K: Due to the incompetence of my staff you were not notified. I was
expecting you at 2:45.
R: No one told me.
K: It was because it was someone I wanted to see.
R: I am going to the State Dept. I rang Gen. Haig 3 times.
K: They didn't notify me.
R: The President has sent another message direct by Farland. About the whole situation. One
or two suggestions — my trouble is that they keep saying see you.
K: Two things. One, tell your people to stop all cable traffic with
respect to help on ammunition and so forth. We are doing what we can and
we will send a coded message. It's getting too dangerous for you to send
it. I will keep you informed.
R: I am going to State now to keep the record straight.
K: Tell them you would like to invoke mutual security treaty. A formal
R: An aide memoire. Unsigned.
K: The secret clauses also?
R: "The bilateral U.S. /Pakistan agreement ? ? ? ? ? and independence of
Pakistan ? ? ? ? ? ? ? gravest to Pakistan ? ? ? ? extend material help
to us. ”
K: Say they should use clarifications used in subsequent years.
R: Are you very busy today?
K: I will see you first thing tomorrow. We wax are here to support you.
R: You don't have to say that. Things are getting late.
K: I can give you news that we are getting something out of the Shah for
ammunition. You can send a cypher through me.
R: I have not sent a cable. Only through you. Are your cables different
from the State Dept.?
Raza/Kissinger 2:47 p.m. 12/8/71
R: So you will give me a -time tomorrow.
K: You can count on it.
1Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370,
Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, 6-10 Dec 1971. No
No mutual security treaty has ever been concluded between the
United States and Pakistan. The references to such a treaty and
unqualified references to an assurance offered to Pakistan by
administration indicate that Nixon and Kissinger were ill-informed about the nature and
extent of a U.S. commitment to take military action to assist
Pakistan in the event of an attack by India. Kissinger's reference to a
mutual security treaty during this conversation is an apparent
reference to the Agreement of Cooperation signed by the United
States and Pakistan on March 5, 1959, in the context of
Pakistan's membership in the Baghdad Pact. The agreement (10
UST 317) obligates the
United States to take appropriate action "as may be mutually
agreed upon" to defend Pakistan against aggression. The
agreement cites the Joint Resolution to Promote Peace and
Stability in the Middle East of March 9, 1957. (PL–7, 85th
Congress) The Joint Resolution contemplated, among other things,
the use of armed forces to assist nations against aggression by
"any country controlled by international communism" so long as
such use of force was consonant with the treaty obligations and
the Constitution of the United States. The assurance offered to
Pakistan in 1962, which was cited by Kissinger repeatedly during the crisis, was that
the United States would come to Pakistan's assistance in the
event of Indian aggression against Pakistan. The assurance was
delivered in an aide-mémoire presented to Pakistani President
Ayub Khan on November 5, 1962. (For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume
XIX, page 372, footnote 6) The aide-mémoire did not subject the assurance to any
qualification relating to constitutional constraints. A
Department of State press release issued on November 17, 1962,
however, stated that the United States had assured Pakistan
that, if India misused United States military assistance in
aggression against Pakistan, the United States would take
"immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority,
appropriate action to thwart such aggression.” (Ibid., footnote