Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

200. Minutes of the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control¹ ²

Washington, October 18, 1976

The CCINC Working Group proceeded with the agenda (Attachment #1) modifying it to include a statement with respect to treatment by Dr. DuPont.

Ambassador Vance noted that the ad hoc Intelligence Task Force of the Working Group was continuing with its efforts. A number of problems had been more precisely identified and work on them was underway. The Working Group could anticipate a progress report by its next meeting at which time, hopefully, improved arrangements would be in effect.

Turning to the FY 1977 Narcotics Control Assistance Program, Ambassador Vance drew attention to the program funding statement distributed with the agenda. He noted particularly the reduction to the level of $34 million for FY-77, explaining it on the basis of the circumstance that many high cost items for the then identifiable programs, particularly for Burma and Mexico, were taken care of with FY-76 and Interim Quarter monies. He noted that the FY-78 figure will return to the level of about $38–$39 million. Also in connection with this item, Ambassador Vance referred to the Washington visit of Ambassador de Beus, the Executive Director of UNFDAC, this week. This gave us an opportunity to discuss UNFDAC activities with respect to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran and also UNFDAC’s fund raising efforts. Ambassador Vance himself will be visiting Tehran in early November and Dr. DuPont had been there recently. Key items of concern in that tri-country area were improved Afghan border surveillance and meaningful income substitution programs in Afghanistan and Pakistan. He noted that as a result of stern talk from both UN and American officials, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan had issued an order calling for poppy destruction in certain areas of the country.

Mr. Mann asked whether the United States still was contributing about 80% of UNFDAC’s funding. It was confirmed to him that we were, but it was also stressed that we were still pressing the UN management to obtain greater contributions elsewhere. Realistically, however, one should not expect miracles in this connection. The greatest hope might be Iran because of the direct value to Iran of UNFDAC work in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Mr. Mann could not understand why the western Europeans were contributing so little. Ambassador Vance noted that Ambassador de Beus had pressed them and also that the United States had pressed them. He noted, however, that the United States faced a dilemma. In our own interest we must assure that the Fund has adequate monies to be effective and thus we have given so much. Then, because of that fact, others conclude that we will provide the necessary support and therefore they don’t. Mr. Johnson wondered if Congress would agree to increased contributions for FY-77 and FY-78 for UNFDAC. Ambassador Vance felt that there will be considerable difficulty, especially with the Senate Appropriations Committee, and thus that we will need all the support we can get on this. He noted that Tom Cox of S/NM would be visiting Geneva to review the UNFDAC programs to assure that they were both rational and coordinated with our own.

Mr. Mann wondered whether, in connection with the current UN General Assembly, there were briefing papers for American officials, notably the Secretary of State, asking them to call on foreign officials for contributions, or increased contributions, by their countries to the Fund. Mr. Johnson noted that in addition Governor Scranton might make some approaches of this type since the President had called upon him to be active in the narcotics control field.

Mr. Bensinger then spoke to Agenda Item 3 dealing with the DEA resource allocations in FY-77 for DEA activities abroad. He noted that the memorandum circulated on this subject (Attachment #2) was generally self explanatory. He wanted to emphasize that in FY-77 there would be an increase of 41 man years in foreign tactical and strategic intelligence activities. He advised that agents’ evaluation reports had been revised to emphasize their intelligence reporting role. In general, he was confident, because of the new emphasis, that the Customs Service and the Coast Guard will be getting more and better intelligence from DEA. He then introduced Mr. Gordon Fink, formerly of NSA and now Assistant Administrator of DEA for Intelligence.

Messrs. Johnson and Parsons suggested that the staffing at some of DEA’s European offices might be too heavy and wondered if DEA was planning to rotate some personnel there. Mr. Bensinger replied that possibly some personnel in western Europe would not be replaced at the end of their normal tours. He undertook to supply Mr. Parsons a breakdown by office and type of functions of DEA personnel for FY-76 as compared with FY-77, as planned.

In this connection, Ambassador Vance referred briefly to the role of the State Department, as Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee, in being charged by the President to carefully scrutinize US presence abroad. He noted particularly the question of DEA’s use of regional offices and the difficulty that he, as a middle man, had in trying to explain to the staff of the Under Secretaries Committee why DEA needed them when other agencies apparently did not. Mr. Bensinger noted that DEA had advised OMB that it would not use all of the positions authorized for FY-77 because of its greater emphasis on reprogramming. As for regional offices, he felt it was his responsibility to decide whether he needed them as a management tool or not. His present feeling was that they were necessary and that DEA could not be effective if it went to a direct reporting system. For one thing, the new DEA guidelines needed to be enforced and interpreted and this was an important role of the regional offices. He felt that all of the other principal DEA foreign concerns were best served by the existence of the regional office structure.

Turning to Agenda Item #4 concerning program developments of general interest, Ambassador Vance discussed the current information concerning the Turkish straw crop and what was known concerning bids for it. (The basic data is summarized on attachment #3.) He emphasized that in spite of US and UN representations, the Turks were proceeding with construction of a straw processing plant of a 20,000 ton capacity. There was consequent worry that an excess of production, brought on in order to assure meeting that capacity, might result in less effective control efforts. He hoped that, where diplomatic representations had failed, the law of supply and demand might make the Turks proceed more sensibly. While this was yet to be seen, there was, for now, however, no evidence of the Turkish Government deciding to authorize poppy cultivation in new areas. Also there was a consensus that the Government of Turkey was well committed to the straw processing and will not change back to opium gum.

The Egyptian seizure of 175 kilos of opium several months ago was briefly mentioned, it being noted that samples of it would soon be on their way to both the DEA and UN labs. Ambassador Vance asked Mr. Bensinger to assure that the analysis be made as quickly as possible after receipt of the sample.

Mr. Kennedy referred to recent reports that North Koreans in four Scandinavian countries have been using the diplomatic pouch to smuggle narcotics, as well as other contraband, into those countries. These items were apparently sold to obtain funds to cover the operating costs of North Korean Embassies. The Danes, for one, had expelled the entire North Korean mission. It was not known, however, how severely the other countries will deal with them.

Dr. DuPont acquainted the Working Group with some highlights with respect to his recent visit to Iran. He had had a very successful meeting with the health/social services bureaucracy of that country and felt it was active in making progress. He noted that the Iranian policy was to make the price of opium/heroin cheaper for the addicts and concurrently to deal severely with the pusher (shooting them). He noted the opinion there that United States policy, with the heavy enforcement emphasis, tended to make the prices too high for the addict. In Iran there was not a decisive shift from opium use to heroin use. The street price of heroin was 10 a milligram in Iran as compared to $2 in the United States, with opium in Iran being even cheaper. He found the Iranian Prime Minister very skeptical of the UN in any regard, and also very skeptical of dealing with the Afghans whom he regarded as very primitive. The Prime Minister’s attitude toward opium was in favor of a distribution system akin to that for cigarettes, i.e., with the government meeting the demand and earning revenue from it rather than trying to deny the demand, earning nothing from it and spending heavily on enforcement. Dr. DuPont did note, however, that the Prime Minister did seem to favor the exchange of technical information in the region on the whole drug problem. He then referred to a conversation with a recent Indian visitor who advised him that 70% of the use of opium in India was in the Punjab and, in at least one Punjabi village, 50% of the men were addicted. Under the current emergency in India there was a tightening up on the dispensing of opium to licensed addicts with resultant problems for Indians who had become accustomed to ready availability of opium through that system. Dr. DuPont then referred to Africa. In his view he saw it as having great potential for substantial illicit narcotics production. He noted that Nigeria was an important source of hashish for the UK. He felt that the climate and geography, together with the relative poorness of the farmers of Africa, all pointed to the need to watch that area carefully.

Finally Dr. DuPont referred to NIDA’s plans for training foreign officials in aspects related to the demand side of the drug problem. He expressed the hope that, additional to NIDA’s own funding, there would be assistance from CCINC monies.

Ambassador Vance then invited Mr. Walter Leamy, Chairman of the Training Subcommittee, to discuss the FY-77 planning for training activities in support of CCINC goals. Mr. Leamy reviewed the outline of points (Attachment #4) emphasizing that great stress would be put on foreign instructor training and foreign institution building. There would also be greater emphasis than before on follow-up programs. The International Alumni Association itself would importantly service DEA’s interest in the follow-up of training given foreign officials in the six-week course. He also noted the growing importance of the detector dog training program, importantly including the training of dog trainers and handlers, operated by US Customs. Mr. Acree cited several examples of results obtained, in terms of important narcotics seizures, which could be traced to Customs training efforts, either because customs had trained the official involved in the seizure or had trained someone who had passed skills on to another, which resulted in a significant seizure.

Ambassador Vance noted there have been increasing complaints from Congress as to the size and seeming open-endedness of the CCINC training program. Therefore the emphasis on training the trainers should be real and strong and we should always be ready with concrete examples, such as those given by Mr. Acree, to use in pointing out results to the Congress. Ambassador Vance reminded Mr. Leamy of his desire for information on local institutions abroad that are being or might be used for narcotics training. This was needed as a basis for moving effectively on the new emphasis. Dr. DuPont expressed an interest in having NIDA profit from the experience of the existing Training Subcommittee as it went about building its own training effort. It was therefore agreed that NIDA would appoint someone to participate in the CCINC Training Subcommittee.

1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, INM/P Files, Lot 84 D 147, Cabinet Committee–Working Group. No classification marking. Not published are Attachment 1, an October 1 memorandum circulating the agenda to Working Group members; Attachment 2, undated charts outlining fiscal year 1977 overseas spending and personnel levels; and Attachment 4, fiscal year 1977 international narcotic enforcement training objectives. Attachment 3 has not been found.
2. The Working Group discussed intelligence matters, budgetary allocations, and developments in overseas assistance and training programs.