Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

185. Memorandum for the File¹ ²

Washington, December 22, 1975

SUBJECT:

• DRUG ABUSE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

PARTICIPANTS

• Congressman Rodino
• Congressman Quie
• Congressman Wolff
• Congressman Rousselot
• Congressman Rangel
• Congressman Murphy
• Congressman Symms
• The President
• Henry Kissinger
• Brent Scowcroft
• Jim Cannon
• Jack Marsh
• Phil Buchen
• Howard Tyler
• Dick Parsons
• Ed Johnson
• Max Friedersdorf
• Bob Goldwin

PRINCIPAL TOPICS OF DISCUSSION

1. The President opened the meeting by stating that he was concerned about the worsening drug problem, and had commissioned the White Paper on Drug Abuse to develop recommendations for dealing with it. He said that he had sent the white paper to his Cabinet officers for comments, and intended to follow-up on the effort. He said that he had held discussions about mutual narcotic problem with President Echeverria, President Lopez of Columbia, and Prime Minister Demeril (twice). He said that he appreciated the Congressmen taking the time to discuss their perspective on the problem with him. He mentioned that he had exchanged letters and two phone calls with Congressman Rangel.

2. Congressman Rangel said that the common experience of all of the signers of the letter was that the drug abuse situation was getting worse in their districts, and said that this was true not only for center cities but for border states as well. He said that the Congress understands that the drug problem will never be completely eliminated, but said that the Congress wanted some assurance that this problem remained high on the national agenda. He said that the white paper goes a long way to identify the problem and recommending potential solutions to it, and said that Congress is prepared to do its part legislatively. But, he said that Congress was very anxious to hear the President, the Secretary of State, and our Ambassador to the United Nations state publicly that drug abuse remains a national priority to ensure that the State Department and our Ambassadors give it sufficient attention.

3. Congressman Rodino echoed the remarks made by Congressman Rangel and said that the critical need at this point was to put the full weight of the Presidency in the Federal government behind the effort to stem the growing problem of drug abuse. He said that the State Department had been largely uncooperative, and talked about the difficulty he and his colleagues had in getting the State Department to react strongly to the Turkish renewal of opium growth. According to Congressman Rodino, the State Department essentially told Congress to “stop rocking the boat”, and implied that drugs were simply not as important as other aspects of our relationship to Turkey.

4. The President interrupted to say that his information said that Turkey had done a good job in controlling diversion from their new crop, and that he had been assured personally by Prime Minister Demeril that that government would not relax its efforts.

5. Congressman Rangel said that he was very unhappy to hear the President discuss the controls on production being implemented by Turkey, rather than a discussion of the rationale behind our acceptance of the Turkish decision to grow poppies again in violation of the Executive Agreement. He said that we had somehow suddenly shifted from a policy of encouraging a ban to one of accepting poppy growth without adequately explaining our reasons to Congress.

6. Congressman Wolff said that the Turkish poppy straw crop was only 6 tons this year instead of the 20 tons which were projected. He said he was aware of the “poorcrop” explanation but that his information didn’t bear this out. He said that opium is a non-perishable item which can be stored underground, and implied that the 14 tons difference either leaked into the illicit traffic or was stockpiled for later sale to the illicit traffic. Congressman Wolff went on to quote from the paper Tom Peters prepared for the Murphy Commission, focusing on isolated references to the State Department’s failure to respond to the narcotic initiative, and the fact that those initiatives which had been launched were the direct result of Domestic Council intervention. He then quoted from a recent GAO report which also said the State Department was not responding adequately to the drug problem. In conclusion, he said that State Department often subordinated narcotic interests to other foreign objectives, and was reluctant to use tools such as aid cut-offs to apply pressure to foreign governments in regards to narcotics matters.

7. The President said that we should look at individual countries, and not make blanket statements. He said that since we give no foreign aid to Mexico, it was impossible for us to use that as leverage in that country, but that President Echeverria had promised to do whatever could be done within the limits of Mexico’s ability to deal with this problem. The President said that in Columbia we similarly do not have leverage from foreign aid, since there is no foreign aid program. However, he said that the Columbian government was willing to cooperate fully with us, and said that we had committed to provide twin engine aircraft and helicopters for their efforts. In the case of Turkey, he said that the Congressman understood the situation in which our leverage is less than before.

8. Congressman Wolff said that in his conversations with Turkish officials, they had said that the U.S. government had lowered its priority on drugs.

9. Congressman Murphy interrupted and said that he felt the real issue which the Congressmen wanted to discuss was their desire for the President to lend his personal voice. He said that the Secretary of State had been in the area (meaning Turkey), but had never stopped in Turkey to discuss the potential lifting of the poppy ban during those critical months. He said that it was his hope that the President and the Secretary of State would mention the narcotic priority publicly—perhaps give it some prominence and a “show biz” air—he said that people are looking for an indication of personal interest. Further, he believes that the Secretary should direct our ambassadors to make drugs a major item in their relationship with host governments.

10. Henry Kissinger said that he agreed completely with the Congressmen concerning the importance of the drug problem. He said he found the evidence of a resurging problem shocking, and counted drugs as a major national problem. He pledged to give 100% support to the narcotic program and asked the Congressmen to alert him of any special problems, such as an ambassador not giving drugs proper attention, and promised to deal with it. He said that last March he did interrupt a shuttle to go to Ankara and speak to the Turks about drugs, and was given an assurance that they would use the poppy straw process. He admitted that the Department of State is not the most responsive department, and that its bureaucracy is slow and often not decisive. He said he did not know and was surprised by the figures concerning Turkish production mentioned by Congressman Wolff. He said that in determining our narcotic foreign policy, three factors must be taken into account in assessing what we should do in each country: (1) whether that country had an internal drug problem, or merely views it as an American one; (2) the state of our relationships with those countries; and (3) the basic strength of the central government (in particular, Burma was mentioned as an example of a government which did not have control over the poppy growing region). He then explained that in the case of the Turkish internal political decision to renew poppy growth, the Congressmen certainly must understand the kind of pressure which was brought to bear on the government since the “swing districts” in the 1974 election campaign were all opium producers.

11. Congressman Rangel said that he did not know about the trip to Ankara and was unaware of the steps being taken by the Secretary of State.

12. Henry Kissinger said that “we must and will inform you better about what we are doing”. He said that there was a tendency by State Department desk officers and country directors to try to get along with their clients and avoid ruffling the waters, but in the case of Turkey they did make strong representations. He promised to inform Congress better of his personal actions in the narcotic area.

13. Congressman Rangel mentioned the problem of Mexico, citing statistics which show that it accounts for 90% of all heroin in this country.

14. Henry Kissinger said that it was not wise to make Embassy officers lobby host government legislators on narcotics matters, since that would set a dangerous president. However, he said that members of Congress could certainly fill a valuable role in this area, and said that the State Department should work more closely with members of Congress to enlist their aid in particular situations such as the Turkish one. He said that Columbia is a good example of a country where the only constraint is on limited resources, since they want to help as much as possible.

15. Congressman Rodino said that the Congress had heard that the eradication campaign was proceeding slowly, and that there were very few troops in the field and that many of the helicopters were not operating.

16. The President said that his intelligence concerning Mexico was that it was difficult to get major action with the election coming up and with rampant corruption in many levels of the Mexican government.

17. Congressman Rangel said that the real problem was the geographic problem of widely scattered plots in mountainous terrain. He said the only practical way to achieve a significant impact was to use herbicides. He said that he understood the political problem the Mexican government had in making that decision, but asked if we would be ready to provide herbicides, spray rigs, and additional helicopters if such a decision were made.

18. Henry Kissinger said that President Echeverria was in fact a lame duck and would not be president beyond December 1976. He said that as a practical matter, we should being to deal with the new president on these new matters. (The clear implication was that he intended to contact Lopez-Portillo.)

19. Judge Tyler said that on December 29 or 30 the AG would be in Acapulco. He said that the AG would definitely discuss herbicides with Ojeda Paullada, and said that he was not sure if other people from Justice or DEA would be present.

20. The President asked Judge Tyler if we were ready to make equipment ready for a herbicide campaign.

21. Judge Tyler said the real question is the Mexican capacity to use more helicopters with their own constraints.

22. Congressman Murphy said that he understood the misuse of helicopters was a problem. For example, Army zone commanders using the helicopters to transport their families to the beach.

23. Congressman Rangel said that the Congressmen hoped that two things would happen as a result of this meeting: (1) the President should give them a point of contact to discuss the narcotic problem so that they did not have to write to him personally; and (2) the President and the Secretary of State should make public statements supporting the drug program.

24. Congressman Wolff asked if they could have the President’s support for his amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act which says that the President must report governments are making all possible efforts to control narcotics in order to receive foreign assistance. He said that this would be a good signal of Presidential intent.

25. The President said that he would look at the exact language. He said “I assure you that we will do all that is possible to deal with this problem overseas. The Secretary of State, the Attorney General, all of us will do whatever is necessary. The response will be different in different countries, but we will do all that we can because of the magnitude of the drug problem here. In short, I pledge that pressure will be there if it is necessary.”

26. Congressman Rodino asked if the President would make a major statement about drugs. He asked what the President would do about implementing recommendations in the white paper. He said that he was particularly concerned about the drug problem since it was beginning to impact on women to a vastly expanded degree.

27. The President said: “You will not be disappointed with the action we will announce. I assure you that there will be a broad government effort to meet the problem.” He said that he would speak on the subject.

1. Source: Ford Library, Parsons Files, Box 23, Opium, January 1975–August 1976, President—Meetings. No classification marking. The meeting commenced at 3 p.m. The Murphy Commission refers to the U.S. Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, Report of the Commission, Washington, GPO, 1975. For Ford’s discussion with Echeverría, see Document 15. For Ford’s discussion with Lopez see Document 180. For Ford’s discussion with Demeril see Document 179.
2. A Congressional delegation met with President Ford to discuss international aspects of the drug problem.