Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume E–3, Documents on Global Issues, 1973–1976

107. National Security Council Under Secretaries Decision Memorandum 8A¹ ²

Washington, May 5, 1975

Subject:

• 1969 US-Japan Space Cooperation Agreement

In response to your request, the Under Secretaries Committee has reviewed the 1969 US-Japan Space Cooperation Agreement with a view to defining our objectives and obligations. The results of this review are presented below and discussed in the enclosed report.

Factors Considered

Under the 1969 agreement, we undertook to permit US industry to provide to Japan, on a commercial basis, technology for space launching vehicles and for communications and other satellites for peaceful applications. The export of such technology is subject to Government control under our “Munitions List” procedures.

The level of launch vehicle technology to be made available was specified in the agreement as that of NASA’s Thor Delta. No specific level of satellite technology was identified in the agreement. We have thus far emphasized the export of products and services rather than technology for manufacturing satellites.

The agreement has facilitated significant sales of hardware, technology, and related services by US industry to Japan and has served our political interests. However, as implementation of the agreement has proceeded, the Japanese have pressed for increasingly advanced levels of technology beyond what we consider required by the agreement. To accede fully to Japanese requests could speed up Japan’s emergence as a very able competitor in the space market.

In reviewing this matter, the Committee has considered the following factors:

• —The economic competition which might result from transfer of more current advanced technology to the Japanese.
• —The possible diplomatic repercussions of a change in US posture which might be perceived by the Japanese as a reduction in US interest in space cooperation.
• —The economic gain and the insight into Japanese space planning that are obtainable by continued technology and hardware sales to the Japanese.
• —The objective of maintaining a non-discriminatory policy toward all our allies, the Europeans as well as the Japanese.
• —The desirability of establishing a mutually acceptable limit on the level of spacecraft technology to be transferred to the Japanese under the 1969 Agreement.

An abrupt cut-off of the availability of US hardware and technology would certainly be viewed by the Japanese as motivated by US desire to inhibit their emergence as a potential commercial competitor. If such a cut-off seriously disrupted the Japanese space effort, serious political problems would be created.

However, a moderate tapering off of the availability of US hardware and technology might well be viewed by the Japanese as inevitable as the US obligations under the treaty are fulfilled. The tapering off would be made more acceptable by continuing assurances that existing US launch policies would provide support for their space programs.

The recommendations below are intended to limit the flow of US technology to Japan without provoking a major political issue.

Recommendations

Taking the foregoing factors into account, the Under Secretaries Committee recommends that you approve the following approach:

A. We should allow the 1969 Agreement to run its course on the following basis:

1. If requested by Japan and by US industry, we would favorably consider for export, as consistent with national security requirements, remaining launcher manufacturing technology up to the level of the Thor Delta which was operational at the time the 1969 Agreement was concluded (the so-called Delta 58). This is required by the Agreement. Guidance and re-entry technology would be excluded.

2. We would seek to limit exports of satellite technology to the level of that in orbit in 1969, as consistent with national security requirements. NASA will develop appropriate technical criteria to provide a basis for a case-by-case review of export requests.

B. Any export requests going beyond the level of technology in orbit in 1969 as defined above would be evaluated on the basis of our general policy on providing space launching and technology assistance to other countries (NSDM 187). Restrictions would be imposed on the transfer of hardware and technology by Japan to third-parties, and we would require that Japan not provide launch services to third parties without our approval. Any requirement for recoupment (for example, of any US investment in the research and development involved) would be determined by the US policy in force at the time of the contract signature.

Under the foregoing approach, we would not contemplate renegotiation of the 1969 Agreement with Japan. Major requests from the Japanese Government going beyond the 1969 level would become the subject of new agreements. Minor requests would be processed through normal export licensing procedures.

As Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee, I would like to call your attention in particular to the proposed requirement that Japan agree not to provide launch services to third countries without our prior agreement.

Present national policy in this field—NSDM 187—can be interpreted as contemplating such a requirement in cases involving the sale of US space launching vehicles for use in launchings from foreign sites. In view of the extensive technical assistance being provided to the Japanese for space launcher development, we believe the situation is, in effect, comparable to that covered in NSDM 187.

The requirement for prior approval of launchings for third parties would assist in safeguarding NASA’s interest in providing launch services to other countries. The Japanese would probably regard this as an acceptable quid pro quo. The fact that we have not provided such extensive assistance to the space launcher programs of other countries should preclude possible misinterpretation of the requirement as being discriminatory.

It would, however, be important to put the matter to the Japanese in a manner which would not arouse their sensitivities. Accordingly, if you approve the Committee’s recommendations, the Department of State will develop a suitable approach.

Robert S. Ingersoll
Chairman

1. Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 61, NSDM 306, U.S.-Japan Space Cooperation. Confidential. The attachment was not found.
2. The memorandum recommended allowing the 1969 U.S.-Japan Space Cooperation Agreement to run its course in order to avoid transferring more advanced technologies to Japanese recipients.