Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–5, Part 2, Documents on North Africa, 1969–1972

Documents on North Africa, 1969-1972: Document List

Document 1: Intelligence Note 195 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 19, 1969

Washington, March 19, 1969.

Hughes informed the Secretary of the mood shift in the Maghreb caused by the rapprochement between Morocco and Algeria and the new neutralism in both countries. While these changes had produced positive economic results for both nations, the new relationship appeared to have potential drawbacks for U.S. interests in the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Algeria, Vol. I. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissemination.

Document 2: Intelligence Note 693 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the Acting Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, September 29, 1969

Washington, September 29, 1969

Denney reported that the recent Islamic summit in Rabat, which had resulted in a moderate consensus, was a considerable achievement for Hassan and co-organizer King Faisal of Saudi Arabia.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 13-6. Confidential; Noforn; Controlled Dissemination.

Document 3: Intelligence Note 876 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, December 24, 1969

Washington, December 24, 1969

Hughes reported that, although the Fifth Arab Summit Conference at Rabat ended in disunity and disarray, recent U.S. peace initiatives in the Middle East, including Secretary of State Rogers' December 9 speech and the surfacing of U.S. proposals for an Israel-Jordan peace, had been well received.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 ARAB SUMMIT. Secret; Noforn. On December 16, Rogers had recommended that President Nixon send a message to King Hassan supporting his moderate position at Summit. (Ibid., POL 15-1 MOR). Yet on December 19, when President's Advisor for National Security Affairs Kissinger provided Nixon with a requested list of steps taken to bolster moderate Arab leaders at the Rabat summit, he omitted Rogers' recommendation and draft letter to Hassan. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1243, Saunders Files, Morocco, 1/20/69-12/31/69)

Document 4: Memorandum From the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 19, 1970

Washington, January 19, 1970

In light of recent regional developments, Kissinger recommended that the President authorize a review of U.S. programs in North Africa.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-169, NSSM Files, NSSM 87. Secret. Sent for action. The President approved the recommendation on January 21.

Document 5: National Security Study Memorandum 87, Washington, January 22, 1970

Washington, January 22, 1970

Kissinger conveyed the President's request to review the trend of events in North Africa, as well as the U.S. regional programs, policies, and options there, and draft a National Intelligence Estimate and an options paper for submission to the NSC Review Group.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-169, NSSM Files, NSSM 87. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Bureau of the Budget. A summary of the response is printed as Document 9. This response was later subsumed into NSSM 90, a wider study of “U.S. Interests in and Policy toward the Mediterranean Area,” on February 26. It is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969-72, volume XIV, Middle East Region, 1969-1972

Document 6: Memorandum From the President's Advisor for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, February 4, 1970

Washington, February 4, 1970

Kissinger summarized Admiral George Anderson's impression, based on his recent visit, that the Free World position in North Africa was deteriorating.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 274, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. III. Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. President Nixon underlined a portion of the second paragraph and wrote in the margin, “I completely agree—Except for Tasca—virtually all career State people I have talked to do not adequately recognize this. They keep saying that the June '67 war was a great ‘blow' to Soviet in Mideast. Bunk.”

Document 7: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 23, 1970

Washington, February 23, 1970

Eliot transmitted a memorandum prepared for the Acting Secretary by the Acting Assistant Secretary for African Affairs outlining the possible consequences in North Africa of a positive U.S. response to the Israeli arms request.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 747, Country Files, Africa General, Vol. I. Secret. According to the February 18 Intelligence Note RAFN-4, on his February 7-11 trip to Morocco and Tunisia, Secretary Rogers, although warmly received, was also met with private diplomatic warnings and unprecedented press attacks over U.S. support for Israel. (Ibid.) For additional information on the Secretary's talks with Moroccan officials, see Document 102, Document 20, and Document 145.

Document 8: National Intelligence Estimate 60-70, Washington, March 12, 1970

Washington, March 12, 1970

The estimate reviewed trends and prospects in the four North African states. It concluded that, in general, the recent improvement in political relations was not likely to extend beyond economic cooperation and that the region was turning toward Western Europe and away from close association with either of the Cold War superpowers. This trend was likely to continue as long as the United States continued to be closely identified in Arab eyes with Israel. The report then outlined the prospected trends for individual states, highlighting the potential political and social ramifications of projected economic stability.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A, Box 390. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.

Document 9: Analytical Summary, Washington, April 17, 1970

Washington, April 17, 1970

The memorandum summarized the options paper, entitled “Trends and U.S. Options in North Africa,” produced by the Interdepartmental Group for Africa in response to National Security Study Memorandum 87. This paper examined the present and projected political stability of the four North African nations and the possible influence on U.S. interests in the region, then put forth a strategy for protecting those interests.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 303, NSC Committees and Panels, Review Group, May 1970. Secret. The entire options paper can be found in National Archives, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-169, NSSM 87. The trends outlined in this document are discussed in greater detail in NIE 60-70, printed as Document 8.

Document 10: Memorandum From the Acting Staff Director (Lichtblau) to the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, Washington, May 11, 1970

Washington, May 11, 1970

Lichtblau reported the consensus of the AF/NSC-IG that, although no further action was needed on NSSM 87, the United States should continue an active relationship with North Africa where it maintained appreciable interests.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1-1 AFR-US. Secret. The minutes of the May 21 Senior Review Group meeting on NSSM 90, into which NSSM 87 was folded, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969-72, volume XIV, Middle East Region, 1969-1972.

Document 11: Response to National Security Study Memorandum 90, Washington, June 12, 1970

Washington, June 12, 1970

An excerpt from the paper “U.S. Interest in and Policy Toward the Mediterranean,” prepared in response to NSSM 90, discussed the role of France in North Africa, which U.S. policymakers viewed with ambivalence.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-28, NSC Meeting Files, The Mediterranean, June 17, 1970. Secret; Exdis. The Analytical Summary of the June 12 paper, concluded that “The North Africans in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia have a character and history which distinguish them from the Eastern Arabs and give them somewhat different foreign policy options, particularly those growing out of their closer relationship with Western Europe. The North African governments are turning toward Western Europe—especially France—and away from the close association with either the United States or the USSR that characterized their policies in the 1950s and 1960s. US influence in North Africa will remain severely limited while the US remains closely identified in Arab eyes with Israel and Israel remains in occupation of Arab territory. The USSR is unlikely substantially to improve its modest political and diplomatic position in North Africa, as least as long as current regimes remain in power.” (Ibid.) The full analytical summary is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969-72, volume XIV, Middle East Region, 1969-1972.

Document 12: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom), Washington, December 9, 1971

Washington, December 9, 1971

Based on the November 5 Policy Analysis and Recommended Action review, Irwin presented the conclusions with respect to U.S. policy toward and interests in North Africa. The memorandum emphasized the need to work with North African nations bilaterally, as regional tensions prevented U.S. policymakers from developing a comprehensive strategy for approaching the region as a whole. Oil and natural gas interests in the region, while significant, should not be overemphasized. Finally, the current U.S. programs in North Africa were achieving the appropriate results and should be continued.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 AFR-US. Secret; Exdis. The Summary Sheet is attachment but not printed. No record of the review itself was found.

Document 13: Summary of Airgram A-102 From the Interests Section in Algeria to the Department of State, April 7, 1969

April 7, 1969

The Chief of the Interests Section documented the trends affecting U.S.-Algerian relations in the past year. Algeria's stabilizing political situation enabled the Boumediene Government to focus its attention on domestic programs to boost industrial development and enact agricultural reform. Given these changes, the summary predicted that the chances for renewal of diplomatic relations between the United States and Algeria were nearly even.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 1 ALG-US. Secret. It was repeated to CINCEUR, Bamako, Cairo, London, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, Tunis, and US NATO. Drafted by Galanto, Hoffacker, and Morin; cleared by POL, CONS, and USIA; and approved by Hoffacker.

Document 14: Airgram A-115 From the Interests Section in Algeria to the Department of State, April 14, 1969

April 14, 1969

Hoffacker analyzed the Algerian Government's motivations in its conduct of the trial of famed revolutionary Belkacem Krim and its predicted impact on U.S.-Algerian relations, given that the United States had been accused of supporting Krim in his attempts to conspire against the Algerian Government.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 29 ALG. Secret. It was repeated to Paris, Rabat, Tunis, and Tripoli. Drafted by Galanto and approved by Hoffacker. Enclosures 1 and 2 are not printed. A summary of the trial can be found in the April 11 Intelligence Note No. 268. (Ibid.)

Document 15: Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, August 19, 1969

Washington, August 19, 1969

This 17 page report, titled “Algeria: Troubles Ahead?”, outlined the country's relationship with the Soviet Union and its important economic connection with France, then analyzed the ways in which a shift in that balance could end in favor of closer relations with Moscow.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R00967A, Box 1, O/NE Memorandum, 1969, May-August. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, and discussed with representatives of the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research, who were in general agreement with its judgments.

Document 16: Telegram 174764 From the Department of State to the Interests Section in Algeria, October 15, 1969, 1901Z

October 15, 1969

This telegram transmitted a memorandum of a conversation between the Secretary of State and Algerian Foreign Minister Bouteflika. Over the course of the meeting the two men discussed improving U.S.-Algerian relations, Algeria's relationship with the other major powers and the possible course its new economic programs would follow.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL 7 ALG. Secret; Priority; Limdis. It was repeated to Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. Drafted by Lowrie and approved by Bray. The septel was telegram 176130 to Algiers, October 17, in which the Department expressed gratification at the improved tone in U.S.-Algerian relations, but regretted that it stopped short of full diplomatic resumption. It also advised the Interests Section that Acting Director of AF/N Charles Bray would be the official Algerian contact in Washington. (Ibid., POL 17 US-ALG)

Document 17: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, October 20, 1969

New York, October 20, 1969

U.S. representatives met with the Head of the Algerian Delegation to the UN to discuss a rapprochement between Washington and Algiers. Specifically, the group discussed the three key impediments to the U.S.-Algerian relationship—the U.S. war in Vietnam, Algeria's role in the Maghreb, and the protection of the Palestinians in the Middle East.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-1969, POL ALG-US. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Bray. The conversation took place in New York City. In telegram 2288 from Algiers, December 29, the Interests Section recorded a similar conversation with an advisor to President Boumediene, who noted that Algeria “needs ‘opportune moment' for renewal [of relations.] Although US is on right track in Vietnam, progress is too slow to provide right occasion. Some step on Middle East issue would be more appropriate.” (Ibid.)

Document 18: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 27, 1969

Washington, October 27, 1969

Eliot forwarded an October 24 memorandum that outlined the implications of President Boumediene's reorientation of Algerian foreign policy on the United States. The memorandum highlighted the positive impact of Boumediene's emphasis toward getting Algeria's economic and financial situation in order.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Algeria, Vol. I. Secret.

Document 19: Telegram 166 From the Interests Section in Algeria to the Department of State, February 5, 1970, 1830Z

February 5, 1970, 1830Z

Requesting aid to finance a natural gas project, Bouteflika made clear to Chief of the Interests Section Eagleton that, while not prepared for full diplomatic relations, the Algerian Government hoped to extend economic ties with the United States.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL ALG-US. Secret; Limdis. It was repeated to Paris, Rabat, and Tunis. In telegram 32269 to Algiers, March 5, Rogers noted the complexities of responding to Bouteflika's request for financing, urging that the Algerian Government expand its Interests Section in Washington to facilitate the request. (Ibid.)

Document 20: Telegram Secto 36/581 From Secretary of State Rogers in Morocco to the Department of State, February 11, 1970, 2130Z.

February 11, 1970, 2130Z

The telegram summarized the substance of Rogers' meeting in Rabat with the Algerian Ambassador to Morocco at which Rogers articulated the desire of the U.S. Government to renew diplomatic relations with Algeria and emphasized the U.S. opposition to Israel's expansionism.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 S. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to Rabat.

Document 21: Telegram 64991 From the Department of State to the Interests Section in Algeria, April 30, 1970, 0138Z

April 30, 1970, 0138Z

While the Department favored the expansion of commercial relations with Algeria, it noted that progress was impeded by outstanding disputes between that country and American individuals and corporations.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL ALG-US. Confidential. Drafted by Lowrie on April 28; cleared by E/ORF/FSE, L/AF, E/IMA/FOD, L/C, L/E and AF/N; and approved by Smith. In telegram 652 from Algiers, May 6, Eagleton reported that he had discussed with Algerian officials the fact that Algerian disputes with American oil companies could affect Federal Power Commission (FPC) consideration of the El Paso gas deal. (Ibid.)

Document 22: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 14, 1970

Washington, October 14, 1970

Kissinger relayed to Nixon that presidential emissary and astronaut FRANK BORMAN had enjoyed a warm reception in Algiers during his Vietnam POW mission to world capitals. During his time in Algeria, Borman reported that U.S. presence was needed to offset Soviet intrusion into the area and that Boumediene expressed his hope that the economic cooperation between the United States and Algeria would continue. Kissinger goes on to discuss U.S.-Algerian relations in more depth.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 748, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-74, Algeria, Col. Houari Boumediene. Confidential. Sent for action. Kissinger approved for the President. The letter, not printed, was sent on October 16.

Document 23: Telegram 204757 From the Department of State to the Interests Section in Algeria, December 17, 1970, 0012Z.

December 17, 1970, 0012Z

The Department forwarded a record of Secretary of State Rogers' conversation the previous day with new Minister Counselor of the Algerian Interests section Bousselham, in which the latter had stressed the common interests of both countries despite their policy differences.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 ALG-US. Confidential. Drafted by Blake; cleared by NEA/UAR, S, and AF; and approved by Eliot. In a December 14 memorandum from Moore to Rogers, Moore had relayed Bousselham's request for an appointment. Updating the Secretary on the status of expropriation negotiations between Algeria and American firms, Moore concluded, “We want to respond to these Algerian actions to assure them that we share the desire for improved relations. The rather unorthodox gesture of your receiving Bousselham at this time would give such a signal. We urge, therefore, that you agree to see him for a 10 minute courtesy call before December 19.” (Ibid., POL 15-1 ALG) In telegram 205697, December 18, the Department reported on Bousselham's talks on economic relations with Deputy Under Secretary Samuels and Assistant Secretaries Newsom and Trezise. (Ibid.)

Document 24: Telegram 58412 From the Department of State to the Embassy in France, April 7, 1971, 1955Z

April 7, 1971, 1955Z

This 5 page telegram transmitted Secretary Rogers account of the April 6 meeting between Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David Newsom and French Ambassador Lucet at which Lucet inquired as to U.S. relations with Algeria. Lucet was particularly interested in the U.S. importation of Algerian liquefied natural gas.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL ALG - US. Secret. It was repeated to Algiers. Drafted on April 6 by Blake (AF/N); cleared by EUR/FBX, E/ORF/FSE, and AF; and approved by Blake. As a series of documents indicates, Paris, still in negotiations with Algiers over post-independence expropriations, was not eager to see the United States act on the El Paso Company's proposed deal with SONATRACH. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials Project, NSC Files, Boxes 677-678, Country Files, Europe, France) In telegram 65768, April 17, the Department sent an oral message from Nixon to President Pompidou indicating that the United States had no desire to impede France in resolving its problems with Algeria, and that there was time for French-Algerian negotiations to be completed before the natural gas deal was finalized. The restoration of political relations with Algeria, Nixon emphasized, would benefit all in the West. (Ibid., Box 678, Country Files, Europe, France, Volume VIII, 4/71-12/71)

Document 25: Airgram A-11 From the Department of State to the Interests Section in Algeria, June 16, 1971

June 16, 1971

This Airgram transmitted a Policy Planning Paper for Algeria. The paper highlighted the geographic, economic, and political importance of Algeria and outlined U.S. interests and objectives in the African nation over the course of the next five years, Algeria's objectives with respect to the United States, and concluded with a 6 part recommended course of action. The Paper was approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 ALG-US. Secret; Noforn. Telegram drafted by Edward Holmes (AF/NSC-IG) and approved by Carter. Attached but not printed at Annex A is documentation on U.S. agency expenditures in Algeria; at Annex B is background information; and at Annex C is a list of approved policy guidance papers.

Document 26: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers, July 13, 1971

July 13, 1971

With this memorandum Kissinger conveyed the President's authorization to respond favorably to the Federal Power Commission's request for the administration's views on the importation of gas from Algeria and transmitted a memorandum detailing the Algerian expropriation of United States and French property.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Algeria, Vol. I. Secret. While the tabs are not printed, Tab B is summarized in the footnote to Document 24.

Document 27: National Intelligence Estimate 62-71, Washington, July 31, 1971

Washington, July 31, 1971

This 15 page report analyzed Algeria's international relations, noting that Algeria remained non-aligned with other countries and was skillful at playing the big powers off against each other while retaining its own independence of action. Moreover, Algeria would continue to exploit its natural gas reserves as a means for funding the expensive development projects the Government had undertaken.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79-R01012A, Box 420. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.

Document 28: Telegram 113 From the Interests Section in Algeria to the Department of State, January 21, 1972, 1420Z.

January 21, 1972, 1420Z

The Interests Section warned the Department that, owing to the continued delay in FPC approval of the El Paso project, the momentum generated by improving U.S.-Algerian relations was slowing and that the delay could cause disillusionment in Algeria.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL ALG-US. Secret. It was repeated to Cairo, Khartoum, London, Paris, Tripoli, Tunis, and Rabat.

Document 29: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Kissinger noted that the Algerians had recently approached Raytheon about purchasing an air defense communications network and presented the President with the arguments for and against allowing Raytheon to sell radar equipment to Algeria.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 735, Country Files, Africa, Algeria, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. The attached February 8 memorandum from Rogers is not printed. Saunders sent the memorandum to Kissinger on March 1 and recommended that he send it to the President for approval. Haig approved the recommendation on behalf of the President.

Document 30: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 11, 1972

Washington, March 11, 1972

Kissinger recommended that Nixon sign a letter of greeting to President Boumediene, to be delivered in Algiers by visiting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs David Newsom.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 748, Presidential Correspondence, 1969-74, Algeria, Col. Houari Boumediene. Confidential. Sent for action. Tab B, dated March 7, is not printed.

Document 31: Telegram 540 From the Interests Section in Algeria to the Department of State, March 28, 1972, 1333Z.

March 28, 1972, 1333Z

In a meeting with President Boumediene, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Newsom stressed U.S. initiatives in the international field as well as in U.S.-Algerian relations, and expressed the hope that diplomatic relations might soon be resumed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 AF. Secret; Priority. It was repeated to London, Paris, Rabat, Tripoli, and Tunis. In the septel, telegram 547 from Algiers, March 29, Newsom urged the Department that “We have opportunity in Algeria for major export gain and for strong economic relationship based on our need for gas. Our recent international initiatives have improved political atmosphere. Complications and delays in approving El Paso, however, still major impediment to our success and resumption relations here. Action requested: we need find urgently possible major economic actions which can demonstrate our interest and maintain our momentum here. I suggest meeting pertinent agencies following my return.” (Ibid.) According to telegram 118270 to Djakarta, June 30, the Federal Power Commission gave its general approval of the El Paso importation of Algerian LNG on June 28. (Ibid., ORG 7 S)

Document 32: Telegram 1171 From the Interests Section in Algeria to the Department of State, July 2, 1972, 1245Z

July 2, 1972, 1245Z

As instructed, Deputy Chief of Mission of U.S. Interests Section William Eagleton proposed to Deputy Secretary-General Smail Hamdani that the United States and Algeria resume relations, adding that Secretary of State Rogers could come to Algiers himself at the end of his current trip to make the announcement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL ALG-US. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. In telegram 119670 to Algiers, July 1, Assistant Secretary Newsom had advised Eagleton that since Yemen had restored relations with the United States, and favorable action had been taken by the FPC on the El Paso-SONATRACH agreement, several preconditions to U.S.-Algerian resumption had been met. (Ibid.) In telegram 1200 from Algiers, July 7, Hamdani advised Eagleton that Algeria could not receive the Secretary and renew relations in the present unsettled atmosphere. (Ibid.)

Document 33: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, July 31, 1972

Washington, July 31, 1972

In an official démarche, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Newsom discussed with Minister Abdelkader Bousselham the hijacking of a Delta Airlines aircraft by members of the Black Panthers, who had been paid a million-dollar ransom.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AV 12 US. Confidential. Following his 1968 flight from the United States to avoid imprisonment for an assault conviction, Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information for the Black Panthers, founded a headquarters in Algeria. On June 3, two Black Panthers had demanded and received $500,000 in ransom after hijacking a Western Airlines flight, a sum which the government of Algeria returned to the airline. The Government then released the hijackers to the Black Panthers in Algiers.

Document 34: Telegram 188030 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations and the Interests Section in Algeria, October 14, 1972, 1933Z

October 14, 1972, 1933Z

The telegram transmitted an October 12 memorandum of conversation between Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs Bouteflika and Secretary of State Rogers, who summarized the positions of their respective governments on matters of common interest, including the Middle East and hijacking.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 ALG. Confidential; Priority. It was repeated to Paris. Drafted by Lane and approved by Newsom.

Document 35: Memorandum of Conversation, October 20, 1972, 3 p.m.

October 20, 1972, 3 p.m.

Minister Bousselham and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Newsom discussed a range of issues, notably hijacking, the Middle East, Vietnam, and the El Paso deal.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL ALG-US. Confidential. Drafted by Lane and cleared by Newsom. The meeting took place in Newsom's office.

Document 36: Letter From the Ambassador to Libya (Newsom) to the Country Director for Northern African Affairs (Root), Tripoli, March 27, 1969

Tripoli, March 27, 1969

Newsom advised Root that he had successfully distanced the United States from previous U.S. commitments to assist the succession of the Crown Prince. Newsom went on to discuss the U.S. interest in maintaining a positive relationship with the new Prince.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967—69, POL LIBYA—US. Secret; Official; Informal. The referenced Airgram A—72, March 28 from Tripoli, is not printed. (Ibid., POL 15—1 LIBYA).

Document 37: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Lake) for the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 2, 1969

Washington, September 2, 1969

In this memorandum, Saunders advised Kissinger of a coup staged by a group of young military officers, who had proclaimed the Arab Republic of Libya. Saunders then offered a brief discussion of the political complexion of the new government, the Libyan monarchy's response to the coup, and possible U.S. strategies in dealing with the new government.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1239, Saunders Files, Libya, 1969. Secret. According to a September 2 exchange between Jon Howe and Harold Saunders, the message was sent to Kissinger in California. (Ibid., Box 738, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. I) Similar reports on Libya were contained in Bureau of Intelligence and Research Intelligence Note 625, September 1 (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967—69, POL 23—9 LIBYA) and Intelligence Memorandum 2216/69, September 1. (Central Intelligence Agency, DI/OCI Files, Box 13, Job 79—T00829A)

Document 38: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the Acting Secretary of State (Richardson), Washington, September 4, 1969

Washington, September 4, 1969

Newsom summarized an African Inter-Departmental Group working paper on U.S. options in Libya. He recommended that Washington maintain diplomatic relations with the new regime and coordinate the timing of recognition with the British.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967—69, POL 23—9 Libya. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Robert Allen, Jr. (AF/N); cleared by Root and John Stevenson (L). The tabs are attached but not printed. Richardson approved the recommendation, and wrote, “These steps should be simultaneous, I think. ELR” On a September 5 memorandum from Newsom to Richardson, conveying word of London's intention to recognize the Libyan regime on September 6, Richardson approved a recommendation to follow suit. (Ibid.)

Document 39: Intelligence Memorandum, Washington, September 16, 1969

Washington, September 16, 1969

This 9 page CIA paper, titled “Implications of the Libyan Coup: Some Initial Thoughts,” examined the nature of the new regime and the future of Libyan politics; the effect of this new government on western military facilities and petroleum interests; and outlined the larger consequences this coup would have on the larger Arab world.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1239, Saunders Files, Libya, 1969. Secret. Prepared in the Office of National Estimates, Central Intelligence Agency. It was discussed with representatives of the Office of Current Intelligence and the Office of Economic Research, who were in general agreement with its judgments. In the September 10 research memorandum RAF 18, Denney furnished Rogers with information on the leaders of the Libyan Revolutionary Command Council. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967—69, POL 15 Libya) Another Central Intelligence Agency memorandum released in September, ER IM 69—125, assessed the importance of Libyan oil to the United States and its allies. (Central Intelligence Agency, OER Files, IM 69—125)

Document 40: Telegram 158075 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Morocco, September 17, 1969, 2104Z.

September 17, 1969, 2104Z

In this 4 page telegram, the Department provided guidance to Embassies in pro-western, moderate Arab states which had voiced concern over the lack of American reaction to the Libyan coup.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 LIBYA. Secret. Drafted on September 12 by Root and Newsom; cleared by L, S/S and AF; and approved by Richardson. In telegram 5131 from Tunis, September 2, the Embassy reported the comments of Foreign Minister Bourguiba Jr., who, recalling the Mossadeq case, said he hoped we and UK could in effect ‘bring the King back.’ I pointed out some of problems involved in action such as this.” (Ibid.)

Document 41: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 1, 1969

Washington, October 1, 1969

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 738, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information.

Document 42: Telegram 1134 From the Embassy Office in Benghazi to the Department of State and the Embassy in Libya, October 30, 1969, 1750Z.

October 30, 1969, 1750Z

Foreign Minister Saalih Mas'uud Buwaysiir presented Ambassador Joseph Palmer with a note calling for discussions to terminate the American presence at Wheelus.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 LIBYA—US. Secret; Immediate. It was repeated Priority to London and to USCINCEUR, CO 16th AF TORREJON, CINCUSAFE, and CO 7272 FTW Wheelus AB. A translation of the note was sent to the Department in telegram 1133 from Benghazi, October 30. (Ibid.) Due to the distribution of Libyan ministries in several cities, the U.S. Embassy also had offices in Benghazi and Baida. According to an October 10 memorandum from Acting Secretary of State Richardson to Nixon, the exfiltration cases were incidents in which U.S. employees at the Wheelus base smuggled two Libyans out of the country. (Ibid., POL LIBYA—US)

Document 43: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 17, 1969

Washington, November 17, 1969

Saunders notified Kissinger that Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird had cleared a note to the Libyans indicating that the United States was prepared to begin talks on withdrawal of U.S. military facilities, and hoped that training could meanwhile resume.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 738, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information.

Document 44: Memorandum From Robert Behr and Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 20, 1969

Washington, November 20, 1969

The memorandum summarized the attached NSC paper, titled “Possible Alternative Pressures on Present Libyan Regime.” The 9 page paper detailed U.S. economic interests in private oil investment; outlines possible strategies to employ in discussions with the new regime; and analyzes options both for and against those strategies.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H—71, WSAG Meeting, Libya and Lebanon, 11/24/69. Top Secret. Sent for information. Attached but not printed are the annexes to the NSC paper.

Document 45: Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting, Washington, November 24, 1969, 3:03-5:18 p.m.

Washington, November 24, 1969, 3:03-5:18 p.m.

Over the course of this meeting, the group weighed different options presented in a contingency paper for negotiating with the new Libyan Government, focusing specifically on the issues of U.S. oil interests, the base at Wheelus, and possible covert intervention.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H—114, WSAG Meeting, Libya and Lebanon, 11/24/69. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House

Document 46: Telegram 3684 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State, December 11, 1969, 1010Z

December 11, 1969, 1010Z

RCC Chairman QADHAAFI, after surviving an attempted countercoup involving Minister of Defense al-Hawwaaz and Minister of the Interior AL-HAASI, hinted that the coup leaders had help from Washington and London.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 LIBYA. Secret; Immediate. It was repeated Priority to Algiers, Benghazi, London, Paris, Rabat, Tunis, CINCEUR, CINCUSAFE/LAS/GER, WHEELUS, OACSI/DA/WASHDC, and CO/EUCOM/FLDELEMENT/USAFAC/FRANKFURT. In telegram 206436 to Tripoli, December 12, the Department directed the Embassy to refute the allegation of involvement in the strongest possible terms. (Ibid.)

Document 47: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 11, 1969

Washington, December 11, 1969

Saunders transmitted negotiating instructions on the Wheelus base prepared by State and Defense.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 738, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. A note on the memorandum indicates Haig approved it. The notes on the attached December 11 memorandum from Johnson to Kissinger reads: “Word received by phone that Mr. Packard concurs. H.H.S.”; “O.K. Haig for HAK 2/12/69”; and “Cleared cable with Jan Barbieri, S/S, 2100-2/12/69. SS.” The instructions were transmitted in telegram 206408 to Tripoli, December 12. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 LIBYA—US)

Document 48: Telegram 3711 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State, December 13, 1969, 1355Z.

December 13, 1969, 1355Z

Ambassador Joseph Palmer recommended a contingency statement in case the meetings of a U.S. official with one of the coup plotters should be exposed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 23-9 LIBYA. Secret; Immediate. It was repeated immediate to Benghazi. In telegram 3622 from Tripoli, December 3, Palmer had recommended a negative reply to Minister of Defense HAWAAZ, who had requested American assistance in his struggle against other elements within the Libyan Government, so as “to preserve our future relations with whichever faction may come out on top of the possible power struggle here.” (Ibid.) In telegram 201909 to Tripoli and Benghazi, December 4, the Department concurred, adding “we would hope not to foreclose possibility future contact with HAWAAZ as may later be appropriately selected.” (Ibid.) [text not declassified] (Ibid.)

Document 49: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Washington, December 23, 1969

Washington, December 23, 1969

Newsom advised Johnson to prepare to deflect domestic criticism for the U.S. agreement to withdraw from Wheelus on June 30 at a time when ties were growing between Libya and Egypt.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, DEF 15 LIBYA—US. Secret. Drafted by Blake. Sent for information. The text of the agreed minute, not printed, was sent to the Department in Airgram A—278, December 29. Intelligence Note 869, December 19, advised Rogers that, at QADHAAFI's invitation, two Egyptian army units had been deployed to Libya's two major cities. (Ibid., POL 23-9 LIBYA)

Document 50: National Intelligence Estimate 36.5-69, Washington, December 30, 1969

Washington, December 30, 1969

The 8 page report examined the short-term prospects for Libya, emphasizing issues likely to affect U.S. interests, particularly western military installations, oil policies, Libyan arms negotiations with the Soviet Union, and Arab-Israeli “matters.”

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79—R01012A, Box 369. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and NSA participated in the preparations of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.

Document 51: Telegram 169 From the Embassy in Libya to the Departments of State and Defense, January 26, 1970, 1346Z.

January 26, 1970, 1346Z

In this 6 page telegram, Ambassador Joseph Palmer recounted his January 25 conversation with Prime Minister Mu'ammar al-Qadhaafi, in which QADHAAFI aired his views on the future of the U.S. military programs in Libya and Palmer tried to clarify some points of contention.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 LIBYA. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to USCINCEUR, CINCUSAFE, 16TH AF TORREJON, WHEELUS AB, Benghazi, London, and Paris. The reftel is telegram 7024 to Tripoli, January 15. (Ibid.) In telegram 12659 to Tripoli, January 27, the Department instructed the Embassy to avoid the implication that Libya's request for ammunition would be received routinely or favorably. (Ibid.)

Document 52: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, undated

Washington, undated

Kissinger outlined 6 tenets that would form the basis of the United States continuing relationship with the Libyan Air Force, based on the recommendations of Ambassador to Libya Joseph Palmer and the Departments of State and Defense. The memorandum recommended a shift in the relationship to plan for possible future instability in the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 738, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. The President approved the recommendation. According to a covering sheet, the date of the memorandum was February 12. In telegram 25239 to Tripoli, February 19, the Department transmitted the outline for a new U.S. relationship with the Libyan Air Force. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1 LIBYA—US)

Document 53: Intelligence Memorandum 490/70, Washington, February 13, 1970

Washington, February 13, 1970

The 6 page report assessed the revolutionary government of Libya as it effected the staying power of the present regime and outlined the directions in which the leaders appeared to be moving.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DI/OCI Files, Job 79—T00830A, Box 2. Secret; Noforn. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinated with the Office of Economic Research, the Office of National Estimates, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Clandestine Service.

Document 54: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, March 20, 1970

March 20, 1970

Kissinger presented the President with the proposal for action to influence the Libyan Government to adopt policies consistent with U.S. objectives and minimize those policies inimical to them.

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Libya. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent for action. Tab A is not printed. Nixon approved the recommendation on March 23.

Document 55: Telegram 724 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State, April 13, 1970, 1428Z.

April 13, 1970, 1428Z

Ambassador Joseph Palmer reported that the Revolutionary Command Council was reviewing its basic foreign policy decisions with the United States. Based on U.S. policies on the Arab-Israeli dispute, one of the contending factions was arguing that the United States was a “lost cause” and should be written off.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL LIBYA—US. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. The LARAF commander pressed the Embassy for a decision on the F—5s in telegram 723 from Tripoli, April 13. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 Libya) Palmer's follow-up comments were sent to the Department in telegram 734 from Tripoli, April 14. (Ibid.)

Document 56: Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency through the Deputy Director for Plans (Karamessines) to the Director of Central Intelligence (Helms), Washington, April 16, 1970

Washington, April 16, 1970

This memorandum outlined a discussion between the Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, Ambassador David Newsom, Deputy Assistant Secretary Rodger Davies, David Blee, and Archie Roosevelt concerning the issue of whether to uphold the U.S. contract to deliver a number of F—5 aircraft, which predated the September revolution, or defer delivery in the interests of the Option 1A operation. Ultimately, the group concluded it would be best to defer delivery.

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Libya. No classification. The attachment is not printed.

Document 57: Telegram 70798 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya, May 9, 1970, 1748Z.

Libya, May 9, 1970, 1748Z

Secretary of State Rogers instructed Ambassador Joseph Palmer to inform the Libyan Government that while no decision had yet been made about the F—5 sale, the United States was prepared to accept five Libyan pilots for F—5 training.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL LIBYA—US. Secret. Drafted by Palmer; cleared by J, AF, AF/N, NEA, L, PM, DOD/ISA, SAFUSI, and Joint Staff; and approved by Rogers.

Document 58: Intelligence Brief INRB 131 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson, Washington, May 27, 1970

Washington, May 27, 1970

While acknowledging that Libya might revoke the concessions of individual oil companies, the 3 page report concluded that the nationalization of the oil industry as a whole was unlikely.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 6 LIBYA. Secret; Noforn; Limdis. Drafted by Bazil W. Brown, Jr. (INR/Africa); cleared by Harrop. For more on the oil negotiations in Libya, see Foreign Relations, 1969-72, volume XXXVI, Energy Crisis, 1969-1974.

Document 59: Letter From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard), Washington, June 2, 1970

Washington, June 2, 1970

Johnson asked Packard to review the current instructions for terminating the U.S.-Libyan Economic Assistance agreement, which indicated that the United States had in fact overpaid Libya for the use of the Wheelus base.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, AID (US) 4 LIBYA. Secret. Drafted by Suddarth and Elizabeth Verville (AF/N) and cleared by PM, L, AF/N, and H. Enclosures are not printed.

Document 60: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 12, 1970

Washington, June 12, 1970

Eliot sent Kissinger an informal memorandum reporting that in an official ceremony on June 11, the Wheelus commander had turned over the base to the Libyan Air Force.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 738, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. I. Confidential. In telegram 1510, June 27, Ambassador Joseph Palmer took the Deputy Prime Minister to task for the criticism the Libyan Air Force Commander had leveled at Washington during the turnover ceremony, causing Palmer to boycott the remaining events. JALLUUD assured Palmer that he and other RCC members had had no prior knowledge of what Farjaani intended to say. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL LIBYA—US)

Document 61: Letter From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Packard) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson), Washington, June 26, 1970

Washington, June 26, 1970

Packard recommended against Johnson's suggestion that the United States admit to owing further payments for Wheelus.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 LIBYA—US. Secret. The attached letter is printed as Document 59.

Document 62: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) to Acting Secretary of State Johnson, Washington, July 2, 1970

Washington, July 2, 1970

Moore recommended that Ambassador Joseph Palmer be given authority to terminate the U.S.-Libyan agreements currently in force.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15-4 LIBYA—US. Secret. Sent for action. Drafted by Suddarth and Bray; and cleared by Blake and Salans. The attachments are not printed. The detailed instructions (Tab A) were sent to Tripoli in telegram 105547 on July 2. (Ibid., POL LIBYA—US) The formal notes of termination of outstanding U.S.-Libyan agreements were transmitted to Tripoli in telegram 106573, July 4. (Ibid.)

Document 63: Intelligence Memorandum 531/70, Washington, July 31, 1970

Washington, July 31, 1970

This 6 page report examined arms supplies and suppliers to Libya since the 1969 revolution.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DI/OCI Files, Job 79—T00830A, Box 6. Secret; Noforn. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency, and coordinated with the offices of National Estimates, Strategic Research, and Economic Research, and with the Directorate of Plans.

Document 64: Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, August 5, 1970

Washington, August 5, 1970

Rogers alerted the President to the implications of the introduction of Soviet weapons into Libya.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Secret.

Document 65: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, August 12, 1970

Washington, August 12, 1970

Kissinger recommended that the President reject Secretary of State Rogers' suggestion for a meeting with Ambassador Joseph Palmer.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. No action indicated, but a note on the covering memorandum indicated that Saunders contacted the Ambassador to express regrets. Tab A is not printed. Tab B is printed as Document 64.

Document 66: Memorandum for the Record, Washington, August 19, 1970

This meeting discussed Libya and examined certain aspects of Option 1A.

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Libya. Secret; Eyes Only.

Document 67: Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Karamessines), Washington, August 20, 1970

Washington, August 20, 1970

Johnson sent a memorandum presenting the Department's views on Option 1A following consultation with Ambassador Joseph Palmer.

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Libya. Secret.

Document 68: Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 28, 1970

Washington, August 28, 1970

Hoskinson alerted Kissinger to a plot by Libyan exiles to release Idriss loyalists from prison.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Top Secret. Sent for information. The attached list of cables is not printed.

Document 69: Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, December 31, 1970

Washington, December 31, 1970

Moore submitted to Rogers an action memorandum on the various views within the administration on F—5 sales to Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 LIBYA. Secret. The paper was drafted by Blake, and cleared by PM/MAS, NEA, and H. In telegram 196791 to Tripoli, Tunis, and USCINCEUR, December 9, the Department explained that it saw no way to deliver the F—5s to Libya for later transfer to a third party. (Ibid.)

Document 70: Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Plans of the Central Intelligence Agency (Critchfield) to the Director of Current Intelligence (Parmenter), Washington, February 23, 1971

Washington, February 23, 1971

Critchfield informed Parmenter that a critical point in relations with Libya might be approaching.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79-01229A, Box 1, AA—1, AF DIV, 1971. Secret. The attachment is not printed. The memorandum has Critchfield's typed signature with an indication he signed the original.

Document 71: Telegram 373 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State, February 24, 1971, 1147Z.

February 24, 1971, 1147Z

Prime Minister Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi assured the Ambassador that there were no outstanding issues between Libya and the United States apart from the Arab-Israel dispute.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 LIBYA. Secret; Priority; Exdis. It was repeated to Benghazi. In the referenced telegram 4025 to Tripoli, January 9, the Department had advised that the “consensus is that fulfillment [of the F—5] contract difficult justify in terms current Libyan posture toward Middle East peace initiative, their present attitude toward US and US interests in Libya, and generally poor prospects for any marked improvement.” Paragraph 3 dealt with expulsions of American citizens from Libya and paragraph 4 with the petroleum negotiations. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 LIBYA) In telegram 185 from Tripoli, January 26, Palmer discussed the F—5s with MUFA Undersecretary KIKHYA. (Ibid.) In a subsequent comment, telegram 381 from Tripoli, February 24, Palmer wrote that there was “nothing new” in Qadhafi's emphasis on the U.S.-Israeli relationship, but that he was struck by the Libyan leader's commitment to non-alignment, his pragmatism, and the cordiality of his reception. (Ibid.)

Document 72: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, March 18, 1971

Washington, March 18, 1971

Saunders recommended against the sale of F—5s to Libya, arguing that the Libyan Government would be unfriendly no matter what Washington did.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Secret. Sent for action. Although Richard Kennedy registered his dissent in an attached memorandum, Kissinger initialed his agreement on March 30.

Document 73: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 27, 1971

Washington, March 27, 1971

Kissinger apprised Nixon of the current state of play on the oil negotiations with Libya.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 293, Memoranda to the President, December 1970—April 1971. Secret. Sent for information. A March 31 notes reads “The President has seen.”

Document 74: National Intelligence Estimate 36.5-71, Washington, April 30, 1971

Washington, April 30, 1971

The paper drew conclusions about likely developments in Libyan policy, particularly in foreign affairs.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79—R01012A, Box 418. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and NSA participated in the preparations of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction. Pages six and seven, not published, featured a map.

Document 75: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, May 8, 1971

Washington, May 8, 1971

Moore advised that the Secretary decline to sell Libya the remaining F—5s, but express the Department's willingness to provide support for those already delivered.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 LIBYA. Secret. Sent for Action. Rogers initialed the option in the first paragraph “to delay further.” Drafted by Newsom and Blake; and cleared by NEA, PM, and L. The attachment is not printed.

Document 76: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, May 17, 1971

Washington, May 17, 1971

Saunders updated Kissinger on the status of an internal plot against the Libyan regime.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The attachment is not printed.

Document 77: Memorandum, Washington, May 17, 1971

Washington, May 17, 1971

The CIA provided a status report on Libyan developments.

Source: National Security Council Files, Nixon Intelligence Files, Libya. Secret; Eyes Only. The May 24 covering memorandum from Hoskinson to Kissinger is not printed.

Document 78: Airgram A—6 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya, June 16, 1971

June 16, 1971

The Department forwarded a Policy Planning Paper for Libya as approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 LIBYA—US. Secret; Noforn. Covering airgram was drafted by Edward W. Holmes (AF/NSC) and approved by Carter. The annexes are not printed.

Document 79: Memorandum From Secretary Laird to Secretary Rogers, December 2, 1971

December 2, 1971

Laird recommended to Rogers that the United States allow a Spanish firm to sell F—5Bs to Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 LIBYA. Secret.

Document 80: Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore) to the Acting Secretary of State Irwin, Washington, December 7, 1971

Washington, December 7, 1971

Moore notified the Acting Secretary that Libya had nationalized a subsidiary of British Petroleum, which shared a concession with an American firm.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 15-2 LIBYA. Confidential. Drafted by Clark and cleared by E/ORF/FSE, EUR/BMI, and AF/N. Intelligence Note RAFN—60, December 9, described the nationalization as part of a long-term Libyan plan for resolving financial claims against the United Kingdom, but added that the timing was determined by Iran's recent occupation of Persian Gulf islands, for which Tripoli blamed London. (Ibid., POL LIBYA—UK)

Document 81: Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Defense Laird, Washington, December 15, 1971

Washington, December 15, 1971

Rogers disagreed with Laird's position on permitting a Spanish firm to sell F—5Bs to Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 LIBYA. Secret.

Document 82: Information Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Moore), the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources and Food Policy (Katz), and the Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (Hillenbrand)

18 December 1971

The memorandum advised Rogers of U.S. agreement to a British request for support in its dèmarches to major oil-consuming countries, urging them not to purchase oil from the former British Petroleum concession.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, PET 15-2 LIBYA. Secret. Drafted by Robert Pelletreau (AF/N) and Gordon Brown (E/ORF/FSE); and cleared by AF/N, AF, E/ORF/FSE, L, and EUR/BMI.

Document 83: Letter From the Ambassador to Libya (Palmer) to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom), Tripoli, December 22, 1971

Tripoli, December 22, 1971

Palmer conveyed his deepening concern at the U.S. postponement of a decision on military sales to Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 LIBYA. Secret; Limdis; Official—Informal. The tabs are not printed.

Document 84: Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to the Ambassador to Libya (Palmer), Washington, January 7, 1972

Washington, January 7, 1972

Newsom advised Palmer of the Secretary's belief that while a negative decision could provoke a reaction from Libya, the absence of a decision would not.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 LIBYA. Secret; Official; Informal. The letter is an unsigned copy.

Document 85: Memorandum From the Counsel to the President (Dean) to the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig), Washington, February 3, 1972

Washington, February 3, 1972

Dean warned Haig that the Libyan Government planned to loan three million dollars interest-free to the Nation of Islam.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Secret. The Libyan Government gave its grant to the Nation of Islam on May 8. (Ibid.)

Document 86: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, February 8, 1972

Washington, February 8, 1972

Eliot notified Kissinger of the termination of U.S.-Libyan bilateral agreements dating from the previous regime.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Confidential.

Document 87: Letter From Secretary of Defense Laird to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 1, 1972

Washington, March 1, 1972

Laird again presented arguments in favor of State's approval for the sale of aircraft to Libya.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 75-0125, Box 14, Libya 000.1---1972. Secret.

Document 88: Action Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs (Spiers) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, April 7, 1972

Washington, April 7, 1972

Since Rogers had decided again to hold the F—5 question in abeyance, Spiers prompted the Secretary to notify Laird and the Spanish Foreign Minister, who had requested approval of the sales to Libya.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 LIBYA. Secret. Drafted by Chris C. Pappas, Jr. (PM/MAS); and cleared by PM/MAS, AF/N, NEA/PA, EUR/SPP, and AF. The attachments are not printed, but Rogers sent the letters to Laird and Minister of Foreign Affairs Gregorio Lopez Bravo on April 13. (Ibid.)

Document 89: Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Newsom) to Acting Secretary of State Richardson, Washington, May 31, 1972

Washington, May 31, 1972

Newsom advised Richardson that the Libyan Government had requested a reduction of the size of the U.S. mission to fourteen from thirty-five.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US—LIBYA. Confidential.

Document 90: Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, July 28, 1972

Washington, July 28, 1972

Irwin provided a memorandum for the Secretary on ways to manage relations with Libya that would protect American oil investments.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL LIBYA—US. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Newsom. According to a memorandum to Irwin from Robert Smith, the agreement between Egypt and Libya involved a plan for political unification of Egypt and Libya by September 1, 1973. (Ibid.)

Document 91: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 9, 1972

Washington, August 9, 1972

Saunders asked Kissinger if the pressure from oil companies was sufficient to warrant the sale of the F—5s to Libya, which remained a major irritant in U.S.-Libyan relations.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.

Document 92: Memorandum From Samuel M. Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 1, 1972

Washington, September 1, 1972

Hoskinson inquired whether Kissinger would like to override Rogers' view that there should be no change in U.S. arms policy towards Libya.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 739, Country Files, Africa, Libya, Vol. II. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Kissinger approved the recommendation. In an October 18 memorandum, Newsom asked whether, given Libya's interventionism in other countries and merger with Egypt, stricter controls should be imposed on the sale of U.S. spare parts. Irwin agreed. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12-5 LIBYA)

Document 93: Telegram 189100 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Libya, October 17, 1972, 2114Z

Libya, October 17, 1972, 2114Z

The Department conveyed a memorandum of conversation between the Secretary and the Libyan Foreign Minister, in which the former fended off demands for the contracted F—5s by inquiring about Libyan plans for the aircraft.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL LIBYA—US. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to Cairo, Tel Aviv, and USUN. Drafted by CONNOR (USUN); cleared by AF; and approved by Michael Habib (S/S).

Document 94: Telegram 1699 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State, October 30, 1972, 1600Z.

October 30, 1972, 1600Z

The Ambassador and Qadhafi had a tour d'horizon conversation in which the Libyan leader sent a message to the President.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 LIBYA. Secret; Priority.

Document 95: Telegram 1849 From the Embassy in Libya to the Department of State, December 7, 1972, 1456Z

December 7, 1972, 1456Z

The telegram warned that the United States could expect overt discrimination from Libya due to its policy of support for Israel.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL LIBYA—US. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Lagos. In telegram 199168, November 2, the Department instructed the Embassy not to broach the topic of the F—5s, but observed that Tripoli had neither been asked for, nor made, payments for the F—5s. (Ibid., DEF 12-5 LIBYA)

Document 96: Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Ross) to Armin H. Meyer of the Office of the Secretary, Washington, December 13, 1972

Washington, December 13, 1972

Ross acknowledged the links between Libyan leaders and terrorism, while passing along a report that noted Tripoli's doubts over the benefits of terrorist tactics.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-8 LIBYA. Secret.

Document 97: Airgram A-34 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State, February 17, 1969

February 17, 1969

The report assessed the impact on U.S. interests of the recent increase of Soviet influence in Morocco. The influx of Soviet arms and technicians into Algeria were of prime concern to Morocco's national security and economic well-being at the same time the Arab-Israeli dispute placed pressure on King Hassan to align Morocco with Arab extremists. This report goes on to outline the strategic importance of Morocco and to analyze U.S. policies and conditioning factors toward the GOM.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL MOR-US. Secret. Drafted by Earle Russell, Jr.; cleared by Edward Dow, Jr., Gordon Schraeder, Phillip Birnbaum, and Col. Gahl; and approved by Dwight Dickinson.

Document 98: Telegram 2481 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State, May 18, 1969, 1626Z

May 18, 1969, 1626Z

This telegram transmitted an account of Ambassador Tasca's conversation with General MOHAMED MEDBOUH, in which Tasca expressed U.S. concern that Morocco's warming relations with the Soviets could damage confidence between Washington and Rabat.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL MOR-US. Secret. It was repeated to Moscow, Paris, Casablanca, and Tangier. According to telegram 75955 to Rabat, May 13, King Hassan had been dropped from the 1969 list of official visitors to Washington following the visit of Soviet President Podgorny to Morocco. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 7 MOR)

Document 99: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 7, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, October 7, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

In response to the request of King Hassan's envoy Mamoun Tahiri, President Nixon invited suggestions for greater U.S.-Moroccan cooperation, emphasizing his regard for Morocco as a strong anchor in the Mediterranean.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Newsom. The conversation took place at the White House. On September 17, Kissinger had conveyed King Hassan's wish to send a special emissary to discuss the recent Libyan coup and the upcoming Islamic Summit meeting in Rabat (see North Africa Regional section). Kissinger recommended that Nixon accept the envoy in order to make clear his desire for a fair settlement to the Arab-Israeli crisis and his understanding of Arab and Muslim concerns. (Ibid., Box 1243, Saunders Files, Morocco, 1/20/69-12/31/69)

Document 100: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, January 7, 1970

Washington, January 7, 1970

Kissinger notified Nixon of a recent message from King Hassan, urging that Washington exercise influence in the Maghreb to offset the danger posed by the new radical regime in Libya.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I. Secret; Limdis. Sent for information. Tab B, telegram 21 from Tasca in Rome, January 4, is not published. In a covering letter to Kissinger, January 5, Saunders observed that Hassan's “analysis is overstated and simplistic but reflects an understandable nervousness about the future of his throne since the Libyan coup. Thus far we have tended to look at the North African situation on a pragmatic country and crisis basis. I think the time has come now, however, for a systematic review of the entire situation. I will be sending you a suggested NSSM to give us a grip on the problem.” (See the North Africa Regional section for more on the resultant NSSM 87, “Trends and Options in North Africa,” January 22, 1970)

Document 101: Telegram Secto 27/727 From Secretary of State Rogers in Morocco to the Department of State, February 10, 1970, 1545Z

February 10, 1970, 1545Z

This telegram transmitted an account of Rogers' February 9 meeting with Prime Minister Laraki in Rabat. At this meeting, participants focused their discussion on the Spanish Sahara, Algeria, and, especially, peace in the Middle East.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. It was repeated Priority to Rabat and to Algiers, Tripoli, and Madrid. Rogers was in Morocco from February 7 to 9.

Document 102: Telegram Secto 27/727 From Secretary of State Rogers in Morocco to the Department of State, February 10, 1970, 1545Z.

February 10, 1970, 1545Z

This telegram transmitted an account of Rogers' February 9 meeting with Prime Minister Laraki in Rabat. At this meeting, participants focused their discussion on the Spanish Sahara, Algeria, and, especially, peace in the Middle East.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 S. Secret; Priority; Exdis. It was repeated Priority to Rabat and to Algiers, Tripoli, and Madrid. Rogers was in Morocco from February 7 to 9.

Document 103: Telegram 30004 From the Department of State to the Embassies in Sierra Leone and Guinea, February 28, 1970, 0017Z

February 28, 1970, 0017Z

In the Moroccan section of an African round up for Assistant Secretary Newsom, the Department of State reported that a military plot had been discovered against King Hassan's regime, that Moroccan terrorists had been apprehended in Spain, and that Moroccan student unrest continued.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 AF. Secret; Priority. Drafted on February 26 by Virginia Montague (AF/I); cleared in draft by Hare (AF/N), Marianne Cook (AF/C), Thomas McNamara (EUR/FBX), Gordon Beyer (AF/E), and Harvey Nelson (AF/S); cleared by Donald Spigler (AF/I), and Robert Brown (S/S); and approved by Moore.

Document 104: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, June 3, 1970

Washington, June 3, 1970

Kissinger provided the President with briefing material for his upcoming June 4 meeting with Foreign Minister AHMED LARAKI to discuss the Middle East crisis. In this memorandum, Kissinger presented possible requests by Laraki and underscored the need to bolster the U.S. relationship with Moroccan leadership and use the meeting as a forum for conveying to other Arab leaders the message that the United States was genuinely interested in assisting in a peace settlement.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The attached memorandum and talking points from Secretary Rogers are not printed. The summary of the President's conversation with Laraki is printed as Document 106.

Document 105: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, June 8, 1970

Washington, June 8, 1970

Saunders forwarded for Kissinger's approval a summary of the June 4 conversation between Foreign Minister AHMED LARAKI and President Nixon.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Saunders wrote the following postscript: “The angle to be especially considered is whether in this form this summary could be given to Laraki for his record since he was alone and did not take detailed notes. H.S.” Kissinger eliminated the last sentence in paragraph 3 and substituted the word “just” for “favorable” in the first sentence of paragraph 4. With these changes, Kissinger approved the summary, and agreed that it could be passed on to Laraki. On June 5, Laraki also had urged Secretary Rogers to consider seriously Nasser's peace appeal as a step towards easing the worsening Middle East situation. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL MOR-US)

Document 106: Intelligence Note RAFN-29 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, July 14, 1970

Washington, July 14, 1970

The note reported that King Hassan was preparing to end the “state of exception” he had ruled under since 1965, and allow elections to a new unicameral parliament.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-5 MOR. Confidential; Noforn; Controlled Dissemination. Drafted by Mattson and cleared by Harrop. In a subsequent political summary, Airgram A-209, December 8, the Embassy reported, “The new constitution under which the King enjoys the same prerogatives approximating his powers under the State of Exemption [sic?] won approval so unnecessarily overwhelming (97.8%) in the July 24 referendum as to cast doubts on the credibility of that consultation of the popular will. Nonetheless, the referendum exposed the weakness of the opposition's popular grass-roots support and its inability to compete against the well-oiled political apparatus of the regime.” (Ibid., POL 2 MOR)

Document 107: Intelligence Note RAFN-49 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, November 3, 1970

Washington, November 3, 1970

The 6 page report analyzed King Hassan's past and likely future use of U.S. military facilities in Morocco as leverage for political and economic advantage.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissemination. Drafted by Mattson and approved by Harrop.

Document 108: Telegram 4828 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State, November 4, 1970, 1755Z

November 4, 1970, 1755Z

The Prime Minister asked Ambassador to Morocco Stuart Rockwell if Washington considered the U.S. facilities in Morocco to be a base, which required agreements to govern its usage.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret; Priority; Limdis. The hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on U.S. Overseas Commitments, chaired by William “Stuart” Symington, met in July and November, 1970. In telegram 182605 to Rabat, November 5, the Department replied that the base at Kenitra was under full Moroccan sovereignty and control, and agreed that Rabat might have raised the issue to obtain increased compensation. (Ibid.)

Document 109: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 30, 1970

Washington, November 30, 1970

Saunders recommended that the administration yield to King Hassan's wish for an emissary to discuss U.S. facilities in Morocco, complete a review of the need for the facilities, and possibly ratify new arrangements with the GOM.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger approved the recommendation and wrote on the memorandum, “Ok with Saunders changes and delete last [paragraph] HK.” Attached but not printed at Tab A telegram 195658 to Rabat, December 1. It confirmed that the U.S. Government did not regard Kenitra as a U.S. base. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15-MOR-US) Attached but not printed at Tab B is telegram 5136 from Rabat, November 25.

Document 110: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, January 25, 1971

Washington, January 25, 1971

Saunders summarized for Kissinger a copy of Robert Murphy's report of his discussion with King Hassan. According to Murphy, it all boiled down to Hassan's desire for additional U.S. aid.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for information. The attachment, dated December 17, is not printed. Rockwell's report on the same conversation was sent in telegram 5409 from Rabat, December 15, 1970. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 MOR-US)

Document 111: Telegram 51970 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco, March 27, 1971, 2034Z.

March 27, 1971, 2034Z

In this 9 page telegram, Secretary of State Rogers notified the Embassy that the U.S. Government would seek to retain access to Kenitra as long as the political and economic costs were manageable, but it hoped to avoid a quid pro quo.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 MOR-US. Secret; Exdis. It was repeated to USCINCEUR. Drafted on March 18 by Blake and G. Bader (DOD/ISA); cleared by PM/ISO, USIA, CIA, OSD/ISA, Navy, S/PC, AID, PM/MAS, OSD/Admin, INR, AF, JCS, S/S, and the White House; and approved by Johnson

Document 112: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 29, 1971

Washington, March 29, 1971

Kissinger provided Nixon with background information on U.S. communications facilities in Morocco and proposed an approach towards the Kenitra facilities negotiations with King Hassan.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 740, Country Files, Africa, Morocco, Vol. I. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Nixon approved the recommendation.

Document 113: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 15, 1971, 11 a.m.

Washington, April 15, 1971, 11 a.m.

Prime Minister Laraki explained that King Hassan wished to postpone his visit to the United States in order to attend the upcoming Arab Summit.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Mem Con-The President, Prime Minister Laraki, April 15, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. The Department's draft memorandum of the conversation is located in Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 MOR.

Document 114: Airgram A-117 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State, June 9, 1971

June 9, 1971

In this 4 page airgram, the Embassy commented on the proposal for a reorientation of U.S. policy in Morocco submitted by Foreign Service Officer Edward Djerejian posted in Casablanca. The bulk of the discussion focused on Djerejian's two fundamental assumptions that the United States was overcommitted and that radical change was inevitable.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 MOR-US. Secret. Drafted on June 7 by Parker and approved by Rockwell. The Embassy sent the original proposal to the Department as Rabat A-97, May 19. (Ibid.)

Document 115: Airgram A-43 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco, June 16, 1971

June 16, 1971

The Department forwarded an official statement of U.S. policy toward Morocco, approved by the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Africa, that outlines U.S. interests and objectives in Morocco over the next five years, as well as Morocco's objectives vis-à-vis the United States. It then goes on to outline a 20 part recommended course of action that the U.S. Government should take over the course of the next 5 years.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 MOR-US. Secret; Noforn. Drafted on June 8 by Holmes and approved by Carter.

Document 116: Airgram A-43116. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, July 10, 1971 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco, June 16, 1971

June 16, 1971

Haig alerted the President to the apparent failure of a coup attempt against King Hassan by disaffected members of the Moroccan military.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 357, Subject Files, Morocco, Attempted Coup d'état, 10 July 1971. Confidential. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

Document 117: Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to President Nixon, Washington, July 11, 1971

Washington, July 11, 1971

Haig reported that sporadic fighting continued in Rabat, that King Hassan was unharmed, and that General Oufkir had been charged with restoring order.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 357, Subject Files, Morocco, Attempted Coup d'état, 10 July 1971. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The congratulatory message, not published, was sent as telegram 124513 to Rabat, July 11. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 MOR)

Document 118: Intelligence Note RAFN-39 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, July 15, 1971

Washington, July 15, 1971

This 4 page report speculated that, in the long term, the King's throne remained in jeopardy from civilian and military discontent.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 MOR. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissemination; Limdis. Drafted by Mattson and cleared by Rives.

Document 119: Telegram 3745 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State, July 23, 1971, 1115Z.

July 23, 1971, 1115Z

Ambassador to Morocco Stuart Rockwell speculated on the prospects for King Hassan's regime. While the situation in Morocco seemed to be returning to normal, Rockwell noted that Hassan was trying to rationalize events rather than analyze the causes. Unless Hassan embraced reform, his long term prospects looked dim.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23-9 MOR. Secret. It was repeated Priority to Soto Grande, and to CINCEUR, Madrid, Paris, COMNAVTRACOM, Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, Casablanca, and Tangier. In telegram 3815 from Rabat, July 27, the Embassy suggested that one consequence of the coup might be an attempt by the Moroccan regime to draw closer to the United States. (Ibid., POL MOR-US)

Document 120: Telegram 134263 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Spain, July 23, 1971, 2259Z.

July 23, 1971, 2259Z

In response to a query by Spanish Foreign Minister Lopez Bravo, Under Secretary Johnson offered assurances that the CIA had not been behind the plot to King Hassan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 MOR. Secret; Flash; Nodis. It was repeated Flash to Rabat and Soto Grande. Drafted and approved by Johnson; cleared in substance with Rogers and with Newsom and Eliot. In telegram 101 from Madrid, July 23, Ambassador Robert Hill had transmitted the message from Lopez Bravo that King Hassan suspected the CIA of complicity in the plot against him. (Ibid.) Also on July 23, CIA Director Richard Helms replied to Ambassador HILL: “You may tell Lopez Bravo categorically that neither CIA nor any other element of U. S. Government had anything whatsoever to do with recent plot against King Hassan.” (Ibid.)

Document 121: Telegram 4204 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State, August 19, 1971, 1605Z.

August 19, 1971, 1605Z

The Embassy reported that Minister of Defense Oufkir had informed the Moroccan-U.S. Liaison Office that he intended to promote closer cooperation and coordination with Washington.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 1 MOR. Secret; Limdis; Noforn. It was also sent to SECDEF and USCINCEUR. In telegram 153823 to Rabat, August 20, the Department agreed that while Washington should be helpful, it did not want to increase the U.S. security posture or political identification with the Moroccan regime. (Ibid.)

Document 122: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 29, 1971, 10 a.m.

Washington, September 29, 1971, 10 a.m.

New Prime Minister Mohamed Karim-Lamrani asked Secretary of State Rogers for assistance in enacting crucial reforms in Morocco to restore stability.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 MOR. Secret. Drafted by Robert H. Pelletreau (AF/N); and approved in S on October 13.

Document 123: Telegram 186454 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Morocco, October 12, 1971, 1549Z.

October 12, 1971, 1549Z

The Joint State/Department message provided guidance for handling requests from the Moroccan Minister of Defense for closer ties with the United States. It included U.S. strategic interest in Morocco, guidance on handing requests from General Oufkir dealing with issues of military organization, command and control systems, civic action, and increased advisory effort.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-MOR. Secret. It was also sent to USCINCEUR and repeated to CHMUSLO Rabat. Drafted on October 7 by Blake and Bader (OSD/ISA); cleared by DOD/ISA, JCS, PM/MAS, AF/RA, AF/N, and PM/ISP; and approved by Odell. In telegram 4283 from Rabat, August 25, the Embassy had supplied a more detailed list of Oufkir's subsidiary requests for assistance in improving communications with units and assigning civic tasks to military forces. (Ibid., DEF 19-8 US-MOR)

Document 124: Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and King Hassan of Morocco, via a French Interpreter, October 23, 1971, 11:59 a.m.-12:08 p.m.

October 23, 1971, 11:59 a.m.-12:08 p.m.

Nixon asked for the King's support regarding the upcoming United Nations vote on a U.S. resolution to designate the expulsion of Taiwan an “important question” which would require a two-thirds majority vote.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 12-106. Secret. The editor transcribed the portion of the tape recording published here specifically for this volume. Morocco was instrumental in the defeat of Washington's proposal to retain Taipei as a UN member, by abstaining on the “important question” resolution. With the U.S. defeat, a simple majority successfully voted for Taiwanese expulsion. In telegram 198650 to Rabat, October 30, the Department sent a record of Newsom's discussion with the Moroccan Chargé expressing U.S. disappointment. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 1970-73, POL MOR-US.)

Document 125: National Intelligence Estimate 61-72, Washington, June 15, 1972

Washington, June 15, 1972

Examining the outlook for Morocco, this 11 page report concluded that it was unlikely that King Hassan would give up any of his political authority and, although he could probably continue in power for years, his long-term failure to reform would likely radicalize the political scene.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representative of the FBI who abstained on the grounds that it was outside his jurisdiction.

Document 126: Telegram 3761 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State, August 17, 1972, 0020Z.

August 17, 1972, 0020Z

Ambassador to Morocco Stuart Rockwell gave a preliminary assessment on the failure of another attempt to assassinate King Hassan.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 MOR. Confidential; Niact; Immediate. It was repeated Immediate to Paris, Rome, Madrid, Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, and London, and to USCINCEUR and COMNAVTRACOM.

Document 127: Intelligence Note RAAN-36 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, August 17, 1972

Washington, August 17, 1972

This 3 page report observed that the General Oufkir's suicide removed an irreplaceable pillar of support to the Hassan regime as Oufkir's total devotion to the monarch, coupled with his ruthlessness and organization, had enabled the monarchy to maintain control of the military in spite of attempts to overthrow the regime. As the loyalty of the military was critical to the survival of Hassan's regime, the report noted that a purge of the Moroccan forces was likely and that the United States might possibly be assigned responsibility for supporting the opposition.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 MOR. Confidential. Drafted by Hoffman; cleared by Godfrey Summ (INR/Africa).

Document 128: Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Rush) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer), Washington, August 29, 1972

Washington, August 29, 1972

Following the August 16 coup attempt in Morocco, Rush requested recommendations on how the United States could reduce its military dependence on the communications facilities there.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, FRC 75-0125, Box 15, Morocco 000.1, 1972. On September 22, Vice Director of the Joint Staff Martin Colladay responded to the request for alternatives to U.S. communications facilities in Morocco. He reported the Joint Chiefs of Staff's conclusion that “No precipitate action be taken to reduce US personnel assigned to NAVTRACOM Morocco which supports the Kenitra Air Force Base” but that “current US Navy plans to reduce telecommunications operations at Sidi Yahia complex in late FY 1975 continue as planned.” The Joint Chiefs also recommended that “When a Fleet Satellite Communications System is operational in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean Basin, approximately FY 1977, and lack of dependency on Moroccan-registered frequencies has clearly been established, the United States then inform the Government of Morocco of its intent to close C [text not declassified] facilities entirely.” (Ibid., OASD Files, (C) (A), FRC 77-0094, Box 65, Morocco 1972)

Document 129: Memorandum From the Secretary of State (Rogers) to President Nixon, Washington, September 5, 1972

Washington, September 5, 1972

Rogers summarized Hassan's position in the wake of the failed coup against him by the Moroccan Air Force and noted that another assassination attempt could create a dangerously unstable and unpredictable situation in Morocco. Rogers' outlined U.S. actions following the assassination attempt and presented 3 options for the future.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 MOR. Secret. For the draft NSSM as approved, see Document 133.

Document 130: Telegram 4147 From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State, September 8, 1972, 1600Z.

September 8, 1972, 1600Z

In this 8 page telegram, Ambassador Stuart Rockwell reported on his September 7 meeting with King Hassan. Hassan analyzed the coup attempt and described his future plans for restoring order.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 MOR. Secret. It was repeated to Paris, Madrid, Tunis, Tripoli, Algiers, Casablanca, Tangier, USCINCEUR, and COMNAVTRACOM.

Document 131: Special National Intelligence Estimate 61-1-72, September 14, 1972

September 14, 1972

This 7 page estimate examined the prospects for the Moroccan monarchy and concluded that Hassan's position had been seriously weakened. Another attempt against him was liable to succeed.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 361, Subject Files, National Intelligence Estimates. Secret; Controlled Dissemination. The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Department of State, Defense, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of CIA submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all members of the USIB with the exception of the representatives of the FBI and the Treasury who abstained on the grounds that it was outside their jurisdiction.

Document 132: National Security Study Memorandum 160, Washington, September 14, 1972

Washington, September 14, 1972

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger delivered President Nixon's request for a study of U.S. policy toward Morocco, which would examine U.S. interests and options for protecting them.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 365, Subject Files, National Security Study Memoranda (NSSM's), Nos. 104-206. Secret.

Document 133: Telegram Secto 80/3838 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, October 12, 1972, 1744Z.

October 12, 1972, 1744Z

The telegram transmitted a memorandum of a conversation between Rogers and Behima, in which they discussed a range of issues, notably the need to reconsider U.S. bases in Morocco in order to placate the Moroccan opposition.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 15 MOR-US. Confidential; Exdis. It was repeated to Rabat and Madrid.

Document 134: Analytical Summary, Washington, November 28, 1972

Washington, November 28, 1972

This 8 page summary examined the paper on U.S. Policy Toward Morocco produced in response to National Security Study Memorandum 160.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-66, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 160. Secret. The full NSSM 160 study, dated October 25, is not printed. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 100, Senior Review Group Meeting, Morocco, NSSM 160) The Special NIE is printed as Document 132.

Document 135: Minutes of a Senior Review Group Meeting, Washington, November 30, 1972, 3:38-3:55 p.m.

Washington, November 30, 1972, 3:38-3:55 p.m.

The Senior Review Group concluded that it was strategically important for the United States to maintain friendly relations with Morocco; that King Hassan, still the focal point of authority, deserved support; and that the U.S. military should reduce its presence at Kenitra.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-66, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 160. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The CIA statement is ibid., NSC Files, Box 100, Senior Review Group Meeting, Morocco, NSSM 160.

Document 136: Memorandum From Harold Saunders and William Quandt of the National Security Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 29, 1972

Washington, December 29, 1972

Saunders and Quandt reported that King Hassan hoped to send an emissary shortly to improve U.S.-Moroccan relations and indicated that Hassan continued to believe that the United States was involved in the coup attempts against him.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-237, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 200. Secret. Sent for action. Tabs A and B are attached but not printed. The minutes at Tab C are printed as Document 136. The NSDM at Tab C is printed as Document 138. Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger approved all recommendations and indicated that he wanted Saunders to meet with Canton.

Document 137: National Security Decision Memorandum 200, Washington, January 5, 1973

Washington, January 5, 1973

Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger forwarded President Nixon's approval of the conclusions reached at the Senior Review Group meeting on Policy Toward Morocco.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-237, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 200. Secret.

Document 138: Intelligence Note 198 From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, March 20, 1969

Washington, March 20, 1969

The report speculated on possible successors to aging Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba. It predicted that the transfer of power was likely to be orderly, however, indecision over the succession procedure and the multitude of candidates vying for the position produced concerns for U.S. interests in the region.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 745, Country Files, Africa, Tunisia, Vol. I. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissemination.

Document 139: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, April 3, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

Washington, April 3, 1969, 11:30 a.m.

In a meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, the Tunisian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Habib Bourguiba, Jr., emphasized the importance of close relations with the United States during the upcoming transfer of power and given the unstable political situation facing one of its closest neighbors, Algeria. Bourguiba then requested greater American military assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL TUN-US. Confidential. Drafted by Root and approved on April 15 in S. The conversation took place in the Secretary 's Office.

Document 140: Telegram 63195 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia, April 23, 1969, 2313Z.

April 23, 1969, 2313Z

This joint State and Defense message reported on Bourguiba's talks with Secretary of State Rogers and Secretary of Defense Laird. It instructed the Embassy to respond positively to Bourguiba's hope for dialogue with the new administration, but make clear that no greater American military effort was likely.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967- 69, POL 7 TUN. Secret. Drafted by Root; cleared by ISA/AF, JS, ISA/PPS, and J/PM; and approved by Palmer. In telegram 52187 to Tunis, April 5, the Department reported that in their meetings with President Nixon and other American officials,“President [Bourguiba] and Bourguiba Jr. expressed concern growing Soviet naval presence Mediterranean and continued fear of Soviet-armed Algeria. Tunisia's pro-Western stand had heightened its isolation and vulnerability.” (Ibid., POL 7 TUN) According to Nixon's Daily Diary, on April 1 from 3:23-3:46 p.m., the President met with President Bourguiba and Bourguiba Jr., who were in Washington for the funeral of President EISENHOWER. No memorandum of the conversation was found. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Staff Members and Office Files, President's Daily Diary, April 1, 1969-May 31, 1969)

Document 141: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, September 15, 1969, 11 a.m.

Washington, September 15, 1969, 11 a.m.

In his discussions with Secretary of State Rogers, Foreign Minister Bourguiba Jr. outlined Tunisia's security concerns relating to the September 1 Libyan coup and the perception of American global disengagement.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967- 69, POL TUN-US. Secret. Drafted by Root and approved on September 22 in S. The conversation took place at the Department of State. In telegram 163880 to Tunis, September 26, Rogers followed up with Bourguiba Jr. by expressing Washington's willingness to review Tunisian defense requirements within the context of the current assistance program. (Ibid., POL 7 TUN)

Document 142: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, September 18, 1969, 2:25 p.m.

New York, September 18, 1969, 2:25 p.m.

In a meeting with Foreign Minister Bourguiba Jr., President Nixon assured him the United States would do what it reasonably could to help Tunisia meet its military needs, adding that the Administration was prepared to cope with the political difficulties which additional aid, currently under review, was likely to cause.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL TUN-US. Secret. Drafted by Root. The conversation took place at the Waldorf Astoria during the annual meeting of the UN General Assembly.

Document 143: Airgram CA-6414 From the Department of State to the Embassies in the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, Italy, and Turkey, December 2, 1969

December 2, 1969

The Department provided guidance for consultations on Tunisia. It outlined the Department of State's objectives in Tunisia, and offered a political, economic, and military assessment of the country.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967- 69, POL 1 TUN-US. Secret. It was repeated to Tunis, Rabat, Algiers, Tripoli, and USNATO. Drafted on November 21 by Wisner; cleared by INR/NEA, EUR/FBX, EUR/BMI, DOD/ISA, EUR/AIS, NEA/TUR, AID/AFR/NA, EUR/GER, and AF/N; and approved by Newsom. The background material is not printed.

Document 144: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, February 13, 1970

February 13, 1970

Kissinger summarized Secretary of State Rogers' report of his meetings with Tunisian officials. At this meeting, Prime Minister Ladgham and Foreign Minister Bourguiba, Jr. reiterated their desire for close relations with the United States and voiced concern about the situations in the Middle East and Libya.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 745, Country Files, Africa, Tunisia, Vol. I. Secret. Attached but not printed at Tab A is telegram Secto 39/591 from Addis Ababa, February 12. In the full February 10 memorandum of conversation, Rogers had asserted that “The US is not pro-anybody' but rather pro-peace'” in the Middle East conflict, adding that he had made clear the opposition of the United States to the expansion of Israel in his own December 9 speech. The Tunisian Foreign Minister “remarked that indeed the Secretary's speech of December 9 had opened hopes. It was a shame that President Nixon's speech about additional arms to Israel had looked to so many like backtracking.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, ORG 7 S)

Document 145: Memorandum From the Executive Secretary (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, August 24, 1970

Washington, August 24, 1970

Eliot sent an information memorandum prepared in the Bureau of African Affairs, which observed that, under Foreign Minister Masmoudi, Tunisia had reasserted its non-aligned standing and harmonized its foreign policy with that of the Arab and Third World countries.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 TUN. Confidential. Cleared by Wisner. In Airgram A-155 from Tunis, August 18, the Embassy noted that the “special relationship” that Washington had enjoyed with Tunis was likely to end with the demise or retirement of Bourguiba. (Ibid., POL 15-1 TUN)

Document 146: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, October 7, 1970

Washington, October 7, 1970

Kissinger agreed with Rogers' suggestion that the President reassure Bourguiba that necessary reductions in U.S. assistance would be minimized in view of American interest in Tunisian development and security.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 745, Country Files, Africa, Tunisia, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. A note on the first page reads, “The President has seen.” The attached September 11 memorandum from Rogers to the President is not published.

Document 147: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), October 29, 1970

October 29, 1970

For his 4 p.m. meeting with Foreign Minister Masmoudi, Saunders briefed Kissinger on Tunisian views of the Middle East crisis and domestic security and development.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 745, Country Files, Africa, Tunisia, Vol. I. Confidential. Sent for information. The attached Department of State memorandum is not printed.

Document 148: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, October 29, 1970

Washington, October 29, 1970

In a meeting with President's Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Foreign Minister Masmoudi requested U.S. support in keeping the Soviets out of the Mediterranean and achieving a Middle East settlement.

Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 268, Memoranda of Conversation, Chronological File, October 1970. Confidential. Drafted by Saunders. The meeting took place in Kissinger's office. In telegram 182778 to Tunis, November 6, the Department provided a memorandum of a conversation between Rogers and Masmoudi, October 28, in which the latter expounded on the need for Washington to put pressure on Israel to achieve Middle East peace, and to take account of the Palestinian movement as a political force. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 TUN)

Document 149: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, November 12, 1970, 3 p.m.

Washington, November 12, 1970, 3 p.m.

Source: Washington National Records Center, OASD/ISA Files, Box 24, FRC 73-A-1975, Tunisia 1970, 000.1, Jan---. Secret

Document 150: Telegram 1 From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State, January 1, 1971, 1800Z.

January 1, 1971, 1800Z

The Embassy transmitted a report by a special team of U.S. doctors which had diagnosed President Bourguiba with “involutional melancholia” and, possibly, arteriosclerosis. It then goes on to discuss Bourguiba's mental state, the possibility for political succession, and potential requests to the U.S. Government for assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 TUN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In telegram 6097 from Rabat, December 26, the Embassy had conveyed the urgent request of Prime Minister Nouira for a U.S. psychiatric team to be dispatched to Tunisia to treat Bourguiba . (Ibid.) In telegram 209981 to Rabat, December 29, the Department advised the Embassy that an American internist and psychiatrist would arrive in Tunis on December 31. (Ibid.)

Document 151: Telegram 9 From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State, January 3, 1971, 0200Z.

January 3, 1971, 0200Z

In this telegram, the Embassy conveyed Prime Minister Nouira hope that President Bourguiba would be welcomed into the United States, via American transport, for further medical treatment. Nouira also requested any assistance the United States could offer with regards to improving Bourguiba's health.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 TUN. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. In telegram 261 to Tunis, January 3, the Department, “in view great esteem USG has for Bourguiba and in recognition President's long friendship for US,” offered military evacuation aircraft to carry Bourguiba to Walter Reed Army Hospital. (Ibid.) The physicians at Walter Reed confirmed the President's involutional depression and “mild but definite arterial brain damage.” (Ibid.)

Document 152: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, March 4, 1971

Washington, March 4, 1971

Kissinger briefed the President on the internal political situation in Tunisia and the implications for bilateral relations of the expected departure of President Bourguiba from the political scene.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 745, Country Files, Africa, Tunisia, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for information. This document is an unsigned copy. Attached but not printed is the January 22 memorandum from Rogers to the President on the “Transfer of Power in Tunisia.”

Document 153: Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, April 13, 1971

Washington, April 13, 1971

Saunders forwarded a memorandum from the Departments of State and Defense, notifying Tunisia that the United States would provide an additional $1 million for their $3 million military assistance program for 1971.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 745, Country Files, Africa, Tunisia, Vol. I. Secret. Sent for action. Kissinger approved the recommendation. The attachments are not printed.

Document 154: Airgram A-41 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Tunisia, June 22, 1971

June 22, 1971

The Department sent copies of a Policy Planning Paper for Tunisia as approved by the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Africa. The paper was to be an official statement of U.S. policy toward Tunisia and was to be used as a guideline by all elements of the Embassy in the preparation of policy statements, action plans, and future budgetary projections.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 TUN-US. Secret; Noforn; Limdis. Drafted on June 21 by Nancy Rawls (AF/NSC-IG) and approved by Carter.

Document 155: Telegram Secto 7/3076 From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State, October 2, 1971, 2231Z.

October 2, 1971, 2231Z

The telegram contained a memorandum of conversation between Rogers and Foreign Minister Masmoudi on the subject of the Middle East. Masmoudi outlined his concerns for Tunisia and emphasized the importance of maintaining a close relationship with the United States. Rogers outlined the U.S. position highlighting the importance of an interim peace agreement before the United States would consent to any further assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 TUN. Confidential; Exdis. It was repeated Priority to Tunis and to Cairo and Tel Aviv. In telegram 4608, September 11, Calhoun reported Masmoudi's plea for U.S. support in achieving a political solution, which he passed along from Egyptian President Sadat. (Ibid., POL TUN)

Document 156: Intelligence Memorandum 2101/71, Washington, December 8, 1971

Washington, December 8, 1971

Anticipating an end to President Bourguiba's rule, this 18 page report, titled “Tunisia: The Hour of Separation Approaches” analyzed Bourguiba's four decade rule of Tunisia and his philosophy of government, it outlined the most pronounced forces of change emerging within the power structure, and examined probable successors.

Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 16, DI/OCI Files, Job 79-T00831A, Box 8. Secret; Noforn. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. In requesting preparation of a study of current political dynamics in Tunisia, a March 18 CIA memorandum noted that, “We believe there is need for a critical and unorthodox analysis of the political situation that will re-examine current assumptions to the effect that existing institutions in Tunisia are sufficient to insure an orderly transition to a stable and moderate post-Bourguiba Government.” (Central Intelligence Agency, DDI Files, Job 79-01229A, Box 1, AA-1, AF DIV, 1971)

Document 157: Intelligence Note RAFN-62 Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Washington, December 23, 1971

Washington, December 23, 1971

This 5 page report analyzed the internal and external security threats to Tunisia and concluded that Tunisian claims of a heightened danger from Algeria and Libya were exaggerated.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23 TUN. Secret; Noforn; Controlled Dissemination. Drafted by Hoffman and cleared by Rives.

Document 158: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 17, 1972

Washington, February 17, 1972

Ambassador El Goulli thanked Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Newsom for helping to arrange a meeting with President Nixon, and hoped that the evident good will towards Tunisia would produce the requested internal security assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 TUN-US. Confidential. Drafted on February 22 by Michael V. Connors (AF/N); cleared by Harry I. Odell (AF/N); and approved by Newsom. According to the President's Daily Diary, Goulli met with the President from 3:05-3:06 on February 14. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Staff Members and Office Files, President's Daily Diary, February 1, 1972-March 31, 1972) The Ambassador delivered a letter from President Bourguiba, not printed, in which Bourguiba expressed appreciation for Nixon's update on his Peking trip and his assurances of continuing U.S. interest in Tunisian development and North African security. Bourguiba concluded by hoping for high-level discussions to review bilateral relations and the international situation. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 TUN)

Document 159: Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, February 29, 1972

Washington, February 29, 1972

Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Newsom informed Ambassador El Goulli that the United States would be unable to comply with Tunisia's request for internal security assistance.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 23 TUN. Secret. Drafted on March 3 by Michael Connors and cleared by Newsom.

Document 160: Letter From President Nixon to President Bourguiba, Washington, March 14, 1972

Washington, March 14, 1972

Nixon authorized Ambassador John Calhoun to advise Bourguiba of the outcome of his talks in Peking and Moscow, and pledged as much Tunisian development assistance as resources allowed.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL TUN-US. Unclassified. In a February 24 memorandum to Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Eliot had recommended that the President respond to Bourguiba's hand-delivered letter, in recognition of Bourguiba's status as a long-standing ally and to soften the blow of the U.S. refusal to provide a requested $7.3 million in internal security assistance. (Ibid., POL 15-1 TUN)

Document 161: Telegram 1963 From the Embassy in Tunisia to the Department of State, April 24, 1972, 1015Z.

April 24, 1972, 1015Z

In this 6 page telegram, Ambassador John Calhoun offered an overview statement on the PADM and PARA review for Tunisia in 1972, praising Tunisia's alignment with the United States and friendly voice in Arab, Mediterranean, and Third World councils.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 TUN. Secret.

Document 162: Memorandum of Conversation, New York, October 13, 1972, 5 p.m.

New York, October 13, 1972, 5 p.m.

Foreign Minister Masmoudi asked U.S. Ambassador to the UN William Witman why the United States had written off the Palestinians and become totally wedded to the Israelis, leaving Washington's friends in an untenable position.

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 TUN. Confidential. Drafted on October 17 by Witman. The conversation took place in the UN General Assembly Delegates' Lounge. In telegram 188159 to Tunis, October 16, the Department transmitted a memorandum of conversation between Masmoudi and Rogers in which the two disagreed over U.S. policy toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. (Ibid.)

Document 163: Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, December 11, 1972

Washington, December 11, 1972

Kissinger recommended that Nixon respond to President Bourguiba's recent letter by reassuring him of U.S. interest in Tunisia.

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 762, Presidential Correspondence, President Bourguiba. Confidential. Sent for action. In his October 25 letter, not printed, Bourguiba renewed his request for a bilateral review of U.S.-Tunisian relations and the international scene. In Nixon's December 12 reply, not printed, he agreed that a dialogue on bilateral matters was important, and that, while much could be communicated at the ambassadorial level, he welcomed Bourguiba's views at any time.