Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972

119. Telegram 3745 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹ ²

Rabat, July 23, 1971, 1115Z

Subject:

• Future of the Regime

1. Summary—Whatever motivations of coup plotters were, King Hassan needs to change his life style and way of doing business if he is to survive. His initial reactions to coup indicate he seeking rationalize events rather than analyzing their causes and modifying his policies accordingly. This sounds like recipe for continued instability.

2. While situation in Morocco has returned to something approaching normalcy, things are not the same as before. Thus, there are police roadblocks at the exits from the city (and elsewhere in the country), there are numerous soldiers in evidence around residences of Moulay Abdallah at Souissi and Hassan at Skhirat, our former military contacts are skittish about contact with US, and there is general air of uncertainty as to future. Skhirat is still the number one topic of conversation, and it intrudes itself into every social gathering. As one of Casablanca’s contacts says, we are drowning in hypotheses.

3. Setting aside predicatable rumors and allegations of foreign involvement, which no one in authority except King seems to take seriously, there are still only two broad themes invoked to explain coup. One is corruption such as qte rampant qte are widely used in describing corruption here, we have previously reported (our A–71 of April 6, 1971) that its dimensions are hard to fix. It has certainly been less blatant than it was in Farouk’s Egypt) or Idriss’ Libya. Corruption is a popular issue, however, and it seems to have been a major preoccupation with Medbouh. It is easy to imagine Medbouh and Ababou being able to get other officers and their subordinates worked up about it, even though they themselves mere beneficiaries of the system.

4. What seems to bother the student from Wazzan more than corruption, however, is the King’s lifestyle, which is contrasted unfavorably with that of Muhammad V, whom everyone remembers as a man of simple habits. Hassan’s flamboyant taste in clothes, his numerous palaces, and the presumed high living that goes on inside them, while needed government actions are postponed because of lack of money, have undoubtedly alienated many conservatives, as well as liberals. A poor music student asks, for instance, “Why does Hassan keep building new palaces when we don’t even have a conservatory?” Essentially same question is posed in different ways by different people, but it all boils down to a query as to why the King is living so high on the hog if the country is so poor. The popular answer is a conclusion that he is not virtuous, that he is therefore not entitled to rule, and that his days are numbered because there is no one left he can trust. In past people have put the blame on those around Hassan rather than on him. They no longer seem inclined to give him the benefit of that doubt.

5. The second theme, personal ambition, has taken second place to corruption in the reports of most Western observers. We find it hard to believe, for instance, that Medboubh was motivated simply by a desire for more power. On the other hand, while it is true that Medbouh and his co-conspirators were already enjoying the fruits of power, it also seems clear that they wanted more or they would not have moved. There were no declarations of intent to step down as soon as the body politic was purified, and no indications of any carefully thought-out plans for reform. The more one looks at the coup, the more it looks like a simple power play, by at least some of those involved, such as Ababou and Hammou. The plotters intended to get rid of the King one way or another and to take over the country. Corruption was a handy issue, but they do not seem to have made much of it. Ababou reportedly harrangued people at the Etat Major about corruption, but there were no declarations about corrupt rule and no call for the populace to rally around the standard of revolution on radio. Failure to issue such radio appeals, which would have struck a responsive chord, can be explained by lack of prior planning, but it is perhaps significant that more attention was not paid to this aspect by the plotters.

6. The two themes are not mutually exclusive in any event. Both were undoubtedly at work. If corruption was and is the primary problem, the King theoretically can do something about that, and about his own lifestyle. Personal ambition, however, is likely to be a recurring problem, whatever he does about corruption, until and unless he creates some viable political institutions. The royal spell has now been broken. Medbouh and Ababou have shown that way, and the next group of officers will be more careful, and will have organized more support in advance.

7. The regime was and is institutionally vulnerable because it is headed by an autocratic monarch and monarchs are increasingly anachronistic in transitional societies. Even in Morocco, where the monarchy is native and of long standing, the traditional basis of Hassan’s kingly legitimacy is not alone sufficient to justify his rule in modern times. His role as commander of the faithful and his descent from the prophet may assure him some conservative support, but have never cut much ice in Morocco when it comes to bread and butter issues such as tribal loyalties, vengeance, schools and jobs.

8. Above sui generie weakness has been compounded by King’s refusal to share real power with or seriously consider representative political interest groups, i.e., political parties, labor unions, students, intellectuals, even professionals and businessmen. He has denied himself strength that comes from giving broad spectrum of interest groups, as opposed to favored individuals, stake in success of regime and its policies. And he has further alienated many members of such groups by heavy-handed use of state security forces against them. He has created no meaningful institutions, and has dismantled most of those that existed already (comment in last para Casablanca A–54 is pertinent in this regard). The one institution to which he paid great attention, the military establishment, has just bitten the hand that fed it.

9. The above political/institutional liabilities must be added serious lack of dynamism in economic and social development. While GOM has pursued reasonably rational economic policies, overall performance has shown marked lack of urgency. As Department well aware, annual per capita income average just over $200 nationwide and is much lower in rural areas. There is very serious and politically dangerous unemployment. We estimate about 27 PC in Casablanca, the economic capital, and rural unemployment/underemployment situation is perhaps worse. Situation made progressively worse by population growth.

10. Such problems of course not unique to Morocco, but political danger here stems from knowledge that not only is GOM undynamic in facing development problems but also the King and his Ministers are living uncommonly well. People can bear hardship if convinced leaders are hardworking, honest and sincere (Nasser’s formula). They are not so convinced here.

11. Implicit in all of foregoing is that if King corrects the weaknesses of the regime, and changes his personal style, he has a decent chance of survival. The problem of ambitions among officers may remain, but can be better controlled if he has some institutions other than state security apparatus on which he can depend for support. He will have to show far more vigor and dedication to running country than he has to date, however, he might take clue from his sharifis, cousin, King Hussein, put down his golf club, forego his concubines, and roll up his sleeves. He would do even better to emulate Iran’s Shah and proclaim and pursue his own white revolution. Whatever he does, King must realize he is in desperate competition with serious counterclaimants for power. He will have to work hard if he is to win.

12. Much of what we have heard from and about Hassan since the coup indicates that, whatever agonizing inward reappraisal he is going through, he is outwardly seeking to rationalize the coup attempt by adducing outside interference, mental instability on Medbouh’s part, drugged troops, etc., rather than seriously analyzing country’s malaise and trying to do something about it. Thus, on the one hand he told Medbouh’s brother-in-law Othman Benjelloun on July 17 that henceforth the watchword was to be austerity, and on the other we have just been told he sent the Kenitra golf pro off to England on July 21 to buy 42 pairs of golf shoes for the palace entourage. If this reflects his appreciation of his situation, we can visualize him trying to do business as usual except for increased reliance on fewer people and on more stringent repressive measures. We believe this would be recipe for continued instability and we share views of Mohamed Abderazzak in this regard reported in Casa’s 0375.

Rockwell

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 23–9 MOR. Secret. It was repeated Priority to Soto Grande, and to CINCEUR, Madrid, Paris, COMNAVTRACOM, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Casablanca, and Tangier. In telegram 3815 from Rabat, July 27, the Embassy suggested that one consequence of the coup might be an attempt by the Moroccan regime to draw closer to the United States. (Ibid., POL MOR-US)
2. Ambassador to Morocco Stuart Rockwell speculated on the prospects for King Hassan’s regime. While the situation in Morocco seemed to be returning to normal, Rockwell noted that Hassan was trying to rationalize events rather than analyze the causes. Unless Hassan embraced reform, his long term prospects looked dim.