec 71)

Document 153: Analytical Summary Prepared by the National Security Council Staff, Washington, November 11, 1971

Washington, November 11, 1971

Summary of a contingency paper drafted in the Department of State that outlined options open to the United States in the event of an outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. The summary was prepared for use by the Washington Special Actions Group.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–082, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 11/12/71. Secret; Exdis. The summary was attached to and summarized an undated paper that outlined contingency planning in the event of an outbreak of war between India and Pakistan. Neither the contingency paper nor the analytical summary have drafting information, but the former was apparently drafted in the Department of State and the summary was prepared by the NSC staff. Samuel Hoskinson and Richard Kennedy probably drafted the summary, which they forwarded with the contingency paper to Kissinger on November 11 under a covering memorandum for use by the Washington Special Actions Group at their November 12 meeting. (Ibid)

Document 154: Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sultan Khan, November 15, 1971, 4:31–4:39 p.m.

November 15, 1971, 4:31–4:39 p.m.

Nixon briefed SULTAN KHAN on his conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, assured him of U.S. sympathy and support for Pakistan, and discussed U.S. efforts to try to prevent a war.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and SULTAN KHAN, Oval Office, Conversation No. 617–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 155: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 23, 1971, 10:55 a.m.

Washington, November 23, 1971, 10:55 a.m.

Kissinger and Rogers expressed some differences over the U.S. response to the escalation of fighting in East Pakistan.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 15–23 November 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript. The announcements referred to in the conversation are apparently the projected announcements of Nixon's scheduled meetings in December with West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, French President Georges Pompidou, and British Prime Minister EDWARD HEATH. The cable referenced in the conversation is apparently telegram 212549 to Islamabad, November 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK)

Document 156: Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, November 24, 1971, 12:27–1:12 p.m.

Washington, November 24, 1971, 12:27–1:12 p.m.

Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers discussed the implications of the crisis in South Asia and the approach to be taken in dealing with India and Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Rogers, Oval Office, Conversation No. 624–21. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 157: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 26, 1971, 10:42 a.m.

Washington, November 26, 1971, 10:42 a.m.

Nixon and Kissinger discussed the fighting in East Pakistan. Nixon said he "would like the Indians to be embarrassed.”

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 24–30 November 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcript.

Document 158: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 3, 1971, 3:45 p.m.

Washington, December 3, 1971, 3:45 p.m.

Kissinger and Rogers discussed whether to place the blame for the conflict on India.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1–5 December 1971. No classification marking.

Document 159: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of the Treasury Connally and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 5, 1971

Washington, December 5, 1971

Kissinger and Connally agreed that the fighting between India and Pakistan had developed as a result of collusion between India and the Soviet Union. They further agreed that it was necessary to oppose India in the conflict.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, December 1971. No classification marking.

Document 160: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Minister of the Soviet Embassy (Vorontsov), Washington, December 5, 1971, 4:55 p.m.

Washington, December 5, 1971, 4:55 p.m.

Kissinger called Vorontsov to confirm that President Nixon felt that the crisis in South Asia had created a watershed in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 1-5 December 1971. No classification marking.

Document 161: Conversation Between President Nixon and Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, December 6, 1971, 9:19–9:24 a.m.

Washington, December 6, 1971, 9:19–9:24 a.m.

Nixon and Rogers discussed the crisis in South Asia and the bleak prospects facing the Pakistani Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Rogers, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–14. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 162: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 6, 1971, 6:14–6:38 p.m.

Washington, December 6, 1971, 6:14–6:38 p.m.

Nixon and Kissinger discussed the crisis in South Asia, focusing on the approach to take with the Soviet Union and China, and the best way to deal with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 630–20. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 163: Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Commerce Stans, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), and the President's Assistant and Press Secretary (Ziegler), Washington, December 7, 1971, 3:55–4:29 p.m.

Washington, December 7, 1971, 3:55–4:29 p.m.

Following a report to Nixon by Stans on his trip to the Soviet Union, Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, and Ziegler discussed a background briefing Kissinger intended to give the press concerning the crisis in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Haig, and Ziegler, Oval Office, Conversation No. 631–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 164: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza), Washington, December 8, 1971, 2:47 p.m.

Washington, December 8, 1971, 2:47 p.m.

Kissinger suggested that Pakistan invoke its mutual security treaty with the United States.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 6-10 Dec 1971. No classification marking. No mutual security treaty has ever been concluded between the United States and Pakistan. The references to such a treaty and unqualified references to an assurance offered to Pakistan by the Kennedy administration indicate that Nixon and Kissinger were ill-informed about the nature and extent of a U.S. commitment to take military action to assist Pakistan in the event of an attack by India. Kissinger's reference to a mutual security treaty during this conversation is an apparent reference to the Agreement of Cooperation signed by the United States and Pakistan on March 5, 1959, in the context of Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad Pact. The agreement (10 UST 317) obligates the United States to take appropriate action "as may be mutually agreed upon" to defend Pakistan against aggression. The agreement cites the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and Stability in the Middle East of March 9, 1957. (PL–7, 85th Congress) The Joint Resolution contemplated, among other things, the use of armed forces to assist nations against aggression by "any country controlled by international communism" so long as such use of force was consonant with the treaty obligations and the Constitution of the United States. The assurance offered to Pakistan in 1962, which was cited by Kissinger repeatedly during the crisis, was that the United States would come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of Indian aggression against Pakistan. The assurance was delivered in an aide-mémoire presented to Pakistani President Ayub Khan on November 5, 1962. (For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XIX, page 372, footnote 6) The aide-mémoire did not subject the assurance to any qualification relating to constitutional constraints. A Department of State press release issued on November 17, 1962, however, stated that the United States had assured Pakistan that, if India misused United States military assistance in aggression against Pakistan, the United States would take "immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action to thwart such aggression.” (Ibid., footnote 7)

Document 165: Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and Attorney General Mitchell, Washington, December 8, 1971, 4:20-5:01 p.m.

Washington, December 8, 1971, 4:20-5:01 p.m.

During the course of a discussion of the crisis in South Asia, Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell weighed the possibilities of increasing pressure on India. Nixon instructed Kissinger to contact China to urge the Chinese to initiate military moves toward the Indian border, and he authorized the movement of a carrier group into the Bay of Bengal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Mitchell, Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 307–27. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 166: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 8, 1971, 8:03–8:12 p.m.

Washington, December 8, 1971, 8:03–8:12 p.m.

Nixon and Kissinger weighed whether to cancel the Moscow summit if the Soviet Union did not restrain India. Nixon reiterated his conviction that China could exercise a decisive restraining influence on India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, White House Telephone, Conversation No. 16–64. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 167: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, December 9, 1971, 6:59 a.m.

Washington, December 9, 1971, 6:59 a.m.

General Colin Hamilton responded to an Indian allegation of U.S. military assistance to Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Miscellaneous–SOA 1971. Secret; Limdis. Prepared by Brigadier General COLIN C. HAMILTON, USAF.

Document 168: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 9, 1971, 12:44–1:27 p.m.

Washington, December 9, 1971, 12:44–1:27 p.m.

Nixon and Kissinger again weighed the moves they could make to prevent India from dismembering West Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 633–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 169: Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), the Soviet Minister of Agriculture (Matskevich), and the Soviet Chargé d' Affaires (Vorontsov), Washington, December 9, 1971, 4:00–4:41 p.m.

Washington, December 9, 1971, 4:00–4:41 p.m.

Nixon reviewed progress toward détente and asked Maskevich to inform Chairman Brezhnev that such progress would be seriously jeopardized if the Soviet Union did not act to restrain India from attacking West Pakistan. If India were to attack West Pakistan, Nixon warned there would be a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, Matskevich, and Vorontsov, Oval Office, Conversation No. 634–12. No classification marking. According to the President's Daily Diary, Butterfield also attended the meeting. (Ibid., White House Central Files) The comments by Matskevich were translated by an interpreter. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 170: Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, December 9, 1971

Washington, December 9, 1971

Intelligence assessment of the implications of an Indian victory over Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–083, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 12/9/71. Secret. Prepared for the Washington Special Actions Group.

Document 171: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 9, 1971, 5:57–6:34 p.m.

Washington, December 9, 1971, 5:57–6:34 p.m.

Nixon and Kissinger concluded that, while East Pakistan could not be saved, they would have "accomplished a lot" if they managed to "save a strong West Pakistan.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 634–19. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 172: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51–11:12 a.m.

Washington, December 10, 1971, 10:51–11:12 a.m.

Nixon and Kissinger discussed the measures that could serve to preserve the territorial integrity of West Pakistan. Nixon ordered a program of economic support for West Pakistan and a public relations campaign to fix the blame for the crisis on India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–8. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portions of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 173: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 10, 1971, 12:47–1:01 p.m.

Washington, December 10, 1971, 12:47–1:01 p.m.

Kissinger reported to Nixon on his meeting with Soviet Chargé Vorontsov.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 174: Information Memorandum From the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff (Cargo) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, December 11, 1971

Washington, December 11, 1971

Cargo assessed U.S. interests in the South Asian crisis and stressed the importance of brokering a cease-fire in West Pakistan. Looking beyond the conflict, Cargo suggested the U.S. objective should be to establish a normal and positive relationship with the new Government of Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. A copy was sent to Sisco.

Document 175: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Among the Deputy Prime Minister of Pakistan (Bhutto), the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza), and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), December 11, 1971, 7:28 p.m.

December 11, 1971, 7:28 p.m.

Bhutto asked to meet with Nixon, and he and Raza pressed Kissinger for a firm public statement warning India to cease intervention in Pakistan.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 11–15 Dec 1971. No classification marking. Haig was also on the telephone. Kissinger and Haig were in Washington; Bhutto and Raza were in New York City.

Document 176: Telegram 12414 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, December 12, 1971, 0825Z

December 12, 1971, 0825Z

Ambassador Farland asked Pakistani President Yahya to clarify Pakistan's position with respect to a cease-fire.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, and USUN.

Document 177: Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, December 12, 1971, 8:45–9:42 a.m.

Washington, December 12, 1971, 8:45–9:42 a.m.

In the course of discussing the public opinion aspects of the crisis, a UN resolution to condemn India as an aggressor, and a hotline message to Moscow, Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig were confronted with the implications of having offered to protect China from the Soviet Union if China intervened in the conflict between India and Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger and Haig, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–3. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 178: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 12, 1971, 10:27–10:37 a.m.

Washington, December 12, 1971, 10:27–10:37 a.m.

Nixon and Kissinger reacted to the news that India had offered an assurance that it would not attack West Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–6. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 179: Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 12, 1971, 11:04–11:14 a.m.

Washington, December 12, 1971, 11:04–11:14 a.m.

Nixon and Kissinger completed drafting the hotline message to the Soviet Union.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–11. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 180: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs

Washington, December 12, 1971

The contingency paper, prepared for the Washington Special Actions Group, examined the refugee problem created by the conflict in East Pakistan from humanitarian, political, economic and managerial perspectives, but assumed the "overriding importance" of humanitarian considerations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on December 10 by Thomas P. Thornton (S/PC). Thornton also apparently drafted the attached study. Cleared in S/P by Deputy Director Joseph Neubert and Cargo; in NEA by VAN HOLLEN, Quainton, and Constable; and in S/R, IO/UNP, INR/RNA, and AID/NESA.

Document 181: Telegram 223704 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, December 12, 1971, 2250Z

December 12, 1971, 2250Z

Indian Ambassador Jha responded to a U.S. request to outline India's war aims.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Also sent immediate as Tosec 9 to the White House with a request to pass it to Secretary Rogers on Air Force One. Repeated to Dacca, Islamabad, London, Moscow, and USUN. Drafted by Quainton and approved by Irwin

Document 182: Telegram 11295 from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, December 13, 1971, 0211Z

December 13, 1971, 0211Z

Ambassador Annenberg met with British Prime Minister HEATH and Foreign Secretary DOUGLAS-HOME to discuss Britain's position in the United Nations on the fighting in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Sent flash to the Department with a request to pass to the White House for the President and Secretary Rogers. Repeated flash to USUN.

Document 183: Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Information Cable TDCS–314/13308–71, Washington, December 13, 1971

Washington, December 13, 1971

A report on Indian Prime Minister INDIRA GANDHI's briefing at which India's war aims were discussed in light of the United Nations cease-fire resolution.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan Situation. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Distribution. Sent to the White House and distributed within the Departments of State, Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, the JCS, and NSA.

Document 184: Telegram 5627 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, December 14, 1971, 0408Z

December 14, 1971, 0408Z

Consul General Spivack met with Governor Malik and General FARMAN ALI to discuss the possibility of a cease-fire to avoid the danger of a "bloodbath" in East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated flash to Islamabad and New Delhi.

Document 185: Telegram 5628 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, December 14, 1971, 0441Z

December 14, 1971, 0441Z

Governor Malik informed Consul General Spivack that the question of a cease-fire was being handled through Ambassador Farland in Islamabad and that it would be unnecessary to put forward proposals from Dacca.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Repeated flash to Islamabad and New Delhi.

Document 186: Telegram 12542 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, December 14, 1971, 1420Z

December 14, 1971, 1420Z

In light of the impending collapse of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan, the Embassy assessed Pakistan's options. It concluded that Pakistan would concede East Pakistan to Bangladesh if peace "with honor" could be negotiated.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated priority to Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Kathmandu, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and USUN.

Document 187: Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable TDCS–315/07612–71, Washington, December 15, 1971

Washington, December 15, 1971

Report on the Soviet response to an Indian request that the Soviet Union recognize and sign a defense treaty with Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan Situation. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissemination. Sent to the White House, and distributed within the Departments of State and Defense, the CIA, the JCS, and NSA. Also sent to Islamabad for the Ambassador, the DCM, the political counselor, and the defense attaché. Sent to Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras for principal officers only, and to CINCPAC, CINCPACAF, CINCPACFLT, AND CINCARPAC.

Document 188: Telegram 19243 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, December 15, 1971, 0738Z

December 15, 1971, 0738Z

Ambassador Keating asked for the rationale behind the decision to deploy the U.S. carrier task force into the Indian Ocean.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, 12/14/71–12/16/71. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Also sent to the White House.

Document 189: Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant (Haldeman), and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 15, 1971, 8:45–11:30 a.m.

Washington, December 15, 1971, 8:45–11:30 a.m.

Nixon and Kissinger discussed the implications of the Soviet assurance that India would not press an attack on West Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of Conversation among Nixon, Haldeman, and Kissinger, Oval Office, Conversation No. 638–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation published here specifically for this volume.

Document 190: Telegram 11410 From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State, December 15, 1971, 1656Z

December 15, 1971, 1656Z

Ambassador Annenberg reported on a conversation with STANLEY TOMLINSON, British Deputy Under Secretary of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, in which Tomlinson discussed U.S.–UK differences of perspective on the crisis in South Asia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis.

Document 191: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 16, 1971, 10:40 a.m.

Washington, December 16, 1971, 10:40 a.m.

Nixon and Kissinger reacted to India's declaration of a cease-fire in the west.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 16–17 Dec. 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcription.

Document 192: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 16, 1971, 12:15 p.m.

Washington, December 16, 1971, 12:15 p.m

Nixon told Kissinger he intended to continue to take a hard line on economic assistance to India.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 16–17 Dec. 1971. No classification marking. The omissions are in the original transcription.

Document 193: Telegram 227784 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, December 18, 1971, 2222Z

December 18, 1971, 2222Z

Secretary Rogers met with Pakistani Deputy Prime Minister-designate Bhutto, who expressed appreciation for U.S. support for Pakistan during the crisis. He said he was returning to Pakistan in anticipation of assuming the reins of political power. He was prepared to seek reconciliation with India and asked the U.S. not to act hastily in recognizing Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15-1 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Laingen and approved by VAN HOLLEN. Laingen initialed for VAN HOLLEN. Repeated to New Delhi, USUN, London, Moscow, Tehran, Paris, Dacca, and Calcutta. Sent with an instruction to deliver at the opening of business on December 19.

Document 194: Telegram 19600 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, December 23, 1971, 1035Z

December 23, 1971, 1035Z

The Embassy reported on an interview Indian Prime Minister Gandhi gave to a journalist in which she said U.S.-Indian relations could return to normal if the U.S. was prepared to recognize India's predominant position on the subcontinent.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, 12/17/71–12/31/71. Confidential; Limdis.

Document 195: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 23, 1971, 8 p.m.

Washington, December 23, 1971, 8 p.m

Rogers and Kissinger differed over the nature of the U.S. assurance to Pakistan.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 18–23 Dec. 1971. No classification marking. The excision was in accordance with the donor's deed of gift.

Document 196: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird, December 30, 1971

December 30, 1971

Nutter's memorandum to Laird assessed, from the perspective of the Department of Defense, U.S.-South Asia policy in the wake of the crisis on the subcontinent.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 76–0197, Box 74, Pakistan 092 (Aug–Dec) 1971. Secret; Sensitive.

Document 197: Telegram 232870 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, December 30, 1971, 0016Z

December 30, 1971, 0016Z

The Department's initial decision was that U.S. humanitarian assistance to the successor state in East Pakistan would be channeled through the United Nations

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Sisco and C. Herbert Rees, Director of the Office of South Asian Affairs (AID/NESA) on December 23; cleared in AID/NESA by Williams and in the White House by Saunders; and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, and Calcutta.

Document 198: Editorial Note

President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger discussed the aftermath of the crisis in South Asia in a telephone conversation on January 1, 1972. In the course of a general discussion of the impact of the crisis, Kissinger made the point that India needed to re establish better relations with the United States. He felt that the Gandhi Government would be concerned to offset the embrace of the Soviet Union and the concomitant growth of the Communist party and Communist influence in India. Discussion then turned to the question of the recognition of Bangladesh. Nixon said it was premature to consider such recognition. Kissinger pointed out that only India and Bhutan had recognized Bangladesh at that point.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, January 1, 1972, 11:00–11:19 a.m., White House Tapes, Conversation No. 17125.

Document 199: Telegram 22 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State, January 3, 1972, 1014Z

January 3, 1972, 1014Z

Ambassador Farland met with Pakistani President Bhutto who was planning to announce that day that Sheikh Mujibur Rahman would be released from prison.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 29 PAK. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad.

Document 200: Telegram 26 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State, January 3, 1972, 1154Z

January 3, 1972, 1154Z

In response to Pakistani President Bhutto's request to President Nixon for economic assistance to help Pakistan recover from the effects of the war with India, Ambassador Farland said that he was authorized by Nixon to begin negotiations for a new PL–480 agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, and Lahore. The text of Bhutto's letter to Nixon on December 21, 1971, transmitted to Islamabad on December 30 in telegram 233015, is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 330

Document 201: Telegram 300 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, January 9, 1972, 0427Z

January 9, 1972, 0427Z

Ambassador Keating argued in the Embassy's policy assessment for 1971 for efforts to improve U.S. relations with the predominant power on the subcontinent.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 INDIA–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras with a request that the Department repeat as desired. On January 13 Sisco responded to Keating's overview of U.S. relations with India with a personal telegram to Keating in which he said that Keating's analysis was of great value but added: "Many of the policy issues you raise involve a complex series of decisions and it is unlikely that we shall be able to give you a comprehensive reply.” (Telegram 6586 to New Delhi; ibid.)

Document 202: Telegram 364 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, January 12, 1972, 1130Z

January 12, 1972, 1130Z

Ambassador Farland reported that Pakistani President Bhutto had reacted skeptically to Mujibur Rahman's statement that there would be no ties between Bangladesh and West Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL PAK–US. Secret; Nodis.

Document 203: Backchannel Message from the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Islamabad, January 13, 1972, 0949Z

January 13, 1972, 0949Z

Farland assessed the situation in Pakistan and concluded that Pakistani President Bhutto faced serious difficulties in virtually every area of national activity.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 138, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Middle East, Farland, Amb. (Pakistan). Secret. Kissinger's and Nixon's initials were written on the message in what appears to be Haig's handwriting, suggesting it was forwarded to both of them. Farland was responding to a request from Nixon, sent to him backchannel on January 2, for an assessment of the situation in Pakistan. (Backchannel message WH 20010 from Kissinger to Farland; ibid., Box 426, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages 1972, Amb. Farland, Pakistan)

Document 204: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 16, 1972, 1 p.m.

Washington, January 16, 1972, 1 p.m.

Nixon and Kissinger looked toward improved relations with India, but not until mid-year.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, Jan-Apr 1972. No classification marking. The omission is in the original transcription.

Document 205: Telegram 642 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, January 16, 1972, 0711Z

January 16, 1972, 0711Z

Ambassador Keating reported that Foreign Secretary Kaul told him that his Government felt the time had come to improve relations between India and the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Moscow, London, Madras, Calcutta, Bombay, and Bangkok for NELSON GROSS, the Secretary's Coordinator for International Narcotics Affairs.

Document 206: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, January 17, 1972

Washington, January 17, 1972

Rogers submitted to Nixon a paper prepared in the Department of State outlining policy objectives in South Asia with the suggestion that it be circulated to the members of the NSC as a basis for discussion.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Nodis. The attached paper was Secret; Exdis. Rogers' memorandum and the attached paper, drafted on January 15, were circulated on January 17 by NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis to the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Director of the CIA. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 642, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972)) An earlier draft of the paper, submitted on January 7 by Sisco to Rogers, indicates it was drafted in NEA/INC by Quainton with the concurrence of Schneider and VAN HOLLEN. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF1–1 ASIA SE)

Document 207: Analytical Summary Prepared by Members of the National Security Council Staff for the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 17, 1972

Washington, January 17, 1972

The summary analyzed the papers dealing with postwar issues in South Asia which were prepared for the Senior Review Group in anticipation of its meeting on January 19.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Nodis. Saunders and Kennedy transmitted the summary to Kissinger in a January 17 memorandum. (Ibid.) The reference in the summary to a Department of State options paper is to Document 206. The remainder of the papers cited in the study can be found in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72, and ibid., NSC Files, Box 642, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972). The paper dealing with Bangladesh and the letters from Prime Ministers Heath and McMahon are included in the Bangladesh compilation in this volume. See documents 376, 386, and 387.

Document 208: Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to President Nixon, Washington, January 18, 1972

Washington, January 18, 1972

Raza conveyed a letter from Pakistani President Bhutto to Nixon in which Bhutto expressed appreciation for the support the U.S. gave to Pakistan during the conflict with India, and asked for continuing U.S. support as Pakistan attempted to negotiate a peace settlement and recover from the impact of the conflict.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. No classification marking. The text of Bhutto's letter was transmitted to Islamabad on January 28 in telegram 16271. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 US/NIxON)

Document 209: Telegram 774 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, January 19, 1972, 1110Z

January 19, 1972, 1110Z

Ambassador Keating asked for authorization to reciprocate the interest in improved relations expressed by Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul on January 15. Keating recognized that a policy review was in process in Washington but felt that neither country should delay the process of improving bilateral relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Islamabad, Madras, and priority to Saigon for NELSON GROSS. Telegram 300 and 642 are Documents 201 and 205.

Document 210: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, January 19, 1972, 3:04–4:25 p.m.

Washington, January 19, 1972, 3:04–4:25 p.m.

The Senior Review Group reviewed South Asia policy and decided to recommend that recognition of Bangladesh be postponed, the restoration of improved relations with India take place slowly, and restrictions on trade with Pakistan be removed.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–113, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1972–1973. Secret; Nodis. The January 19 attachment is Top Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. For the Departments of State and Defense documents cited by Kissinger see Documents 206 and 207.

Document 211: Airgram A–20 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, January 21, 1972

January 21, 1972

The Embassy offered an assessment of India's nuclear intentions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–8 INDIA. Secret; Exdis; Noforn; dissem/controlled, dissem/no dissem abroad. For background use only. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras. Drafted on January 17 by political officer Harmon Kirby and approved by DCM Galen Stone.

Document 212: Telegram 11838 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, January 21, 1972, 1406Z

January 21, 1972, 1406Z

Ambassador Jha met with Under Secretary of State Irwin to reiterate India's interest in improved relations with the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Limdis. Drafted on January 20 by Quainton, cleared by VAN HOLLEN, and approved by Irwin. Repeated to Kathmandu, Dacca, Islamabad, Saigon, and Moscow.

Document 213: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 22, 1972

Washington, January 22, 1972

The Department of Defense recommended renewal of military supplies to Pakistan, conditioned upon the political climate in the U.S. and the impact of such supplies on prospects for a settlement between Pakistan and India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret; Sensitive.

Document 214: Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, January 24, 19721

Washington, January 24, 1972

Raza transmitted a letter to Nixon from Pakistani President Bhutto in which Bhutto asked the United States to underwrite the sale of rice by Pakistan to what he continued to refer to as East Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. Most Immediate. The attached letter is undated and bears an unsigned typed signature. Kissinger's handwritten notation on Raza's letter reads: ”Al–Make sure this receives urgent attention.” Haig, in turn, wrote on the letter: ”Saunders Rush.” The text of Bhutto's letter was transmitted to Islamabad on January 29 in telegram 16993. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INCO–RICE 17 BANGLA DESH–US)

Document 215: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 25, 1972

Washington, January 25, 1972

The memorandum transmitted the joint State-AID recommendations for economic policy for Pakistan and India, put forward in response to a tasking from the Senior Review Group, which included PL–480 agreements with both countries and debt deferral for Pakistan. From the perspective of State and AID, the resumption of economic assistance to India should depend upon "Indian intentions.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret. Drafted by Tiger and Francis H. Thomas (NEA/PAF); revised by Irwin; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, VAN HOLLEN, and Sisco, and by Rees and Williams. Deputy Executive Secretary Robert T. Curran signed for Eliot.

Document 216: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 26, 1972

Washington, January 26, 1972

The Department recommended continued suspension of the sale or delivery of lethal military equipment and spare parts to India and Pakistan "until the situation is further clarified.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. Secret; Exdis. Curran signed for Eliot.

Document 217: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 28, 1972

Washington, January 28, 1972

In a memorandum prepared for Kissinger and the Senior Review Group, the Department outlined alternate strategies for U.S. policy in South Asia. One strategy called for no major modifications of policy while the situation on the subcontinent was still in flux. The other envisioned taking advantage of the fluid situation to move toward more normal relations with India and to recognize and establish relations with Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. Secret; Exdis. Curran signed the memorandum for Eliot.

Document 218: Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, January 28, 1972

Washington, January 28, 1972

Raza informed Sisco that Pakistan intended to call upon the UN Security Council to post UN observers along the border between India and Pakistan to report on Indian violations of the cease-fire. Pakistan requested U.S. support for this initiative.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK/UN. No classification marking.

Document 219: Analytical Summary Prepared by Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff for the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 28, 1972

Washington, January 28, 1972

In a summary prepared for Kissinger, Saunders and Kennedy analyzed issues concerning South Asia that the Senior Review Group was scheduled to discuss on February 1. Drawing on papers prepared by the Departments of State and Defense, AID, and the NSC staff, they summarized issues relating to strategy, humanitarian assistance, economic assistance, military supply, and cease-fire and withdrawal.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, 2/1/72. Secret. A January 28 memorandum from Saunders and Kennedy to Kissinger indicates that they drafted the summary. (Ibid.) Of the papers cited in the summary, the January 28 Department of State paper dealing with alternate strategies is Document 217 and the January 25 paper on economic assistance for India and Pakistan is Document 215. Two of the papers dealing with military supply, dated January 22 and January 26, are Documents 213 and 216. The third, "Commerce Licenses for India and Pakistan,” is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. On January 28 the NSC staff prepared an assessment of a Department of State paper dealing with the issues of ceasefire and withdrawal that was sent to the NSC on December 22. The paper and assessment can be found ibid. A January 26 paper dealing with humanitarian assistance is in the Bangladesh compilation in this volume as Document 389. The discussion in the summary of the possibility of the U.S adopting a more independent position vis-à-vis the three major powers of the area, in the paragraph which outlines Strategy II, prompted Kissinger to ask a question in the margin: "When?"

Document 220: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, February 1, 1972, 2:35–3:57 p.m.

Washington, February 1, 1972, 2:35–3:57 p.m.

The Senior Review Group discussed several policy issues relating to South Asia that were pending decision. Much of the discussion dealt with humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–061, SRG Meeting, 2/1/72. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes.

Document 221: Memorandum for the President's File, Washington, February 3, 1972

Washington, February 3, 1972

In a conversation with Ambassador Keating, President Nixon told him to tell the Indian Government that "India has a friend in the White House.” The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger added: "But we must move at a measured pace.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, Beginning January 30, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Prepared but not initialed by Kissinger.

Document 222: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Nutter) to Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, February 4, 1972

Washington, February 4, 1972

In the light of reports indicating that India might test a nuclear weapon in the near future, Nutter pointed up the dangerous implications of such a development.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 77–0094, India 471.61, 1972. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it on February 5. A handwritten note in an unknown hand, beneath Nutter's signature, reads: "L & N–We might pressure USSR to control Indian nuclear ventures.”

Document 223: Memorandum for the President's File, Washington, February 8, 1972, 3:15–4:20 p.m.

Washington, February 8, 1972, 3:15–4:20 p.m.

President Nixon and World Bank President Robert McNamara discussed restoration of U.S. economic assistance to India. Nixon questioned the value of such assistance for the U.S.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 87, Memoranda for the President, Beginning February 6, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Prepared but not initialed by Kissinger. The meeting was held in the President's office in the Old Executive Office Building. Connally also attended the meeting. The conversation was also tape-recorded. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Connally, Kissinger, and McNamara, February 8, 1972, 3:15–4:20, Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 320–328)

Document 224: Telegram 1770 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, February 10, 1972, 1500Z

February 10, 1972, 1500Z

Ambassador Keating reported that he and Indian Foreign Secretary Kaul had discussed steps that could be taken to improve relations between the United States and India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent by Keating with an instruction to deliver to Sisco at the opening of business on February 10.

Document 225: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 11, 1972, 1 p.m.

Washington, February 11, 1972, 1 p.m.

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed the possibility of establishing a "realistic" relationship between the United States and India. Kissinger reviewed the controversy over whether he had offered an assurance, during his trip to India in July 1971, that the U.S. would come to India's assistance if India was attacked by China.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India, Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

Document 226: Telegram 1581 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 17, 1972, 1330Z

February 17, 1972, 1330Z

Chargé Sober reported on indications that Pakistan was interested in a closer security relationship with the U.S. and would welcome the lifting of the arms embargo.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 PAK–US. Secret; Nodis. Sent to the Department for the attention of VAN HOLLEN.

Document 227: Telegram 1622 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 18, 1972, 1800Z

February 18, 1972, 1800Z/

The Embassy transmitted a message from Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon in which Bhutto reviewed Pakistan's grievances and concerns regarding India in the hope that they would factor into Nixon's discussions with Chinese leaders during Nixon's impending visit to China.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

Document 228: Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline) to Director of Central Intelligence Helms, Washington, February 23, 1972

Washington, February 23, 1972

Cline sent to Helms INR's assessment of the possibility that India was developing a nuclear weapon.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files, Job 80–B01086A, Box 1, Folder 59, India. Secret; No Foreign Dissem. The attached secret report was drafted on February 10 by William D. Howells (INR/DRR/RNA) and Lawrence E. Finch, Chief of the Strategic Affairs Division (INR/DRR/RSG).

Document 229: Telegram 1833 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 25, 1972, 1050Z

February 25, 1972, 1050Z

Chargé Sober reported that Pakistani President Bhutto was prepared to meet with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in New Delhi to discuss a comprehensive peace settlement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi, Dacca, Karachi, and Lahore.

Document 230: Telegram 1834 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 25, 1972, 1117Z

February 25, 1972, 1117Z

In a conversation with Chargé Sober, Pakistani President Bhutto indicated that he was interested in pursuing a closer security relationship between Pakistan and the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi, Karachi, Lahore, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

Document 231: Editorial Note

Source: Telegrams 2087, 3396, and 3530 from Islamabad, March 6, April 18, and April 21. Telegrams 2087 and 3530 are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 PAK. Telegram 3396 is ibid., POL 15–5 PAK.

Document 232: Telegram 2922 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, March 8, 1972, 1624Z

March 8, 1972, 1624Z

The Embassy reported that criticism of the United States was a constant theme during a 3-week campaign tour of India by Prime Minister Gandhi. Her anti-U.S. tone was only partially mitigated by occasional acknowledgement of a desire to improve Indo-U.S. relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 INDIA. Confidential. Repeated to Islamabad, London, Moscow, Dacca, Madras, Bombay, Calcutta, and CINCPAC.

Document 233: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 10, 1972, 4 p.m.

Washington, March 10, 1972, 4 p.m.

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed prospects for improving relations between the U.S. and India in the wake of President Nixon's trip to China.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office in the White House.

Document 234: Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 10, 1972

Washington, March 10, 1972

Saunders and Hoskinson outlined for Kissinger "where we stand on the economic aid front for Pakistan and where we seem to be heading.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Confidential. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum.

Document 235: Telegram 2213 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, March 10, 1972, 0725Z

March 10, 1972, 0725Z

Pakistan offered to make military facilities available in Pakistan for U.S. use as part of a program of closer military collaboration between the two countries.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF PAK–US. Top Secret; Exdis.

Document 236: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, March 17, 1972

Washington, March 17, 1972

Rogers conveyed to Nixon an assessment of the Pakistani proposals for closer military collaboration and policy recommendations based on the assessment.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret;Exdis.

Document 237: Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 18, 1972

Washington, March 18, 1972

Sisco reported on a meeting of the Senior Review Group on March 17. The SRG discussed the major pending policy issues related to South Asia, including the recognition of Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1 ASIA SE–US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by VAN HOLLEN on March 17 and sent through Irwin. This is the only record of this meeting of the Senior Review Group that has been found.

Document 238: Letter From President Nixon to Pakistani President Bhutto, Washington, March 22, 1972

Washington, March 22, 1972

Nixon discussed his trip to China. He also offered Bhutto the assurance that "We will continue to demonstrate our concern for the well-being and the security of the people of Pakistan and help you through this extremely difficult post-war period.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. No classification marking. A copy of Bhutto's March 1 letter to Nixon, in which he discussed his impending trips to New Delhi and Moscow, is ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 PAK. Nixon's letter to Bhutto was transmitted to Islamabad on March 23 in telegram 49845. (Ibid., POL 15–1 US/NIXON)

Document 239: Telegram 49598 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, March 23, 1972, 0219Z

March 23, 1972, 0219Z

The Department transmitted to the Embassy a summary of an extensive request for military assistance and sales conveyed to Assistant Secretary Sisco on March 20 by Pakistani Ambassador Raza. The request included 100 tanks, 4 submarines, and 3 squadrons of planes.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 PAK. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Peter Constable (NEA/PAF) on March 21; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, VAN HOLLEN, and Alan Ford, Deputy Director of the Office of Military Assistance and Sales (PM/MAS); and approved by Sisco. Sent for information to DOD/ISA/NESA for Colonel Gross. Raza's letter to Sisco can be found ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country File, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72.

Document 240: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, March 23, 1972

Washington, March 23, 1972

Rogers informed Nixon about his conversation on March 22 with AZIZ AHMED, Secretary General of the Pakistani Ministry of Foreign Affairs. AHMED pressed for a decision on Pakistan's request for military sales and assistance and for an assessment of the future role of the U.S. in South Asia. Rogers assured AHMED of continuing U.S. support for Pakistan and added that the issue of military supply was under review.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country File, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Exdis. Irwin signed for Rogers.

Document 241: Telegram 3666 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, March 23, 1972, 1550Z

March 23, 1972, 1550Z

Ambassador Keating expressed his opposition to any increase in U.S. military collaboration with Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 15 PAK–US. Top Secret; Exdis.

Document 242: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 29, 1972, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, March 29, 1972, 11:30 a.m.

Rogers told Kissinger that when he met with Secretary General AHMED, AHMED would press for a decision to renew the supply of military equipment to Pakistan. Kissinger responded: "That's not on.”

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 243: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 29, 1972, 12:15 p.m.

Washington, March 29, 1972, 12:15 p.m.

Secretary General AHMED discussed Pakistan's security concerns with President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger. He urged the U.S. to maintain a strong presence in South Asia. Nixon responded that his administration would provide all the help that it could to Pakistan, but most of it would be economic assistance. He said it would be difficult to consider military assistance until after the election in November. He added that he intended to recognize Bangladesh within the week. Nixon and Kissinger assured AHMED of U.S. support for Pakistan in the event of an attack by India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 88, Memoranda for the President, Beginning March 26, 1972. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office in the White House. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that Saunders prepared it for the President's file.

Document 244: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 31, 1972

Washington, March 31, 1972

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger emphasized to Indian Ambassador Jha the need for India to exercise restraint in dealing with Pakistan. If it did not, and if it used threats of military action, Kissinger said U.S. "restraint would be more difficult to maintain.” He added that the U.S. would oppose any attempt to force territorial changes in Kashmir.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971–19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Apparently drafted by Kissinger. The luncheon meeting took place in Kissinger's office. The attached clipping is page 17 from the March 27 edition of Newsweek magazine. The Anderson papers were copies of columns written by Jack Anderson for The Washington Post based upon records of WSAG meetings during the December crisis.

Document 245: Telegram 2923 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, April 4, 1972, 0708Z

April 4, 1972, 0708Z

Chargé Sober questioned Pakistani President Bhutto about the request for arms put forward in Washington by Secretary General AHMED. Bhutto said he did not expect a reply on the bulk of the request until after the U.S. presidential election, but added that the need for spare parts to keep old equipment operational was pressing.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi.

Document 246: Letter From the Pakistani Ambassador (Raza) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, April 6, 1972

Washington, April 6, 1972

Raza detailed the efforts his Government was making to initiate negotiations with India and alleged that India had established preconditions for negotiations designed to delay an agreement to settle the crisis. Pakistan called on the U.S. to impress on India the need for an early settlement of the problems of the subcontinent.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–14 INDIA–PAK. No classification marking.

Document 247: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, April 13, 1972

Washington, April 13, 1972

With the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger's approval, Haig authorized a presentation to Congress on economic assistance for South Asia for the fiscal year that called for $90 million for India, $75 million for Pakistan, and $135 million in an unallocated reserve.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger's handwritten comment on the first page of the attached memorandum reads: "There is no chance of giving $200 million to India.” There is a note in the margin of that document in a hand that is apparently Saunders' that reads: "75–75.” Haig wrote “OK” on the Use 90/75 option, and added: "Hal I've checked W/ HAK.” Saunders noted on the memorandum that he notified AID and OMB on April 13 of the revised decision.

Document 248: Telegram 65190 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, April 14, 1972, 2358Z

April 14, 1972, 2358Z

Ambassador Farland was instructed upon his return to Islamabad to conduct with Pakistani President Bhutto a full review of U.S.-Pakistani relations and of prospects for peace on the subcontinent.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan–31 Aug 72. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Constable; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, VAN HOLLEN, and Sisco; also cleared by U. Alexis Johnson, Williams, and at the White House by Haig; and approved by VAN HOLLEN. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, and USUN.

Document 249: Minutes of Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, April 17, 1972, 3:05–4:04 p.m.

Washington, April 17, 1972, 3:05–4:04 p.m.

The Senior Review Group discussed U.S. policy objectives in South Asia and the issues bearing on the possibility of improving relations with India. Members agreed that, to the extent possible, U.S. humanitarian and economic assistance to Bangladesh should be provided on a bilateral rather than a multilateral basis.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–064, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 4/17/72. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The brief from which Helms spoke in assessing the situation in South Asia can be found ibid. The draft telegram cited in the minutes, containing instructions for opening a dialogue with India on a number of contentious issues, was not sent to New Delhi. After discussion by the Senior Review Group, the telegram was revised in the Department of State and returned to Kissinger for approval on April 19. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK) The revised telegram was not sent because of continuing criticism by the Gandhi Government of the U.S. role in Vietnam. See Document 252.

Document 250: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 18, 1972

Washington, April 18, 1972

Kissinger approved a telegram to Ambassador Keating instructing him to explain to the Indian Government the presentation being made to Congress on the proposed "provisional" assistance program for India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71–July 1972. Limited Official Use. Sent for action. Sent to Kissinger through Haig. Kissinger initialed the approval line. Saunders added a handwritten note in the margin that reads: "with addition conveyed orally by Kennedy.” The addition is not marked on the attached draft telegram. A comparison of the draft text with the telegram as sent on April 19 reveals that Kissinger added the penultimate sentence before approving the telegram. That sentence contained an important qualification: "Decisions on allocation will depend on the results of that review and on the circumstances at the time, and you should make clear that no inference should be drawn one way or the other regarding what amounts, if any, might be made available.” See Document 253.

Document 251: Letter From Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon, Rawalpindi, April 18, 1972

Rawalpindi, April 18, 1972

Bhutto wrote to request that the U.S. intervene on behalf of the Pakistani prisoners of war being held he alleged as bargaining chips by India and under threat of prosecution by Bangladesh for war crimes.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 760, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan, President Bhutto. Secret. The letter was delivered to the Department of State on April 25, under cover of a transmittal letter from Charge M. Akram Zaki. The letter was forwarded to the White House on the same day. (Memorandum from Eliot to Kissinger, April 25; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL PAK'US) The text of the letter was transmitted to Islamabad on April 26 in telegram 72027. (Ibid., POL 15'1 US/NIXON)

Document 252: Telegram 67415 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, April 19, 1972, 1650Z

April 19, 1972, 1650Z

Ambassador Keating was instructed to lodge a strong objection to the statement made by the Indian Foreign Minister in Parliament on April 17 concerning Vietnam. The U.S. considered the statement to be "a further unfriendly act on part of GOI,” and Keating was instructed to minimize his contacts with Indian officials for 2 weeks.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on April 18 by Schneider; cleared in NEA by Davies, in EA by Deputy Assistant Secretary William H. Sullivan, and in the White House by Sonnenfeldt; and approved by Irwin.

Document 253: Telegram 67420 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, April 19, 1972, 1650Z

April 19, 1972, 1650Z

The Embassy was instructed to use the details of the proposed economic assistance program for South Asia provided in telegram 67420 to brief the Indian Government on the provisional nature of the $90 million allocation for India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated to Islamabad and Dacca. Drafted on April 18 by Schneider; cleared by Laingen and VAN HOLLEN, MacDonald (AID), and Saunders (White House); and approved by Irwin.

Document 254: Telegram 4957 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, April 20, 1972, 1426Z

April 20, 1972, 1426Z

Ambassador Keating questioned whether the instruction to register a stiff protest with Indian Foreign Minister SWARAN SINGH over his statement about Vietnam might have the effect of attaching more importance to the incident than the U.S. intended.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US. Secret; Niact; Immediate; Nodis.

Document 255: Telegram 69080 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, April 21, 1972, 0126Z

April 21, 1972, 0126Z

The Department agreed that Ambassador Keating should tone down his objection to Indian Foreign Minister SINGH's statement somewhat when he met with the Foreign Minister.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted on April 20 by Schneider; cleared by VAN HOLLEN, Davies, and Haig (White House); and approved by Rogers.

Document 256: Telegram 5044 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, April 21, 1972, 1450Z

April 21, 1972, 1450Z

Ambassador Keating registered with Indian Foreign Minister SINGH an objection to his "unbalanced" statement about the U.S. bombing campaign in North Vietnam. SINGH denied that his statement was biased and argued that it was an "objective judgment" on the situation as he saw it. He felt the issue should not prejudice progress toward improved relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

Document 257: Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 24, 1972

Washington, April 24, 1972

Saunders and Hoskinson summarized for Kissinger a CIA assessment of India's foreign policy in the wake of the war with Pakistan. They also drew policy implications from the assessment.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71'July 1972. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates Kissinger saw it. The 25-page Office of National Estimates memorandum summarized by Saunders and Hoskinson, entitled "India's Postwar Foreign Policy,” April 5, is ibid.

Document 258: Telegram 5254 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, April 27, 1972, 1705Z

April 27, 1972, 1705Z

Ambassador Keating called for Washington to begin the process of trying to reverse what he saw as the "continued downward spiral" of relations between the U.S. and India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US. Secret; Nodis.

Document 259: National Intelligence Estimate 32'72, Washington, May 5, 1972

Washington, May 5, 1972

NIE 32'72 assessed Pakistan's difficult situation and uncertain future.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79'R01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA, and the intelligence organizations in the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, who abstained because the subject was outside of his jurisdiction. An initial cover sheet and table of contents are not published.

Document 260: Telegram 5704 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, May 8, 1972, 1445Z

May 8, 1972, 1445Z

In light of the qualified nature of proposed U.S. economic assistance for India, and the failure to restore the assistance embargoed during the crisis, the Indian Foreign Ministry concluded that the U.S. was no longer interested in the economic development of India and stipulated that "all Americans working on economic aid" should leave India within a month.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Nodis. Eyes only for Sisco and Hannah.

Document 261: Telegram 83263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, May 11, 1972, 2350Z

May 11, 1972, 2350Z

Ambassador Keating was instructed to propose consultations to produce a mutually agreed reduction of U.S. AID staff members in India, taking into account U.S. and Indian priorities for various programs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Eyes only for Ambassador from Hannah and Sisco. Drafted by Schneider and by Williams and Hannah; cleared by VAN HOLLEN, Sisco, Williams, and Hannah; and approved by Irwin.

Document 262: Telegram 5892 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, May 12, 1972, 0835Z

May 12, 1972, 0835Z

The Embassy submitted to the Department of External Affairs a list of AID personnel working in India with an indication of those leaving by September who would not be replaced.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, AID (US) INDIA. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. Eyes Only for Sisco and Hannah.

Document 263: Telegram 85263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, May 16, 1972, 0035Z

May 16, 1972, 0035Z

The Department reiterated that the Indian Government should be made aware that the request to reduce AID staff in India was carefully considered in Washington, and that the U.S. concurred.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted on May 15 by Schneider; cleared by VAN HOLLEN and Williams, and approved by Sisco.

Document 264: Telegram 6684 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, May 31, 1972, 1430Z

May 31, 1972, 1430Z

The question of eliminating the U.S. technical assistance program was considered at "the highest levels,” and it was decided that India would continue to request technical assistance in areas where U.S. technical superiority was obvious.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, AID (US) INDIA. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Eyes Only for Hannah and Sisco. Additional documentation on the further reduction of U.S. economic and technical assistance programs in India can be found ibid.

Document 265: Telegram 7113 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, June 9, 1972, 1525Z

June 9, 1972, 1525Z

Ambassador Keating viewed the impending visit of outgoing Secretary of the Treasury Connally as an opportunity to take a step in the direction of repairing relations between the U.S. and India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71'July 1972. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon's request to review with host governments matters of mutual interest. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Document 266: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 12, 1972

Washington, June 12, 1972

Nixon approved a recommendation that the U.S. participate with other members of the India consortium in rescheduling India's debt.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71'July 1972. Secret. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Nixon saw it. The President initialed the approval line. Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers on June 12 informing him of the President's decision. (Ibid.) The decision relating to the India consortium came in the wake of the meeting of the Pakistan consortium in Paris on May 26. The United States agreed at that meeting to assume responsibility for $50 million of the $108 million of Pakistan's long-term debt that was rescheduled and also pledged $60 million of commodity assistance to Pakistan. (Telegram 4900 from Islamabad, June 5; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, AID 9 PAK)

Document 267: Memorandum of Conversation, Peking, June 20, 1972, 2:05'6:05 p.m.

Peking, June 20, 1972, 2:05'6:05 p.m.

In a conversation with Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger reviewed the cooperation between the United States and China during the crisis in South Asia.

Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Manuscript Division, Box TS 36, South Asia, Chronological File, July 1971'Nov 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation was held in the Great Hall of the People.

Document 268: Memorandum of Conversation, Peking, June 22, 1972, 3:58'6:35 p.m.

Peking, June 22, 1972, 3:58'6:35 p.m.

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai shared their concern about Soviet influence in South Asia and their opposition to the development of Indian hegemony over the subcontinent.

Source: Library of Congress, Kissinger Papers, Manuscript Division, Box TS 36, South Asia Chronological File, July 1971'Nov 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The conversation was held in a guest house.

Document 269: Telegram 5434 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, June 22, 1972, 1138Z

June 22, 1972, 1138Z

Pakistani President Bhutto indicated that he was prepared to be as flexible as possible during his forthcoming summit meeting with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi. He added that if Awami League President Mujibur Rahman was prepared to meet without requiring prior recognition of his government and dropped the threat to try Pakistani prisoners as war criminals, he anticipated that he could propose recognition of Bangaladesh following a meeting with Mujib in July.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, New Delhi, London, Karachi, and Lahore.

Document 270: Telegram WH 22043 From the White House to the Embassy in New Zealand, June 22, 1972, 2349Z

New Zealand, June 22, 1972, 2349Z

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig cabled former Treasury Secretary Connally on President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger's instructions to suggest that when he met with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in New Delhi he inform her that a continuing stream of public criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam on the part of her and members of her Government would not form a basis for the dialogue to improve India's relations with the U.S. that they indicated they wanted to initiate.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 150, Geopolitical File, India, 21 May 1971'21 Dec 1972. Secret; Eyes Only. The telegram was sent from Haig to Connally and marked for the attention of Hoskinson who was traveling with Connally.

Document 271: Backchannel Message WH22059 From President Nixon to John Connally in New Zealand, Washington, June 24, 1972

Washington, June 24, 1972

Nixon referred to the previous telegram from Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig to Connally regarding his meeting with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and added the following instruction: "I would like to emphasize that it is essential that you take the strongest stand on this issue and would like to reemphasize the importance I attach to your maintaining the toughest and most aloof demeanor during your Indian leg in the face of these Indian attacks.”

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 28, Geopolitical File, India Chronological File, 4 Nov 1971'19 Sept 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Haig signed the telegram for Nixon.

Document 272: Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, July 3, 1972

Washington, July 3, 1972

The note assesses the agreement signed by Pakistani President Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi at Simla, India on July 3.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'PAK. Limited Official Use. Drafted in INR/DRR/RNA by David McGaffey and approved by Office Director Curtis Jones. The Embassy in Pakistan forwarded the text of the Simla agreement to the Department on July 3 in telegram 5737 from Islamabad. (Ibid.) In analyzing the agreement, the Embassy concluded that it set the stage for further negotiations on the central issue of Kashmir. (Telegram 5748 from Islamabad, July 3; ibid) The Department was encouraged by the "clear and repeated affirmation on the part of both India and Pakistan of their desire to put an end to conflict and confrontation in South Asia and of their desire to work towards durable peace.” (Telegram 120269 to New Delhi, July 3; ibid.)

Document 273: Telegram 8245 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, July 4, 1972, 1921Z

July 4, 1972, 1921Z

The Embassy reported that former Treasury Secretary Connally and Indian Foreign Minister SWARAN SINGH reviewed the state of U.S.-Indian relations. The focus was on prospects for improved relations, but the exchange became sharp on the issues of U.S. arms supplies to Pakistan and Indian criticism of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Confidential; Exdis. Also designated Conto 220. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Athens for Secretary Rogers , the White House for Jeanne Davis, and Treasury for Leonard S. Dixon, Director of the Office of Administration. Connally's stops in South Asia included Dacca, July 3 and 4, New Delhi, July 4 and 5, Islamabad, July 5'7, and Kabul, July 7. A number of the issues discussed by Connally and SINGH on July 4 were explored at greater length with Foreign Secretary Kaul on July 5 by VAN HOLLEN, DCM Galen Stone, and John M. Hennessy, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. The conversation was reported to the Department on July 6 in Telegram 5874 from Islamabad. (Ibid.)

Document 274: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 5, 1972

Washington, July 5, 1972

Kissinger provided an assessment of the Simla agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71'July 1972. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates Nixon saw it.

Document 275: National Security Study Memorandum 156, Washington, July 5, 1972

Washington, July 5, 1972

On behalf of the President, his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger directed that an analysis of the implications for U.S. policy of a nuclear test by India be prepared.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSMs), Nos. 104'206. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Document 276: Telegram 5868 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, July 6, 1972, 1222Z

July 6, 1972, 1222Z

The cable reported on former Treasury Secretary Connally's exchange with Indian Finance Minister Y. B. Chavan on July 4. The conversation dealt with international monetary and trade reform and with India's perception that the rules governing economic assistance were inequitable and worked to the disadvantage of third world countries.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Confidential; Exdis. Also designated Conto 240. Repeated to New Delhi, Dacca, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Caltigta, Belgrade for Rogers , the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 277: Telegram 4075 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 7, 1972, 2117Z

July 7, 1972, 2117Z

In the first of seven telegrams reporting on his conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi in Simla on July 5, former Treasury Secretary Connally said that he opened the conversation by summarizing the results of President Nixon's trips to Peking and Moscow.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated Conto 254. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 278: Telegram 4076 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 7, 1972, 2120Z

July 7, 1972, 2120Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed the Simla agreement. Connally raised the issue of U.S. assistance to India and Bangladesh and expressed concern that U.S. motives were being misconstrued.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 255. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 279: Telegram 4077 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 7, 1972, 2125Z

July 7, 1972, 2125Z

In the course of discussing the possibility of improved relations between the U.S. and India, former Treasury Secretary Connally and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed the contentious issues of U.S. military supplies to Pakistan and Indian criticism of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 256. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon. Telegrams 4077 through 4080 from Iran, which reported on various aspects of Connally's conversation with Gandhi, Documents 279'282, were misdated as July 8.

Document 280: Telegram 4078 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 7, 1972, 2130Z

July 7, 1972, 2130Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed economic and monetary issues. Gandhi indicated that although her Government had nationalized a number of insurance companies operating in India, she still welcomed foreign investment in sectors such as banking, where India needed foreign investment and expertise.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 257. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 281: Telegram 4079 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 7, 1972, 2130Z

July 7, 1972, 2130Z

In a discussion of the capability of the new Government of Bangladesh to function effectively, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi reiterated that the return of Bengalis from West Pakistan was important.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 258. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 282: Telegram 4080 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 7, 1972, 2135Z

July 7, 1972, 2135Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally commented on the U.S. Presidential campaign, expressing confidence in President Nixon's reelection, and he and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi discussed the political situation in India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 259. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 283: Telegram 4081 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 7, 1972, 2135Z

July 7, 1972, 2135Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally reported that Indian Prime Minister Gandhi's attitude was pleasant and courteous throughout the conversation, even when the exchanges became rather frank.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 260. Sent with instructions to pass to the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 284: Telegram 4085 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 8, 1972, 0940Z

July 8, 1972, 0940Z

In the first of a seven part report on his conversation with Pakistani President Bhutto in Rawalpindi on July 6, Former Treasury Secretary Connally noted that he opened the conversation by indicating that President Nixon had instructed him to inform Bhutto about his trips to Peking and Moscow, and to discuss other issues of mutual interest.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 263. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 285: Telegram 4086 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 8, 1972, 1000Z

July 8, 1972, 1000Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Pakistani President Bhutto discussed the U.S. Presidential campaign.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 264. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 286: Telegram 4087 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 8, 1972, 1030Z

July 8, 1972, 1030Z

Pakistani President Bhutto outlined the trying circumstances in Pakistan he had to deal with since becoming president. He discussed the difficulties of reaching an understanding with Awami League President Rahman that would enable him to recognize Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 265. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 287: Telegram 4088 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 8, 1972, 1130Z

July 8, 1972, 1130Z

Pakistani President Bhutto offered a pessimistic assessment of the Simla conference and the prospects for future dealings with India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 266. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 288: Telegram 4089 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 8, 1972, 1215Z

July 8, 1972, 1215Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally and Pakistani President Bhutto discussed President Nixon's trips to China and the Soviet Union. Bhutto pointed to the growing Soviet presence in South Asia and stressed the importance of an offsetting U.S. presence in the area.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 267. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 289: Telegram 4090 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 8, 1972, 1250Z

July 8, 1972, 1250Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally concluded the conversation by offering suggestions on how to promote foreign investment in Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 268. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 290: Telegram 4091 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 8, 1972, 0645Z

July 8, 1972, 0645Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally concluded from his conversation with Pakistani President Bhutto that while Bhutto was "enormously upset" with India, he was intelligent and pragmatic enough to move beyond the crisis and rebuild his country without letting bitterness blind him.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also designated as Conto 269. The time given for the transmission of the telegram is apparently wrong. Sent with instructions to pass to Islamabad, New Delhi, Dacca, the White House for Davis, and Treasury for Dixon.

Document 291: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 14, 1972

Washington, July 14, 1972

Kissinger summarized reports from India that indicated Indian concerns about the outcome of the Moscow summit and provided evidence of a generally positive Indian reaction to former Treasury Secretary Connally's visit to India.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, Jul 1972'Oct 1974. Secret. Sent for information. Published from an uninitialed copy.

Document 292: Memorandum for the President's File by the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), San Clemente, California, July 14, 1972, 9 a.m.

San California, July 14, 1972, 9 a.m.

Former Treasury Secretary Connally reported to President Nixon on his trip.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 3, Memoranda for the President, Beginning July 9, 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President's Office in the Western White House.

Document 293: Telegram 9257 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, July 24, 1972, 1815Z

July 24, 1972, 1815Z

Ambassador Keating reported a disturbing farewell conversation with Indian Prime Minister Gandhi and drew the conclusion that "at the apex of Indian policy there is a nexus of emotional and distorted attitudes concerning the US which cannot help but burden the prospects for improved Indo-American relations.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US. Secret; Exdis. Keating subsequently discussed this conversation with SINGH. SINGH put the best possible light on the exchange between Gandhi and Keating and concluded that it marked the beginning of a dialogue between India and the United States. (Telegram 9256 from New Delhi, July 25; ibid.)

Document 294: Telegram 9254 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, July 25, 1972, 1745Z

July 25, 1972, 1745Z

Ambassador Keating reported on his farewell calls on Indian President Giri, Indian Prime Minister Gandhi, and Indian Foreign Minister SINGH. Keating was given what he described as "the Indian treatment”: "I was first warmed and relaxed by the affable Giri, then rudely pummeled and goaded by the madam, and finally brain-washed by the great rationalizer SWARAN SINGH.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US. Confidential; Exdis. Keating left his post on July 26. The post remained vacant until Daniel Patrick Moynihan was appointed on February 8, 1973.

Document 295: Telegram 9293 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, July 26, 1972, 1100Z

July 26, 1972, 1100Z

The Embassy concluded that India had no current plans to develop nuclear weapons.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 598, Country Files, Middle East, India, Vol. V, 31 Dec 71'July 72. Secret; Exdis.

Document 296: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, August 1, 1972

Washington, August 1, 1972

Acting Secretary of State Irwin, Assistant Secretary Sisco, and other interested Department of State officials discussed how best to dissuade India from developing nuclear weapons.

Source: Department of State, NEA/INC Files: Lot 77 D 387, Working File'Indian Nuclear Intentions. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted in NEA/INC on August 2 by Dennis Kux. The 42-page draft response to NSSM 156, prepared in NEA/INC on August 4, is ibid. For NSSM 156, see Document 275.

Document 297: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 2, 1972

Washington, August 2, 1972

Acting Secretary of State Irwin and Indian Ambassador Jha discussed the possibility of developing a dialogue to improve relations between the United States and India. Jha sought to explain the negative comments made by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi during Ambassador Keating's farewell call and argued that if a constructive dialogue were not initiated soon, increasing anti-American sentiment in India might make it difficult to do so.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970'73, POL INDIA'US. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on August 7 by Kux and cleared in draft by Irwin.

Document 298: Special National Intelligence Estimate 31'72, Washington, August 3, 1972

Washington, August 3, 1972

SNIE 31'72 analyzed Indian nuclear developments and their likely implications.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79'R01012A, NIC Files. Secret; Sensitive; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was prepared by the CIA, and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, the AEC, and the NSA. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred in the estimate except the representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Treasury, who abstained because the subject was outside of their jurisdiction.

Document 299: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, August 30, 1972, 11:10'11:30 a.m.

Washington, August 30, 1972, 11:10'11:30 a.m.

During his initial call on Secretary of Defense Laird, Pakistani Ambassador Sultan Mohammed Khan brought up the issue of military supplies for Pakistan and the "one-time exception" sale offer of October 1970. Laird indicated that the U.S. was prepared to consider Pakistan's request but not until later in the year.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 75'0125, Pakistan 1972. Confidential. Drafted on September 5 by Lieutenant Colonel Gross and approved by Nutter. The conversation was held in Secretary Laird's office.

Document 300: Response to National Security Study Memorandum 156, Washington, September 1, 1972

Washington, September 1, 1972

In response to NSSM 156, the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia assessed India's nuclear capabilities and intentions and U.S. options for influencing India on the issue.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 77'0094, India, 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The paper was circulated on September 26 to the CIA, the JCS, and the Departments of State, Defense, and the Treasury by Jeanne Davis, Staff Secretary of the NSC, under cover of a memorandum indicating that the paper would be considered by the Senior Review Group at a time to be determined. Copies were also sent to the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. (Ibid) The paper was prepared by an ad hoc group representing State, Defense, CIA, AEC, and ACDA, headed by Sisco, as chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia. The annexes cited in the paper were attached but are not published. The footnotes in the paper occur in the source text. For NSSM 156, see Document 275.

Document 301: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 8, 1972

Washington, September 8, 1972

Nixon approved Kissinger's recommendation that he defer a decision on a Pakistani request for the release of a limited amount of military equipment owned by Pakistan but still in the U.S. as a result of the embargo on military shipments to India and Pakistan.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, July 1972–Oct 1974. Secret. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. A notation at the end of the memorandum indicates that Caspar Weinberger and William Timmons, the President's Assistant for Congressional Relations, endorsed Kissinger's recommendation. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation.

Document 302: Telegram 7547 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, September 8, 1972, 1314Z

September 8, 1972, 1314Z

Pakistani President Bhutto explained to Chargé Sober why Pakistan had not recognized Bangladesh by August as had been anticipated in the Simla agreement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Dacca, London, New Delhi, USUN, Karachi, and Lahore.

Document 303: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 22, 1972, 4:20–4:55 p.m.

Washington, September 22, 1972, 4:20–4:55 p.m.

The President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Indian Ambassador Jha agreed that it was time to begin taking measures to normalize relations between the U.S. and India but recognized that not much of consequence could be done until after the presidential election in November.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 150, Geopolitical File, India, 21 May 1971–21 Dec 1972. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The conversation was held in Kissinger's office in the White House. I. G. Patel was the Special Secretary of the Indian Ministry of Finance.

Document 304: Telegram 3739 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, New York, October 6, 1972, 2300Z

New York, October 6, 1972, 2300Z

In a meeting with Indian Foreign Minister SINGH at the UN, Secretary Rogers took sharp exception to allegations reportedly made by Prime Minister Gandhi that the CIA was interfering in India's internal affairs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 INDIA. Secret; Exdis. Also designated as Secto 70. Repeated to New Delhi, Islamabad, and Dacca. The allegations made by Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to which Rogers referred were reported on October 3 in telegram 1577 from Calcutta. In a speech before Congress Party workers, Gandhi stated that she had information that the CIA had become active in India and she asked party workers to be vigilant and counteract its activities. (Ibid., POL INDIA–US)

Document 305: Telegram 8436 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 12, 1972, 1229Z

October 12, 1972, 1229Z

Chargé Sober recommended approval of a Pakistani request for 400,000 tons of wheat under PL— 480 to offset the effects of a drought. Sober noted Pakistani President Bhutto's urgent interest in the request.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. Confidential; Exdis. Pakistan made the case for additional PL–480 supplies in an aide-mémoire submitted to the U.S. Embassy on October 3. According to the aide-mémoire, the wheat harvest in Pakistan had suffered from drought and unless the requested supplies were provided by the United States, the Government would be confronted with sharp rises in politically sensitive wheat prices. (Telegram 8317 from Islamabad, October 6; ibid.)

Document 306: Telegram 8648 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, October 23, 1972, 1053Z

October 23, 1972, 1053Z

Chargé Sober reported that Pakistani President Bhutto urgently repeated his request for 400,000 tons of PL–480 wheat.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 PAK. Confidential; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated to Karachi and Lahore. Sent with instructions to pass to Agriculture, AID, the Treasury, and the White House.

Document 307: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 27, 1972, 12:00–12:45 p.m.

Washington, October 27, 1972, 12:00–12:45 p.m.

Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Haig met with Pakistani Foreign Secretary Iftikhar Ali to discuss Pakistan's intentions with regard to Bangladesh and the state of Pakistan's relations with India. National Security Council staff member Harold Saunders, who attended the meeting, explained the basis for the pending U.S. response to Pakistan's request for wheat.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. The memorandum bears Saunders' typed signature. The meeting was held in Haig's office in the White House.

Document 308: Memorandum From the Country Director for India, Ceylon, and Nepal (Schneider) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, October 30, 1972

Washington, October 30, 1972

At Sisco's request, Schneider listed U.S. programs in India that had been curtailed by the Indian Government since December 1971.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Drafted in NEA/INC by Donald W. Born. Sent through Armin H. Meyer, who was assigned to NEA as a special consultant after returning to the Department following 3 years as U.S. Ambassador to Japan. He had previously been Ambassador to Lebanon and Iran.

Document 309: Telegram 13259 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, November 3, 1972, 1335Z

November 3, 1972, 1335Z

The Embassy reported on continuing allegations of CIA activities in India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Sent as a joint Embassy/USIS message. Repeated to Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Kathmandu, Moscow, Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras.

Document 310: Telegram 201141 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, November 4, 1972, 0022Z

November 4, 1972, 0022Z

The U.S. agreed to participate with the other members of the India Consortium in restructuring India's foreign debt.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 9 INDIA. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted on November 3 by Schneider; cleared in the Office of International Finance and Development of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs by John Gervers, and in the Office of Planning and Development of AID's Bureau for Asia by Alfred D. White; and approved by Meyer.

Document 311: Memorandum From Harold Saunders and John Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 8, 1972

Washington, November 8, 1972

In apparent response to what he found to be a disappointing decision by the U.S. on his request for PL–480 wheat, Pakistani President Bhutto decided to recognize the Governments of North Korea and North Vietnam, and was considering recognition of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia. He also withdrew Pakistan from SEATO.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for action. Hoskinson initialed for Saunders. Telegram 9038 from Islamabad, November 8, reported that Pakistan had recognized North Korea and North Vietnam and was considering recognition of the Sihanouk Government in Cambodia. (Ibid.) Kissinger checked the approval line. A handwritten notation in the margin next to the approval line, in Richard Kennedy's hand, reads: ”Kennedy to call in Amb Khan per telcon with HAK 11/9/72.”

Document 312: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 9, 1972, 4:30 p.m.

Washington, November 9, 1972, 4:30 p.m.

NSC staff members Kennedy and Saunders called in Pakistani Ambassador Khan to discuss Pakistan's decision to recognize North Vietnam and North Korea. Kennedy said the decision came at a sensitive time in U.S. negotiations with North Vietnam and might create problems with the Congress in seeking support for renewed arms supplies for Pakistan. He asked that U.S. interests be taken into account in the decision to recognize the Sihanouk Government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office.

Document 313: Telegram 207769 From the Department of State to the Embassy in India, November 15, 1972, 1609Z

November 15, 1972, 1609Z

Deputy Secretary Irwin and Indian Foreign Secretary-designate KEWAL SINGH discussed prospects for improved relations between the U.S. and India.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Confidential. Drafted by Kux on November 13, cleared by Sisco, and approved by Irwin. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, USUN, Bonn, Kathmandu, and Colombo.

Document 314: Letter From Indian Prime Minister Gandhi to President Nixon, New Delhi, November 28, 1972

New Delhi, November 28, 1972

Gandhi responded in kind to a letter from Nixon expressing his desire for improved relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. No classification marking. Gandhi sent Nixon a message of congratulations following his reelection. Nixon responded on November 19 with a letter to Gandhi in which he looked toward improved relations between the U.S. and India: "I hope our two countries can develop a sounder relationship based on understanding and respect for mutual interests.” (Ibid., Box 755, Presidential Correspondence File, India (1972)) Gandhi's letter of November 28 was delivered to the White House by the Indian Embassy on December 5. The text was transmitted to New Delhi on December 6 in telegram 220565. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US)

Document 315: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 29, 1972

Washington, November 29, 1972

Saunders assessed the state of relations between the U.S. and Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger highlighted the first of the paragraphs dealing with arms supply and underlined the first three sentences of the paragraph.

Document 316: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 29, 1972, 11:45 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

Washington, November 29, 1972, 11:45 a.m.–12:10 p.m.

President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger and Pakistani Ambassador SULTAN KHAN reviewed a number of issues bearing on relations between the United States and Pakistan.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 202, Geopolitical File, Pakistan, 13 Sept 1971–7 Mar 1973. Confidential. The meeting was held in Kissinger's office in the White House. Tabs A–C were attached but not published.

Document 317: Telegram 217378 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, November 30, 1972, 2242Z

November 30, 1972, 2242Z

Guidance from the Department of State to the Embassies in Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh stipulated that negotiations relating to a peace settlement in South Asia should be left to the countries directly involved, without U.S. mediation.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–PAK. Confidential. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Schneider and Meyer, and in IO/UNP by John Kimball; and approved by Sisco. Also sent to New Delhi and Dacca. Repeated to London, Kabul, Tehran, Ankara, Colombo, and USUN.

Document 318: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 1, 1972

Washington, December 1, 1972

Saunders proposed responses to the issues that Pakistani Ambassador Khan had raised with Kissinger.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 628, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. X, Sept 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for action with Kennedy's concurrence. Kissinger initialed his approval of each of Saunders' recommendations, with one exception. He did not respond to recommendation b of the second section relating to military supply. Approval of recommendation b for dealing with the issue of military supply was implied in Kissinger's delegation to Saunders of the responsibility for providing a response to Khan on the issue and in the handwritten note Kissinger added in the margin in approving recommendation a: "But move fast & give Pakistan a break”. As for the recommendation in section 4, Kissinger authorized a letter to be sent to Pakistani President Bhutto rather than an oral response. The memorandum did not have a section 5. In section 6, Kissinger approved of Saunders meeting with Ambassador Khan to discuss the issues dealt with in the memorandum. The draft letter at Tab A and the memorandum dealing with Pakistan's request for landing rights at Tab B were attached but not published.

Document 319: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 2, 1972

Washington, December 2, 1972

The Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs concluded that a statement made in the Indian Parliament by Foreign Minister SINGH constituted "a strong signal that India now desires better relations.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL INDIA–US. Unclassified with confidential attachment. Deputy Executive Secretary Harry Barnes signed the transmittal memorandum for Eliot. Foreign Minister SINGH made the statement on November 30 in the Rajya Sabha, the upper house of the Indian Parliament. The text of the statement was transmitted to the Department on December 1 in telegram 14364 from New Delhi. (Ibid.)

Document 320: Memorandum From Douglas M. Cochran of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, December 8, 1972

Washington, December 8, 1972

Cochran's memorandum detailed what he described as Pakistan's "growing nervousness" over the state of its relations with the United States.

Source: Department of State, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 76 D 52, PAK/Indian Negotiations July–Dec 1972. Confidential. Cleared by Meyer and sent through Laingen. The December 4 meeting between Rogers and Tridev Roy, head of Pakistan's delegation to the UN General Assembly, was reported to Islamabad on December 5 in telegram 220229. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 PAK)

Document 321: Telegram 9952 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, December 12, 1972, 0600Z

December 12, 1972, 0600Z

Chargé Sober reported that Pakistan and India had reached agreement on delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir. He speculated that further progress on implementing the Simla accord could be anticipated and he recommended a congratulatory letter from President Nixon to Pakistani President Bhutto and Indian Prime Minister Gandhi.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 INDIA–PAK. Confidential; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to New Delhi. Agreement on delineation of the line of control in Jammu and Kashmir was announced in Pakistan on December 11. Mutual troop withdrawals to the border between the two countries were scheduled to begin the following day. (Telegram 9965 from Islamabad, December 12; ibid., POL 31–1 INDIA–PAK) The troop withdrawals were completed by December 20. (Telegram 10226 from Islamabad, December 21; ibid.)

Document 322: Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 14, 1972

Washington, December 14, 1972

Saunders and Hoskinson reviewed U.S. relations with India and Pakistan and proposed a scenario involving a gradual improvement of relations with India, based to some extent on economic assistance, and a positive response to Pakistan's requests for economic assistance and limited military supplies. Kissinger approved and sent to the President the proposed memorandum dealing with military supplies for Pakistan but did not act on the larger proposed scenario.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972). Secret. Sent for action. The documents cited at Tabs A and C were attached but not published. Kissinger initialed the memorandum at Tab B and sent it to Nixon on December 23. (See Document 323) He apparently did not send to the President the memorandum attached at Tab A, which would have advanced the three phase proposals put forward by Saunders and Hoskinson. Under Phase I, a., Kissinger put a check mark in the margin to indicate he wished to discuss the President's letter to Jha. Under Phase I, b., Kissinger wrote "No" in the margin next to the suggestion that Connally should be sent back to India. Under the same heading, Kissinger asked in the margin about an informal agenda to be discussed with the Indians: "What's the agenda[?]" And under Phase II, a., Kissinger wrote in the margin next to the first item: "What is that? Expand.”

Document 323: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 23, 1972

Washington, December 23, 1972

Kissinger reviewed for the President the options relating to the question of renewing the flow of military supplies to Pakistan. Nixon approved a recommendation calling a "clean-up exercise" involving the release to Pakistan and India of military supplies that were caught in the embargo imposed during the crisis.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Saunders and Hoskinson. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendations. Kissinger then added a handwritten note for Saunders: "Hal–Do what is necessary.”

Document 324: Memorandum From the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Afghanistan (Naas) to the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann), Kabul, February 13, 1969

Kabul, February 13, 1969

NAAS recalled the assurance Neumann had received from King ZAHIR that Afghanistan did not plan military expenditures large enough to trigger congressionally mandated constraints on economic assistance to Afghanistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 75 D 129, AID 1–1, Conte–Symington amendments 1969. Secret. Neumann's meeting with King ZAHIR on December 30, 1968, was reported to the Department on January 4 in telegram 42 from Kabul. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 1 AFG) The Conte–Long amendment was section 119 of the Foreign Assistance and Related Appropriations Act of 1968. The amendment directed the President to withhold economic assistance in an amount equivalent to the amount spent by any underdeveloped country other than Greece, Turkey, Iran, Israel, the Republic of China, the Philippines, and Korea for the purchase of sophisticated weapons systems. (PL 90–249; 81 Stat. 936) The Symington amendment was section 620(s) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1967. The amendment required the President to withhold economic assistance if in his view the recipient country excessively and unnecessarily diverted resources to military expenditures. (PL 90–137; 81 Stat. 445)

Document 325: Telegram 2080 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, May 26, 1969, 1620Z

May 26, 1969, 1620Z

Secretary of State Rogers reported on his conversations with Afghani King ZAHIR and Prime Minister Etemadi on May 25.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, ORG 7 S. Confidential; Priority. Also sent to Rawalpindi. Repeated to Kabul, London, Moscow, Ankara, and New Delhi. Also sent as Secto 115. Secretary Rogers visited South Asia following his participation in the SEATO meetings in Bangkok, May 19–23, and prior to his participation in the CENTO meetings in Tehran, May 26–27. He stopped in New Delhi May 23–24, in Lahore, Pakistan May 24–25, and in Kabul May 25. A fuller account of Rogers' conversation with Etemadi was sent to the Department on June 2 in airgram A–84 from Kabul. (Ibid., POL AFG–US)

Document 326: Country Policy Statement on Afghanistan, Washington, August 6, 1969

Washington, August 6, 1969

The country policy statement, approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, outlined U.S. policy and programs in Afghanistan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan. Secret. According to an attached cover sheet, signed by Sisco as Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Near East and South Asia, and also signed by Country Director Spengler, and Sober, as Staff Director of NSCIG/NEA, the group approved the statement and issued it "for the guidance of all concerned with United States policy and programs in Afghanistan.” A table of contents was also attached but not printed. Sober drafted the policy statement. Richardson sent an advance copy of the statement to Kissinger. (Ibid.)

Document 327: Information Memorandum From the Acting Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (Spengler) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies), Washington, August 27, 1969

Washington, August 27, 1969

Spengler noted that Afghanistan had recently purchased three fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union, and he pointed to the problems the purchase could pose for U.S. assistance programs for Afghanistan because of the stipulations of the Conte and Symington amendments.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 75 D 129, AID 1–12 Conte/Symington–SU–7s 1969. Secret. Drafted by Walter G. Ramsay. A copy was sent to Rockwell.

Document 328: Telegram 146191 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, August 28, 1969, 2238Z

Afghanistan, August 28, 1969, 2238Z

Ambassador Neumann was instructed to seek clarification from the Afghan Government as to whether the purchase of SU–7 fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union violated the stipulations of the Conte amendment.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Secret. Joint State/AID message. For the Ambassador. Drafted by Ramsay (NEA/PAF); cleared by Rockwell, Richard C. Matheron (J/PM), and with DOD/ISA, AID/NESA, AID/GC, and AID/PPC; and approved by Spengler.

Document 329: Letter From the Country Officer for Afghanistan (Ramsay) to the Political Counselor of the Embassy in Afghanistan (Naas), Washington, August 29, 1969

Washington, August 29, 1969

Ramsay wrote to NAAS to express his misgivings about the effect the Afghan purchase of fighter-bombers from the Soviet Union might have on the U.S. ability to continue to provide economic assistance to Afghanistan in light of the strictures established by the Conte amendment.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 75 D 129, AID 1–12 Conte/Symington–SU–7s 1969. Secret; Official-Informal. The letter is an unsigned copy. NAAS' August 21 letter to Ramsay is ibid.

Document 330: Telegram 4515 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, September 4, 1969, 0835Z

September 4, 1969, 0835Z

Ambassador Neumann reported that, as instructed, he had met with Afghani Deputy Foreign Minister Farhadi and raised the issue of the purchase of the SU–7s and the possible impact on U.S economic assistance to Afghanistan. Neumann asked for details concerning the purchase.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Secret. Repeated to DIA.

Document 331: Telegram 5090 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, October 6, 1969, 1150Z

October 6, 1969, 1150Z

Afghani Deputy Foreign Minister Farhadi assured Ambassador Neumann that the SU–7s were purchased as replacement aircraft, and that the agreement to do so was negotiated before January 2, 1968. Therefore, the Conte amendment should not come into play.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Confidential.

Document 332: Telegram 5218 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, October 14, 1969, 0815Z

October 14, 1969, 0815Z

King ZAHIR reviewed for Ambassador Neumann the recent history of his government's military acquisition policy and noted that the agreement to purchase SU–7s from the Soviet Union was signed in November 1964.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, DEF 19–6 USSR–AFG. Confidential. Repeated to DIA for DIACO.

Document 333: Telegram 24 From the Consulate in Auckland, New Zealand, to the Department of State, January 16, 1970, 0600Z

January 16, 1970,0600Z

Vice President Agnew met with Prime Minister Etemadi in Kabul on January 7 and reviewed U.S.-Afghan relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/AGNEW. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent with a request to pass to Kabul. Also sent as VIPTO 21. Agnew visited Afghanistan January 6-7, 1970, as part of a 3-week tour of Asia, which included stops in the Philippines, the Republic of China, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Nepal, South Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand. Additional documentation on Agnew's visit to Afghanistan can be found ibid., Conference Files, 1966-1972, Entry 3051B, Box 508, Lot 70 D 387, CF 425. Documentation on the entire trip can be found ibid., Boxes 506-510. During Agnew's visit to Kabul, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented the Vice President with an aide-mémoire outlining the effort Afghanistan was making to deal with its development problems, and another which put forward requests for additional funding of the AID program in the Helmand valley. The texts of the two documents were transmitted to Washington on January 17 in airgram A-06 from Kabul. (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, E 5 AFG)

Document 334: Memorandum From Vice President Agnew to President Nixon, Washington, January 21, 1970

Washington, January 21, 1970

Agnew reported on his January 7 conversation with King ZAHIR.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan. Secret; Nodis; Eyes Only. On January 21 Agnew also sent Nixon a brief summary of his conversation with Prime Minister Etemadi, noting that it had been reported in greater detail earlier. (See Document 333) He sent copies of both memoranda to Kissinger, who forwarded them to Nixon on January 26, under cover of a memorandum summarizing them. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan)

Document 335: Letter From the Afghan Minister of Planning (Sarabi) to the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann), Kabul, July 20, 1970

Kabul, July 20, 1970

Because of drought conditions in Afghanistan, Sarabi sent an urgent request to Neumann for 100,000 tons of wheat under the PL-480 program.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID(US) 15-8 AFG. Unclassified. Sent to the Department on September 2 as an attachment to airgram Kabul Toaid A-375. Published from a copy that indicates Sarabi signed the original. Public Law 480 was the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 as amended. PL-480 was a program of agricultural subsidies to developing countries popularly known as the Food for Peace Act. (68 Stat. 454)

Document 336: Telegram 6242 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, October 8, 1970, 0810Z

October 8, 1970, 0810Z

The Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs inquired about the status of the request for 100,000 tons of PL-480 wheat.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID(US) 15-8 AFG. Limited Official Use. Sent as a joint Embassy/AID message. On October 24, the Department authorized the Embassy to negotiate an agreement for 50,000 metric tons of wheat. Budgetary limitations precluded an agreement for the full amount requested. (AID airgram 2370 to Kabul; ibid.) The PL-480 agreement was signed in Kabul on March 27, 1971. (Telegram 2125 from Kabul, March 27; ibid.) The text of the agreement was transmitted to the Department on March 31 in airgram A-33. (Ibid.)

Document 337: Letter From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Kabul, December 29, 1970

Kabul, December 29, 1970

Neumann assessed the role played by King ZAHIR in Afghan politics and weighed the prospects for using the limited U.S. presence in Afghanistan to offset the preponderant Soviet influence.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Afghanistan. Confidential. Sisco added a handwritten note on the first page which reads: “DM I could not get thru the length of this. JJS” It is not clear to whom the note was addressed. Neumann sent a copy of this letter to Kissinger. On February 17, 1971, Kissinger responded with a letter to Neumann in which he praised Neumann's "perceptive" assessment and noted "I found your description of the King's balancing act a useful approach to the kind of political situation you are watching.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Afghanistan) Sisco sent a telegram to Neumann on January 26, 1971, in which he indicated that it would not be possible to schedule a visit by King ZAHIR during the coming year. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 AFG)

Document 338: Telegram 4311 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, July 12, 1971, 1020Z

July 12, 1971, 1020Z

The Embassy supported an urgent request from the Afghan Government for 100,000 tons of wheat under PL-480.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID(US) 15-8 AFG. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent as a joint AID/Embassy message. The Afghan request was conveyed to the Embassy by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in an aide-mémoire on June 14. (Telegram 3767 from Kabul, June 15; ibid., AID(US) 15-9 AFG) On July 31 AIDauthorized the Embassy to begin negotiations for a PL-480 agreement for the requested amount of wheat. (AID airgram A-1632 to Kabul; ibid., AID(US) 15-8 AFG)

Document 339: Intelligence Note Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, July 29, 1971

Washington, July 29, 1971

The intelligence note assessed the prospects for success of the ZAHIR ministry.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 AFG. Confidential. On May 16, the Government of Nur Ahmad Etemadi resigned as a result of an impasse with the Parliament. (Telegram 3229 from Kabul, May 17; ibid.) On June 8 King ZAHIR appointed his "long-time friend and confidant" Dr. Abdul Zahir as Prime Minister and asked him to form a government. Dr. ZAHIR, who had a long career as a public servant, was educated as a physician in the United States. The Embassy in Kabul judged that ZAHIR's strengths as Prime Minister derived from his knowledge of the Afghan Parliament and the fact that he enjoyed the King's confidence. (Airgram A-69 from Kabul, June 19; ibid.)

Document 340: Telegram 4745 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, August 2, 1971, 0946Z

August 2, 1971, 0946Z

Ambassador Neumann met with King ZAHIR and pointed up the problems he felt the new Government would have to address, particularly with regard to the economy.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 AFG. Confidential. In telegram 4797 from Kabul, August 4, Neumann reported that he raised the same issues in his initial conversation with Prime Minister ZAHIR. (Ibid.)

Document 341: Telegram 4851 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, August 7, 1971, 1345Z

August 7, 1971, 1345Z

Ambassador Neumann urged a prompt response to the Afghan request for emergency assistance to deal with the effects of drought.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) 15–8 AFG. Confidential. Sent as a joint Embassy/USAID message. Sent attention for the Disaster Relief Coordinator. Repeated to Ankara, Bonn, Canberra, Islamabad, London, Moscow, Ottawa, USUN, Brussels, Tehran, and Rome for FODAG.

Document 342: Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Van Hollen) to Acting Secretary of State Johnson, Washington, August 9, 1971

Washington, August 9, 1971

VAN HOLLEN briefed Johnson on the severe impact of drought on Afghanistan. The sale of 100,000 tons of wheat under PL–480 had been approved recently, and VAN HOLLEN alerted Johnson that the U.S. could expect an Afghan request for an additional 100,000 tons.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Memoranda to the Secretary, July to Aug 1971. Confidential. Drafted in NEA/PAF by Robert A. Flaten, and cleared by Laingen and VAN HOLLEN. On August 9 Eliot sent a copy of this memorandum to Kissinger. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG)

Document 343: Letter From the Ambassador to Afghanistan (Neumann) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Kabul, August 12, 1971

Kabul, August 12, 1971

Neumann explained the part his Embassy played in prompting the Afghan Government to respond vigorously to the impact of the drought, and he advocated that the U.S and other creditor nations offer debt relief and long-term economic support to Afghanistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA Files: Lot 73 D 69, Afghanistan. Confidential. Copies were sent to Secretary of Agriculture Hardin, McDonald (AID), Russell S. McClure of the Operations Appraisal Staff in the Auditor General's Office in AID, and Laingen (NEA/PAF).

Document 344: Telegram 5041 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, August 16, 1971, 1002Z

August 16, 1971,1002Z

Afghanistan requested a moratorium on the repayment of debt owed to the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Bonn, Islamabad, London, Moscow, Manila, New Delhi, Ottawa, Paris, Tehran, Tokyo, and the US Mission to the European Community in Brussels. Also repeated to the US Asian Development Bank representative in Manila.

Document 345: Telegram 5067 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, August 17, 1971, 0933Z

August 17, 1971, 0933Z

Because of the impact of drought, Afghanistan increased its request for U.S. wheat to 250,000 tons and asked for it on a grant basis.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Sent as a joint Embassy/USAID message. Repeated to Islamabad, Moscow, and Rome for FODAG. A PL–480 agreement for 100,000 tons of wheat was signed in Kabul on August 23. The text of the agreement was transmitted to Washington on September 27 as an attachment to airgram A–110 from Kabul. (Ibid., AID (US) 15–4)

Document 346: Telegram 166666 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, September 10, 1971, 2109Z

September 10, 1971, 2109Z

The Embassy was instructed to inform the Afghan Government that the United States could not agree to a unilateral moratorium on debt payments.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Confidential. Drafted in E/IFD by Albert C. Cizauskas and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sidney Weintraub, cleared in NEA/PAF, in substance with Treasury, E/IFD/ODF, IBRD, and in information in IMF. Repeated to Moscow, Bonn, London, and Tokyo.

Document 347: Telegram 5641 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, September 13, 1971, 1305Z

September 13, 1971, 1305Z

The Embassy supported the Afghan request for an additional 150,000 tons of wheat.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use; Priority. Sent as a joint AID/Embassy message.

Document 348: Telegram 6010 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, September 28, 1971, 0755Z

September 28, 1971, 0755Z

Ambassador Neumann informed Foreign Minister Shafiq that the U.S. was prepared to provide an additional 100,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan on a grant basis. The two then discussed the Afghan proposal for a debt moratorium.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 AFG. Confidential.

Document 349: Telegram 6169 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, October 4, 1971, 1150Z

October 4, 1971, 1150Z

Prime Minister ZAHIR expressed appreciation for the grant of wheat, and Ambassador Neumann explained the U.S. position on the proposed debt moratorium and offered advice on the management of Afghanistan's debt problems.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FN 14 AFG. Confidential.

Document 350: Telegram Secto 157 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, New York, October 14, 1971, 1924Z

New York, October 14, 1971, 1924Z

Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Shafiq discussed the Afghan economy as affected by drought, debt rescheduling, and the problem of illegal drugs.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 AFG. Confidential. Also numbered USUN 3497. Repeated to Kabul and Moscow. Rogers was in New York for the autumn meeting of the UN General Assembly.

Document 351: Telegram 7282 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, December 4, 1971, 1230Z

December 4, 1971, 1230Z

Ambassador Neumann reported that King ZAHIR and Foreign Minister Shafiq shared the U.S. concern about the flow of illegal narcotics from Afghanistan and were "taking the subject very seriously.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara and Paris.

Document 352: Telegram 7281 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, December 4, 1971, 1235Z

December 4, 1971, 1235Z

Ambassador Neumann discussed Afghanistan's reaction to the crisis occurring in Pakistan with King ZAHIR and Foreign Minister Shafiq.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Belgrade, Islamabad, London, New Delhi, and Tehran.

Document 353: Telegram 616 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, February 1, 1972, 0600Z

February 1, 1972

In his year-end assessment of the situation in Afghanistan, Ambassador Neumann reported favorably on the performance and prospects of the ZAHIR Government. He observed that U.S. relations with Afghanistan were good, and he recommended U.S. initiatives that could be undertaken to support the ZAHIR Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15 AFG. Secret. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, and Tehran.

Document 354: Telegram 22013 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, February 8, 1972, 1912Z

February 8, 1972, 1912Z

The Department transmitted its narcotics control plan for Afghanistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 AFG. Confidential. Drafted on February 7 by Robert A. Flaten (NEA/PAF), cleared by Laingen and with the NEA Inter-Agency Working Group on Narcotics, and approved by Davies.

Document 355: Telegram 884 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, February 12, 1972, 1114Z

February 12, 1972, 1114Z

The Embassy "brought home" the narcotics problem to Afghan officials by stimulating and circulating foreign press coverage of the problem.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 AFG. Confidential. Also sent to USIA. Sent as a joint USIS/Embassy message.

Document 356: Telegram 956 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, February 16, 1972, 0416Z

February 16, 1972 0416Z

Ambassador Gross reported that, although adverse weather prevented him from visiting Afghanistan, he had conveyed through an Afghan official President Nixon's message concerning cooperative efforts to control opium production in Afghanistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 S/NM. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Geneva, Kabul, Paris, and USUN. NELSON GROSS was the Secretary's Coordinator for International Narcotics Affairs. The reference to a single convention is to the Single Convention on Narcotics Drugs, signed in New York on March 30, 1961. (18 UST 1407)

Document 357: Airgram Toaid A-71 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Agency for International Development, March 20, 1972

March 20, 1972

The AID mission within the Embassy assessed U.S. efforts to help the Afghan Government deal with the impact of drought and concluded that continuing U.S support would help Afghanistan with the aftermath of the crisis.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 AFG. Unclassified. Drafted in the AID mission by Charles L. Husick, cleared in the mission by Albert R. Baron, John R. Wilson, Alfonso D. Dominquez, and Cecil H. Uyehara; also cleared in the Embassy by David H. Cohn and Louis L. Mitchell, Jr., and approved by mission director Bartlett Harvey. A notation on the airgram indicates it was received on March 27.

Document 358: Telegram 52513 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, March 28, 1972, 1542Z

March 28, 1972, 1542Z

The Department expressed concern that domestic pressures in Afghanistan and Pakistan might be pushing both countries toward another confrontation over the Pushtunistan issue. The Embassies in Kabul and Islamabad were instructed to counsel restraint.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL AFG-PAK. Confidential. Drafted on March 27 by FLATEN (NEA/PAF), cleared in NEA/PAF by Peter Constable and Laingen, and with EUR/SOV, and approved by VAN HOLLEN. Also sent to Islamabad. Repeated to Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, and London. The reference to a recent Moscow speech is to a speech made by Prime Minister ZAHIR in Moscow on March 14 in which he described the Pushtunistan issue as the only problem that existed between Afghanistan and Pakistan and called for a "solution based on Pushtunistan people's right to determine own fate.” (Telegram 2307 from Moscow, March 15; ibid., POL 7 AFG.)

Document 359: Telegram 1806 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, March 31, 1972, 0400Z

March 31, 1972, 0400Z

Ambassador Neumann reported that, in the context of a "vague atmosphere of political crisis" in Kabul, former Prime Minister DAUD had initiated contact with the Embassy through an intermediary to inquire what the U.S attitude would be in the event that DAUD reassumed power.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL AFG. Secret; Exdis. In telegram 56321 to Kabul, March 31, the Department endorsed the response to DAUD outlined in paragraph 8 of this telegram. (Ibid.)

Document 360: Telegram 2042 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, April 13, 1972, 0945Z

April 13, 1972, 0945Z

On instructions, the Embassy replied to DAUD's initiative.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL AFG. Secret; Exdis.

Document 361: Telegram 2055 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, April 15, 1972, 0340Z

April 15, 1972, 0340Z

Ambassador Neumann "again raised narcotics problem" with Foreign Minister Shafiq, stressing the need for stricter enforcement. Shafiq discussed the steps he was taking to deal with the problem.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Bonn, Geneva, Islamabad, London, Paris, Rome, and USUN.

Document 362: Memorandum From Robert A. Flaten of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs to the Director of the Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Bangladesh Affairs (Laingen), Washington, May 31, 1972

Washington, May 31, 1972

Based on his recent experience as a member of the Embassy staff in Kabul, FLATEN assessed the "creeping" political crisis in Afghanistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15 AFG. Confidential. Copies were sent to Kabul, to Islamabad for Sober, and to London for G. B. Lambrakis. Attached but not published was the memorandum on Pushtunistan cited in FLATEN's assessment. On May 30 the Embassy in Kabul reported that the ZAHIR Government was "subjected to strong domestic pressures that could bring it down any day.” (Telegram 3016; ibid.)

Document 363: Telegram 4008 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, July 12, 1972, 0645Z

July 12, 1972, 0645Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally discussed U.S. relations with Afghanistan with King ZAHIR and Foreign Minister Shafiq on July 7.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Confidential; Limdis. Sent to the Department with a request that it be forwarded to the White House for Jeanne Davis and to the Treasury for Leonard Dixon. John Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon's request to review with host governments matters of mutual interest. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan. He made a 1-day stop in Kabul on July 7 following his visit to Pakistan. Additional documentation on the trip is ibid. During his conversation with Shafiq, Connally was handed a paper that outlined economic problems for which the Afghan Government was seeking U.S. assistance. The text of the paper was transmitted to the Department on July 13 in airgram A-84 from Kabul. (Ibid.)

Document 364: Telegram 4884 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, August 22, 1972, 1233Z

August 22, 1972

Chargé Lewis reported on his conversation with Prime Minister ZAHIR concerning the importance of coordinating efforts to manage and distribute emergency relief supplies.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to USUN.

Document 365: Telegram 5348 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, September 14, 1972, 1200Z

September 14, 1972

The Embassy reported that unless vigorous efforts were made to provide food to highland areas affected by "severe famine" before winter weather isolated those areas, as many as 200,000 faced starvation. The Embassy proposed measures the U.S. could undertake, including an airlift of wheat, to help deal with the crisis.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Sent as a joint State/USAID message. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran.

Document 366: Telegram 169365 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Afghanistan, September 15, 1972, 2237Z

September 15, 1972

The Department concurred in the need for urgent action to try to prevent starvation in the western mountains of Afghanistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Drafted by FLATEN (NEA/PAB), cleared in draft with AID/ASIA/NE, AID/PRI/DRD, and DOD/ISA and by Laingen. Repeated to Islamabad, Tehran, and Moscow.

Document 367: Telegram 5368 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, September 16, 1972, 1000Z

September 16, 1972

Ambassador Neumann discussed with King ZAHIR the measures being taken by the Afghan Government to deal with the food crisis.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, Moscow, New Delhi, and Tehran.

Document 368: Telegram 5636 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, September 27, 1972, 0330Z

September 27, 1972, 0330Z

The Embassy reported that King ZAHIR had rejected the resignation of Prime Minister ZAHIR, but Foreign Minister Shafiq had emerged as the effective head of government and would very likely be appointed Prime Minister before the end of the year.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 AFG. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, Tehran, and USUN.

Document 369: Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, New York, October 12, 1972, 1648Z

New York, October 12, 1972

Rogers met with Foreign Minister Shafiq at the United Nations to discuss U.S.-Afghan relations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 AFG. Limited Official Use. Also numbered USUN 3836. Rogers and Shafiq were in New York for the autumn session of the UN General Assembly.

Document 370: Telegram 6029 From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State, October 16, 1972, 1100Z

October 16, 1972

The Embassy recommended provision of 20,000 tons of wheat to Afghanistan in response to an emergency assistance request from the Afghan Government. The Embassy further suggested that the U.S. provide $400,000 to help offset the transportation costs of trucking food into areas affected by famine.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 AFG. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Islamabad, Tehran, and Rome for FODAG

Document 371: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers, December 12, 1972

December 12, 1972

Sisco informed Rogers that King ZAHIR had accepted the resignation of Prime Minister ZAHIR and had asked Foreign Minister Shafiq to form a new government. Sisco concluded that Shafiq "seems an outstanding choice for Prime Minister.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 76 D 319, 1972 POL-15.1 Prime Minister. Limited Official Use. Drafted by FLATEN (NEA/PAB) and cleared by Laingen and Davies.

Document 372: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, December 18, 1972

Washington, December 18, 1972

Sisco noted that Prime Minister Shafiq had promised "effective measures" to stop the illegal drug traffic in Afghanistan, and he credited the Embassy in Kabul with Shafiq's public recognition of the importance of the narcotics problem.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 11-5 AFG. Limited Official Use. Drafted on December 15 by FLATEN (NEA/PAB), cleared by Laingen, Davies, Seymour H. Glazer (NEA/RA), and by Harvey R. Wellman, Special Assistant to the Secretary for Narcotics Matters. Rogers wrote "no" in the margin next to the recommendation. The draft telegram to Neumann was attached but not published.

Document 373: Telegram 5592 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, December 11, 1971, 1125Z

December 11, 1971, 1125Z

Consul General Spivack recommended that the U.S. contact representatives of Bangladesh to "prevent them from assuming that we are inalterably opposed to idea of independent Bangla Desh or that we would take inordinately long to recognize a BDG substantially established in East Bengal.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Islamabad, New Delhi, Calcutta, and London.

Document 374: Telegram 12575 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, December 15, 1971, 1034Z

December 15, 1971

The Embassy recommended that the U.S. continue and expand contacts with representatives of Bangladesh and time recognition of the new government to follow actions by other major western powers.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Repeated priority to Dacca and New Delhi. Repeated to Calcutta, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, Kabul, and USUN.

Document 375: Intelligence Note RNAN-34 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, December 17, 1971

December 17, 1971

Intelligence assessment of the leadership and orientation of the prospective Government of Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15 BANGLA DESH. Confidential. Drafted in the Office of Research and Analysis for Near East and South Asia by David C. McGaffey and cleared by Office Director Curtis F. Jones

Document 376: Paper Prepared in the Department of State, undated

undated

This paper analyzed the U.S. relationship with Bangladesh and argued, in part, for "relatively early recognition.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret. The paper is undated but it was sent on December 22, 1971, by Executive Secretary Eliot to Kissinger under a covering memorandum that indicated it had been prepared in response to a December 16 instruction from the WSAG to prepare a paper on the subject of the U.S. relationship with Bangladesh. The covering memorandum indicates the paper was drafted by Constable and cleared by Laingen, Schneider, VAN HOLLEN, Sisco, and Irwin. Presumably the same information applies to the attached study. For a record of the December 16 WSAG meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 318. A January 17 memorandum from Davis to the Departments of State and Defense, the JCS, and the CIA indicates that the paper was circulated again for consideration of the Senior Review Group at its meeting on January 19. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, South Asia, Vol. IV (1972)) For the minutes of the January 19 SRG meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 210. The reference in the paper to the Hallstein doctrine is to the policy of West Germany to break diplomatic relations with any country that established relations with the German Democratic Republic.

Document 377: Telegram 5866 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, December 30, 1971, 1115Z

December 30, 1971

In light of what he and his staff viewed as the "inevitable recognition of Bangladesh,” Consul General Spivack urged that he be authorized to enter into informal contacts with Bangladesh officials for discussion of matters relating to the functioning of the Consulate General. He also urged U.S. officials elsewhere to convey to Bangladesh representatives that the United States was not committed to the concept of a united Pakistan and was flexible on the matter of recognition.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL BANGLA DESH-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, London, Manila, Moscow, and USUN.

Document 378: Telegram 10 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, January 3, 1972, 0651Z

January 3, 1972

In part one of his report on his January 1 meeting with Foreign Minister SAMAD, Consul General Spivack reported that SAMAD had solicited U.S. assistance in securing the release of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman from imprisonment in Pakistan. SAMAD assured Spivack that the Consulate General would be allowed to function for the time being and would receive "honorable treatment" while the U.S. considered the question of recognition.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi.

Document 379: Telegram 11 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, January 3, 1972, 0650Z

January 3, 1972

Consul General Spivack reported that part two of his January 1 conversation with Foreign Minister SAMAD involved a discussion of the question of recognition. SAMAD asked about the factors being considered by the U.S. in weighing recognition of Bangladesh, and Spivack indicated that he was not authorized to discuss the question in other than broad, hypothetical terms.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi.

Document 380: Telegram 12 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, January 3, 1972, 0713Z

January 3, 1972

Consul General Spivack noted that at the conclusion of their conversation on January 1 Foreign Minister SAMAD raised the question of whether the U.S. intended to continue funding partially-completed projects begun by USAID. They then discussed how best to describe their meeting to the press. In his concluding comment, Spivack observed that press and television coverage of the meeting was extensive.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Confidential; Immediate, Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi.

Document 381: Telegram 79 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, January 4, 1972, 1255Z

January 4, 1972

Foreign Secretary SULTAN KHAN told Deputy Chief of Mission Sober that his Government continued to view "premature" recognition of Bangladesh as a hostile act. Pakistani President Bhutto felt that there was still the possibility that a political link could be maintained between what his Government continued to refer to as the two wings of Pakistan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Confidential. Repeated to Dacca, Karachi, Lahore, London, Moscow, and New Delhi.

Document 382: Telegram 1047 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca, January 4, 1972, 2232Z

Dacca, January 4, 1972

Secretary of State Rogers instructed Consul General Spivack to avoid further contact with Bangladesh representatives.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by Eliot, and approved by Rogers. Repeated to Calcutta, Islamabad, and New Delhi.

Document 383: Telegram 239 From the Embassy in India to the Department of State, January 6, 1972, 1509Z

January 6, 1972

The Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh appealed to the United States for recognition.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Limited Official Use. Repeated to Bombay, Calcutta, Dacca, Islamabad, and Madras. The attachments cited in the telegram were not found.

Document 384: Editorial Note

On January 10, President Nixon discussed the upshot of the crisis in South Asia with his Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Alexander Haig. With regard to the question of the recognition of Bangladesh, Nixon asked when Pakistan and China were likely to recognize the new government. "Don't we have to wait,” he said, "until they do.” He noted that "everybody else is jumping on the bandwagon,” making specific reference to Britain and France. Nixon agreed with Haig that the United States should move cautiously on the issue.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Haig, January 10, 1972, 5:31-5:48 p.m., Old Executive Office Building, Conversation No. 313-30. No classification marking.

Document 385: Telegram 125 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, January 12, 1972, 0745Z

January 12, 1972

Consul General Spivack reported that he had just been invited to attend the swearing-in ceremony for President Mujibur Rahman to take place that day. He cabled urgently for instructions.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 BANGLA DESH. Limited Official Use; Flash. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi. The Department returned a Flash response within 2 hours instructing Spivack that no U.S representative should attend the ceremony. The cable was drafted by VAN HOLLEN and cleared by Irwin and Kissinger. (Telegram 5773 to Dacca, January 12; ibid.) On January 13 Spivack cabled the Department that the United States was the only government with de facto representation in Dacca not represented at the swearing-in ceremony. (Telegram 136 from Dacca; ibid.)

Document 386: Letter From the Minister of the British Embassy (Tebbit) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 13, 1972

Washington, January 13, 1972

The British Embassy forwarded a message from Prime Minister HEATH to President Nixon. In the message, HEATH discussed a meeting he had just had in London with Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman. MUJIBUR told HEATH that there could be no question of a formal link between Bangladesh and West Pakistan. Under the circumstances, HEATH felt it was important for Western powers to move fairly quickly toward recognition, and he asked Nixon to try to persuade Pakistani President Bhutto of the inevitability of recognizing Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Secret. On January 14 the Foreign Office told the Embassy in London that British recognition of Bangladesh would come within 2 weeks. (Telegram 412 from London, January 14; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH)

Document 387: Letter From the Australian Ambassador (Plimsoll) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 13, 1972

Washington, January 13, 1972

Plimsoll forwarded a message from Australian Prime Minister McMahon to President Nixon. McMahon pointed up his concern about Soviet influence in South Asia and argued the importance of repairing relations with India and providing economic assistance to the new nation of Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-062, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 1/19/72. Top Secret

Document 388: Telegram 158 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, January 14, 1972, 0620Z

January 14, 1972

The Consulate General made the case for early recognition of Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Confidential; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi.

Document 389: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 26, 1972

Washington, January 26, 1972

The Department of State and AID responded to an instruction from the Senior Review Group to prepare recommendations for humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh and India.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-061, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 2/1/72. Confidential. Signed in S/S for Eliot by Robert T. Curran. This memorandum was considered by the SRG at its meeting on February 1. The minutes of the January 19 and February 1 SRG meetings are Documents 210 and 220. Issues relating to South Asia were discussed in both meetings, but the latter was devoted largely to a discussion of humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh.

Document 390: Letter From President Nixon to British Prime Minister Heath, Washington, February 2, 1972

Washington, February 2, 1972

Nixon wrote to HEATH to explain that the United States intended to defer a decision on recognition of Bangladesh "until we have a clearer picture of how it will relate to the broader situation in South Asia.”

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 210, Geopolitical File, South Asia, Chronological File, Jan-June 1972. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to London on February 3 in telegram 19242 for delivery to HEATH. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH) The United Kingdom was among eight countries that recognized Bangladesh on February 4. (Telegram 429 from Dacca, February 5; ibid.)

Document 391: Telegram 1113 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 3, 1972, 1725Z

February 3, 1972

Pakistani President Bhutto suggested that the U.S. extend recognition to Bangladesh as early as February 20.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

Document 392: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 4, 1972, 10:34 p.m.

Washington, February 4, 1972, 10:34 p.m.

Nixon and Kissinger discussed recognition of Bangladesh and decided to delay it until after Nixon had the opportunity to discuss the issue with Chinese Premier CHOU EN-LAI.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 371, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

Document 393: Letter From the Ambassador of Pakistan (Raza) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, February 7, 1972

Washington, February 7, 1972

Raza conveyed to Rogers a message from Pakistani President Bhutto to President Nixon in which Bhutto asked Nixon to intervene with the Indian Government and "the elected leaders in East Pakistan" on behalf of "hundreds of thousands of non-Bengalis including women and children whose very existence in East Pakistan is threatened as a result of planned retaliation and reprisals by armed personnel.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL BANGLA DESH. Immediate; no further classification marking. Forwarded under a covering memorandum by Eliot to Kissinger on February 8. (Ibid.) On February 10 the Department instructed Sober to acknowledge receipt of the message and to inform Bhutto that the United States shared his concern and was watching the situation closely. Sober responded on February 11 that he had done so. (Telegrams 23379 to Islamabad and 1364 from Islamabad, respectively; ibid., SOC 14 BANGLA DESH)

Document 394: Telegram 1374 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 11, 1972, 1200Z

February 11, 1972

Pakistani President Bhutto told Chargé Sober that he would prefer that U.S. recognition of Bangladesh be deferred until March, possibly to follow after Nixon's trip to China.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 627, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Jan-31 Aug 72. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

Document 395: Telegram 26863 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, February 15, 1972, 2356Z

February 15, 1972

The Department provided policy guidance for the Mission for a meeting called by the Secretary-General on relief for Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, SOC 10 BANGLA DESH. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Drafted by Francis H. Thomas (NEA/PAF); cleared in NEA by Laingen, and Schneider, M. Kathleen Bell (IO/UNP), Frank Wiesner (S/R); and approved by VAN HOLLEN. Repeated to Islamabad, Dacca, and New Delhi. The policy guidance conditioned USUN's response to Waldheim's appeal. (Telegram 617 from USUN, February 18; ibid.)

Document 396: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 16, 1972

Washington, February 16, 1972

Kissinger recommended that the United States recognize Bangladesh "about the third week in March,” and Nixon approved the recommendation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Nodis. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of the recommendation.

Document 397: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 16, 1972

Washington, February 16, 1972

Nixon approved recommendations authorizing humanitarian assistance for Bangladesh.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical File, Box CL 210, South Asia, Chronological File, Jan-June 1972. Confidential. Sent for action. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon initialed his approval of all of the recommendations. On February 17 Kissinger sent a memorandum to Rogers that conveyed the decisions approved by the President. (Ibid.) The SRG discussion Kissinger referred to took place on February 1. For a record of the discussion, see Document 220.

Document 398: Memorandum For the Record by the Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Miller), Washington, February 22, 1972

Washington, February 22, 1972

General Haig called the Department with the instruction that nothing be done concerning recognition of Bangladesh until President Nixon returned from China. Contacts with Bangladesh officials were to be kept to a minimum.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Top Secret; Nodis.

Document 399: Telegram 1675 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, February 22, 1972, 1110Z

February 22, 1972

Pakistani President Bhutto suggested that the United States delay recognition of Bangladesh until March 17 at the earliest.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Priority; Nodis.

Document 400: Telegram TOHAK 111 from the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 23, 1972, 2313Z

Washington, February 23, 1972, 2313Z

Haig forwarded to Kissinger Consul General Spivack's request (telegram 642 from Dacca, February 23) for "permission to engage in a broad-ranging exchange of views" with Mujibur Rahman. Haig stated that he had taken steps to ensure that such an exchange did not take place. He reported to Kissinger on developments relating to U.S. humanitarian assistance to Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Exdis. Sent to Howe for Kissinger. Also numbered WH 20460. Telegram 642 from Dacca is also ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 BANGLA DESH.

Document 401: Telegram HAKTO 11 From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig), Peking, February 24, 1972, 0305Z

Peking, February 24, 1972, 0305Z

Kissinger stated that agreement had been reached with the Chinese on "our general game plan" and it was essential to do nothing concerning recognition of Bangladesh until the Indian troops were withdrawn from Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 497, President's Trip Files, Exchange of Notes Between Dobrynin and Kissinger, Vol. 2. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Also numbered WHP 77.

Document 402: Telegram 32170 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca, February 25, 1972, 0234Z

Dacca, February 25, 1972, 0234Z

Consul General Spivack was instructed to take no action with regard to recognition of Bangladesh. He was also instructed to inform Bangladesh officials at a level below Mujibur Rahman of U.S. plans to participate in humanitarian relief, but he was not authorized to meet with Mujib before his trip to Moscow. The Embassy in Pakistan was instructed to inform the government of U.S plans concerning humanitarian relief, and that the question of recognition would be reviewed after President Nixon returned from China.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLA DESH. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent to Islamabad and to Rogers in Peking as Tosec 102. Repeated to New Delhi and to the White House communication center. Drafted by Laingen, VAN HOLLEN, and Sisco; cleared by Schneider, Williams, and in substance with Haig; and approved by Acting Secretary Johnson.

Document 403: Telegram 689 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, February 26, 1972, 1040Z

February 26, 1972, 1040Z

Consul General Spivack relayed a request from Bangladesh Foreign Minister Samad for a statement of U.S. intentions with regard to Bangladesh. His Government wanted to know what to expect in regard to recognition and whether the interests of Bangladesh would be subordinated to those of Pakistan by the United States. He asked for a response before his impending trip to the Soviet Union and he intimated that the status of the Consulate General depended upon the reply.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Secret; Immediate; Niact; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi.

Document 404: Telegram 33181 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca, February 27, 1972, 0354Z

Dacca, February 27, 1972, 0354Z

Consul General Spivack was again instructed to go no further on the question of recognition than to indicate that the issue would be addressed after President Nixon returned from China. Spivack was further instructed to assure Bangladesh Foreign Minister SAMAD that the United States was well disposed toward Bangladesh and would continue to respond to requests for humanitarian assistance.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also sent to Peking for Rogers as Tosec 122. Drafted by VAN HOLLEN, cleared by Constable, Sisco, Saunders, and Haig, and approved by Acting Secretary Johnson. Repeated to the White House, Islamabad, and New Delhi.

Document 405: Telegram 722 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, February 28, 1972, 1610Z

February 28, 1972, 1610Z

Consul General Spivack reported that he met with Bangladesh Foreign Minister Samad and, as instructed, informed him that the question of recognition would have to await President Nixon's decision after his return from China. Samad remained concerned about the status of the Consulate General and whether its mission was to further U.S. relations with Pakistan or Bangladesh. He also expressed concern about the treatment of representatives of Bangladesh in the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi.

Document 406: Telegram 770 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, March 3, 1972, 0615Z

March 3, 1972, 0615Z

Consul General Spivack cabled that he felt that "we are approaching the limits of tolerance of GOBD in matter of continued operation of this post without US recognition of BD.” He suggested that a decision on recognition be conveyed to the Bangladesh Government by March 9th in order "to do what we intend to do without appearing to be forced into it by GOBD action.”

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Saunders sent a copy of this telegram to Haig on March 3 with a covering memorandum in which he suggested that Haig approve an instruction to Spivack to return to Washington for consultation. "The main rationale for bringing him back here would be to gain the time necessary to allow us to recognize only toward the end of March. It seems unlikely that the Bengalis would throw us out if it appeared that we were on the verge of taking a final decision.” Haig returned the memorandum to Saunders with a handwritten note instructing that Spivack be recalled on March 17.

Document 407: Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and President Nixon, Washington, March 3, 1972, 12 p.m.

Washington, March 3, 1972, 12 p.m.

Nixon and Kissinger discussed the timing of recognition of Bangladesh. Nixon said "I am just going to drag my feet on it.” He and Kissinger considered delaying a decision until April.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 397, Telephone Conversations, Home File, Jan–Apr 1972. No classification marking.

Document 408: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, March 6, 1972

Washington, March 6, 1972

Rogers recommended the United States recognize Bangladesh on or about March 25.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–064, SRG Meeting, South Asia, 4/17/72. Secret; Nodis. Saunders sent this memorandum to Kissinger on March 16 under a covering memorandum in which he endorsed Rogers' recommendation. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh) The attached draft messages to China and Pakistan are published in approved final form as Documents 414 and 415.

Document 409: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the NSC Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 7, 1972

Washington, March 7, 1972

Saunders recommended that AID be authorized to extend an additional $10–20 million in relief assistance to Bangladesh. President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Haig approved for Kissinger.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig signed the approval line for Kissinger. In a March 10 handwritten note, attached to the memorandum and addressed to Jeanne Davis, Saunders wrote that he had informed Williams and VAN HOLLEN of Haig's approval of the recommendation.

Document 410: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Haig recommended that Nixon approve an additional $35 million contribution in cash through the United Nations for the relief effort in Bangladesh. Nixon approved the recommendation.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. The memorandum was apparently drafted by Saunders who forwarded it to Haig on March 20 under a covering memorandum. (Ibid.) Haig signed the approval line for the President. For a record of the Senior Review Group's discussion of South Asia on March 17, see Document 237.

Document 411: Telegram 1019 From the Consulate General in Dacca to the Department of State, March 23, 1972, 0930Z

March 23, 1972, 0930Z

The Consulate General reported on the increasing irritation with the United States exhibited by the Government, the media, and the public in Bangladesh. The Consulate General's concern was that the Government's patience was wearing thin and it might take action against the US mission.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Confidential; Priority; Limdis. Prime Ministers Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman met in Calcutta February 6–8. On February 8 they issued a joint declaration summarizing the meetings and stressing the solidarity that existed between the two countries. (The text of the declaration was transmitted to the Department on February 9 in telegram 283 from Calcutta; ibid., POL BANGLADESH–INDIA) Gandhi and Mujibur Rahman subsequently met in Dacca March 18–19, where they signed a mutual defense treaty patterned on the Indo-Soviet treaty of August 1971. (Telegram 3714 from New Delhi, March 24; ibid.)

Document 412: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, March 24, 1972

Washington, March 24, 1972

Haig detailed approximately $100 million in humanitarian assistance committed to Bangladesh by the United States through the United Nations and other international agencies.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. No classification marking. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Document 413: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 28, 1972

Washington, March 28, 1972

Kissinger informed Rogers that the President had decided that United States recognition of Bangladesh should be announced at the Department of State anytime after April 3.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Secret; Nodis.

Document 414: Telegram 55123 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France, March 31, 1972, 0023Z

France, March 31, 1972, 0023Z

The Embassy was instructed to inform the Chinese Ambassador that that the United States intended to recognize Bangladesh on April 4.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US. Secret; Priority, Nodis; Homer. Drafted by Laingen and VAN HOLLEN; cleared by Davies and Sisco, in EA by Deputy Assistant Secretary Winthrop G. Brown, and by Kissinger; and approved by Rogers.

Document 415: Telegram 56144 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Pakistan, April 1, 1972, 0048Z

Pakistan, April 1, 1972, 0048Z

Chargé Sober was instructed to inform Pakistani President Bhutto that the United States intended to recognize Bangladesh on April 4.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Laingen; cleared by Davies, Sisco, Brown, and Kissinger; and approved by Rogers. Repeated Priority to Dacca and New Delhi

Document 416: Telegram 722 From the Consulate General in Karachi to the Department of State, April 3, 1972, 1100Z

April 3, 1972, 1100Z

Chargé Sober reported that he had informed Pakistani President Bhutto about U.S. plans to recognize Bangladesh. Bhutto expressed appreciation that the United States had waited a "reasonable time" before according recognition, and he asked that after recognition the United States provide the majority of its economic assistance to Bangladesh bilaterally.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Confidential; Priority; Nodis. Sent with the suggestion that it be passed to Islamabad and other posts as desired.

Document 417: Telegram 56444 From the Department of State to the Consulate General in Dacca, April 3, 1972, 1736Z

Dacca, April 3, 1972, 1736Z

The Consulate General was instructed to inform the Government of Bangladesh of U.S. plans for recognition on April 4. The Consulate General was also instructed to notify the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that Consul General Spivack would be returning on April 7 and would like to meet with Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman on April 8 to deliver President Nixon's letter concerning recognition.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Constable, cleared by Laingen, and approved by Davies. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi.

Document 418: Letter From President Nixon to Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman, Washington, April 4, 1972

Washington, April 4, 1972

Nixon wrote to accord U.S. recognition to Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 748, Presidential Correspondence File, Bangladesh. No classification marking. The text of the letter was transmitted to Dacca on April 5 in telegram 58480. (Ibid.) Secretary Rogers announced the recognition of Bangladesh at a press briefing on April 4. (Circular telegram 57428 to eight posts in South Asia, Moscow and London, April 4; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH) Mujibur Rahman sent a letter to Nixon on April 9 in which he warmly acknowledged the recognition accorded his country. (Telegram 1301 from Dacca, April 13; ibid.) Consul General Spivack was designated Chargé d' Affaires ad interim of the new Embassy. (Memorandum from Davis to Eliot, April 6; ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh)

Document 419: Telegram 60873 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh, April 8, 1972, 2131Z

Bangladesh, April 8, 1972, 2131Z

The Department outlined for Consul General Spivack the overall U.S. policy objectives in South Asia and the specific objectives of U.S. policy in dealing with Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH–US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Constable; cleared by Laingen, Schneider, VAN HOLLEN, Sisco, and Kissinger; and approved by Under Secretary Johnson. Repeated to Islamabad and New Delhi.

Document 420: Telegram 1227 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, April 10, 1972, 1126Z

April 10, 1972, 1126Z

Consul General Spivack reported that he delivered President Nixon's letter to Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman who "looked forward to the most friendly future relationships between our two countries at both official and popular levels.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 16 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, and New Delhi. The telegram was sent as originating from the Consulate General in Dacca. The Consulate General, which had been accredited to Pakistan and which existed on sufferance in Dacca after the establishment of Bangladesh, became an Embassy following U.S. recognition.

Document 421: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 21, 1972

Washington, April 21, 1972

Saunders took note of President Nixon's intention to shift toward bilateral assistance to Bangladesh and recommended that Kissinger seek the President's approval to indicate to the Bangladesh Government that such a change was contemplated.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. The attached draft memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon, which called for Nixon to respond to a recommendation that the AID officials in Bangladesh be authorized to indicate the U.S. intention to initiate a bilateral aid program, was not sent and is not published. Kissinger responded to Saunders' memorandum in a handwritten note on the memorandum: "He intends to go into bilateral aid but to cut down on multilateral aid.” For a record of the SRG meeting on April 17, during which the question of economic assistance to Bangladesh was discussed, see Document 249.

Document 422: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 15, 1972

Washington, May 15, 1972

In response to the President's expressed desire to convert as much multilateral economic assistance to Bangladesh as possible into bilateral assistance, Eliot forwarded the Department's recommendations as to how the remaining $130 million of a $200 million Congressional appropriation for South Asian relief could be channeled to Bangladesh in the form of bilateral assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The attachment cited in the memorandum is not published. On May 22 NSC Staff Secretary Davis sent a memorandum to Eliot which reads: "In response to your May 15 memorandum, bilateral assistance of $75 to $100 million in the current U.S. fiscal year has been approved. Your recommendations on the mix of other relief assistance for Bangladesh is (sic.) also approved.” (Ibid.) On May 30 the Department of State announced that the United States and Bangladesh had signed a bilateral agreement providing for $90 million in U.S. assistance to Bangladesh as a grant for rehabilitation. (Telegram 94906 to Dacca, May 30; ibid., AID (US) 4 BANGLADESH)

Document 423: Memorandum For the President's File, Washington, May 16, 1972

Washington, May 16, 1972

Ambassador-Designate Karim made his initial call on President Nixon who pledged that the United States would do everything it could to help Bangladesh survive and to provide hope for the future.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 17 BANGLADESH–US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Hoskinson.

Document 424: Intelligence Note RNAN–17 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, June 8, 1972

Washington, June 8, 1972

The INR assessment of political developments in Bangladesh concluded that: "The euphoria of victory in Bangladesh has faded, and the BDG must now contend with criticism in its exceedingly difficult task of reconstruction.” As a result, the analyst concluded, "it is likely that the BDG will tilt toward the left.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL BANGLADESH. Confidential. Drafted in INR/DDR/RNA by David C. McGaffey and approved by Office Director Curtis F. Jones.

Document 425: Telegram Conto 237 From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State, July 6, 1972, 0852Z

July 6, 1972, 0852Z

Former Treasury Secretary Connally reported on his July 3 conversation with Bangladesh Foreign Minister Samad.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Confidential; Exdis. Also numbered telegram 5842. Repeated to Bangkok, Bombay, Budapest for the Secretary's party, Dacca, Calcutta, New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur, Madras, Rangoon, Singapore, and USUN. Sent to the White House for Davis, to the Treasury for Dixon, and to the Department of State for A/OPR, S/S, and NEA. John Connally resigned as Secretary of the Treasury on May 16. Thereafter he visited a number of countries around the world at President Nixon's request to review matters of mutual interest with host governments. Included on his itinerary were stops in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

Document 426: Telegram Conto 262 From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State, July 8, 1972, 0700Z

July 8, 1972, 0700Z

Former Treasury Secretary CONNALLY reported on his July 3 conversation with Bangladesh Prime Minister Rahman.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/CONNALLY. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Also numbered telegram 4084. Sent with instructions to pass to New Delhi, Dacca, Islamabad, the White House for Davis, the Treasury for Dixon, and the Department for S/S, A/OPR, and NEA.

Document 427: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, July 15, 1972

Washington, July 15, 1972

Kissinger sent to Nixon a summary of the relief assistance provided to Bangladesh January 1–June 30.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Limited Official Use. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Haig sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a covering memorandum on July 15, in which he noted that "according to Saunders' bookkeeping" the United States had maintained the 33% contribution level stipulated by Nixon. In a handwritten note on the covering memorandum Kissinger expressed his doubts: "I am sure bookkeeping is crooked. Last year above total was 67%.” Despite his reservations, Kissinger initialed the memorandum and sent it to the President.

Document 428: Memorandum From the Country Director for Pakistan and Afghanistan (Laingen) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco), Washington, August 3, 1972

Washington, August 3, 1972

Laingen summarized the international response to the appeal by the UN Secretary-General for foodgrains for Bangladesh.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 77 D 16, AID 1, Aid to Bangladesh 1972. Limited Official Use. Drafted in NEA/PAB by W. Scott Butcher. The attachment cited in the memorandum is not published.

Document 429: Telegram 4591 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, November 1, 1972, 1101Z

November 1, 1972, 1101Z

To offset an anticipated shortage, Prime Minister Mujibur Rahman requested that the United States supply foodgrains to Bangladesh as quickly as possible.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Priority. Repeated to Canberra, Islamabad, New Delhi for Williams, Ottawa, Tokyo, and USUN. Sent as a joint Embassy/USCOR message.

Document 430: Telegram 4747 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, November 13, 1972, 1142Z

November 13, 1972, 1142Z

Chargé Newberry informed Prime Minister Rahman that the United States could provide 100,000 tons of wheat for arrival in January, and added that an additional 100,000 tons could predictably be provided during the remainder of the U.S. fiscal year. Newberry told Rahman that in all probability no additional amounts would be provided.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 BANGLADESH. Unclassified; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Islamabad, Karachi, New Delhi, Ottawa, Tokyo, and USUN.

Document 431: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 22, 1972

Washington, November 22, 1972

Saunders posed the options open to the United States in the pending debate in the UN General Assembly on the question of membership for Bangladesh. Kissinger decided to continue to support the position taken on the question by Pakistan and China.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 591, Country Files, Middle East, Bangladesh. Confidential. Sent for action. In a November 23 note attached to the memorandum, Richard Kennedy informed Saunders that Kissinger had decided that the United States should hold to its former position on the issue.

Document 432: Telegram 5451 Fromthe Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, December 19, 1972, 1200Z

December 19, 1972, 1200Z

The Embassy proposed that it be authorized to stipulate that the first aid agreement to be signed with the Bangladesh Government in fiscal year 1973 be used as the "occasion to have Awami League cabinet make symbolic gesture to indicate it does not intend to disavow responsibility for BDG's acceptance of US aid.”

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) BANGLADESH. Confidential; Exdis.

Document 433: National Intelligence Estimate 32.1–72, Washington, December 21, 1972

Washington, December 21, 1972

The estimate assessed political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Bangladesh.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79–R01012A. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, and the NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of the CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the United States Intelligence Board with the exception of the representative of the FBI, who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction. A cover sheet and table of contents are not published.

Document 434: Telegram 231058 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh, December 22, 1972, 2104Z

Bangladesh, December 22, 1972, 2104Z

The Department endorsed the Embassy's suggestion that the next aid agreement with Bangladesh be conditioned on the public acknowledgement of the agreement by the participation of a senior member of the Bangladesh Government, such as the Foreign Minister, in the ceremony staged to sign the agreement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, AID (US) BANGLADESH. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Butcher and Lawrence B. Lesser, cleared by Laingen and AID and in substance by USIA, and approved by Meyer.

Document 435: Telegram 5547 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, December 27, 1972, 1034Z

December 27, 1972, 1034Z

Chargé Newberry met with Foreign Minister Samad to express "serious concern" over a spate of attacks on USIS centers in Bangladesh and to ask for assurances that U.S. facilities in the country would be protected.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Immediate. Repeated to Islamabad, Calcutta, New Delhi, and USIA. On December 11 the Embassy reported that a group of young men had defaced the USIS center in Dacca with anti-American slogans and Communist Party insignia. On December 22 a group of over 100 students, protesting the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, attacked the USIS center in Dacca and did serious damage. On December 26 the Embassy reported that a group of leftist youths had virtually destroyed the USIS center in Chittagong, and the following day reported that the same thing had happened in Rajshahi. On December 26 the Department instructed the Embassy to convey "serious concern of USG over spate of destructive attacks against U.S. facilities" and U.S. "distress over the inadequate police protection afforded.” (Telegrams 5310, 5512, 5533, and 5544, December 11, 23, 26, and 27 respectively, all from Dacca; telegram 232100 to Dacca, December 26; all ibid.)

Document 436: Telegram 232926 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Bangladesh, December 28, 1972, 0001Z

Bangladesh, December 28, 1972, 0001Z

Country Director Laingen called in the Bangladesh Chargé to emphasize concern over the safety of U.S. personnel and facilities in Bangladesh and over the related issue of public statements critical of the U.S. by prominent Government and Awami League officials.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Butcher, cleared with USIA, and approved by Laingen. Repeated to New Delhi, Islamabad, and Calcutta.

Document 437: Telegram 5584 From the Embassy in Bangladesh to the Department of State, December 31, 1972, 1255Z

December 31, 1972, 1255Z

Chargé Newberry called on Foreign Minister Samad to protest the failure of the Bangladesh Government to protect the USIS center in Mymensingh. Newberry suggested that a personal message of regret from Prime Minister Rahman to Secretary of State Rogers might help convince Washington that the problem was receiving the attention of the head of government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–8 BANGLADESH. Limited Official Use; Niact; Immediate. Also sent Niact Immediate to USIA, and routine to Islamabad, New Delhi, and Calcutta. In telegram 5583 from Dacca, December 31, the Embassy reported the "bombing, sacking, and burning" of the USIS center in Mymensingh. (Ibid.)