Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVII, Energy Crisis, 1974–1980

53. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting¹

Washington, April 14, 1975, 8–9:02 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]

[Kissinger:] O.K. Jules, what happened to the energy conference?²

Mr. Katz: It’s still going. There’s quite a lot of activity over the weekend. There’s a new draft³ which allegedly represented some progress, but what was behind it I think was Giscard’s visit to Algeria⁴ in coming back and putting apparently—telephoning colleagues—

Secretary Kissinger: Who are the seven?

Mr. Katz: The four producers and the three LDCs—the OPEC LDC bloc.

In response to this, there was an EC–US–Japan draft⁵ which went very far in their direction. In fact, the linkage with energy was very slight. They did remove references to indexation.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, yes, but just a minute. Why do we accept that?

Mr. Katz: Well, to keep the EC on board, and the Japanese. In any case, we were saved from ourselves because the seven rejected it. They put back the—

Secretary Kissinger: In other words, at the energy conference they no longer want to talk about energy.

Mr. Katz: They no longer want to talk about energy, really. They will talk about energy, but they call it a raw materials conference.

Secretary Kissinger: Look, there is to be no further American concession without my particular approval.

Mr. Katz: All right.

Secretary Kissinger: If we walk out alone from the conference, then we walk out alone from the conference. There can be no conference without us. And at every international conference from now on we’re not going to be so pushable.

Mr. Katz: Well, actually, the tactics have worked very well throughout this.

Secretary Kissinger: Only because the other side is irrational.

Mr. Katz: I think that’s right, at the last minute; but until Saturday⁶ night we had the EC out in front behaving very well. The Japanese were going along with everything. I think it was only after this push by Giscard on returning from Algiers that the Community became rather flabby. But last night—or this morning, I guess—at 1 a.m., they were awakened by the French Chairman to be given a response.⁷

Incidentally, these are non-papers at this point; nobody accepts any—

Secretary Kissinger: Look, the French are already doing what I said we wouldn’t stand for—which is to act as a mediator between the consumers and the producers.

Mr. Katz: That’s right.

Secretary Kissinger: We absolutely will not stand for this. And the only way we cannot stand for it is to get strict instructions to Enders and Robinson that we’re going to be difficult.

Mr. Katz: O.K. I think that would be helpful at this point. I think they are looking for some answer.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you think, Hal?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I don’t think you sent any instructions by telegram.

Mr. Katz: No, we haven’t.

Secretary Kissinger: I want Hal to see these things.

Mr. Katz: We’ve sent no instructions by telegram or otherwise. They’ve been operating on the basic scenario that you approved earlier.⁸

Secretary Kissinger: The basic scenario, however, does not include agreement at all costs—

Mr. Katz: That’s right.

Secretary Kissinger: —and once the French understand it, we’re going to be just as difficult as the LDCs, and we can do some of the things that the French do. They can add to the Community to use the producers; it is just the beginning of the nightmare.

Mr. Katz: The other issue on which they have taken a very strong position is on IEA participation at the full conference. The Algerians have said under no terms would they accept this, because IEA is a confrontationist organization.

Secretary Kissinger: In contrast to OPEC.

Mr. Katz: That’s right. Of course, OPEC isn’t there as OPEC. Although they were invited, they declined the invitation. The Governing Board decided unanimously yesterday, with the small countries saying that they absolutely had to have the IEA there because it was their own link to the conference. And this was presented back to the French Chairman, who has declined to do anything about it. But he’s been told that that was a bottom-line issue for us.

Secretary Kissinger: Just a minute. Who is the French Chairman?

Mr. Katz: Guiringaud.

Secretary Kissinger: Just a minute. We are going to protest about the behavior of the French Chairman today.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You’re supposed to see the French Ambassador for the past week.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t give a goddam. I won’t see him today.

Mr. Katz: They’ve distorted the way they’ve put it.

Secretary Kissinger: Hal and Art—I don’t want to hear all the details. Will you get the French Ambassador in and protest, in the sharpest terms, about the behavior of the French Chairman and say it raises serious questions in our mind about our participation in any French-sponsored conference?

Can you do that today, please? It doesn’t require me.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: No, but—well, there’s a separate thing.

Secretary Kissinger: What does he want from me?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: He has instructions to explain to you there the agreement to come to an American-sponsored conference.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s nonsense. Well, I’ll see him as soon as I know what my speech drafts look like—Tuesday or Wednesday.⁹

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Seriously, if you don’t do it this week, we’ll never get the other thing going.

Secretary Kissinger: All right, I’ll do it Tuesday.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We’ll prepare the ground today for this one.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you disagree on doing that?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I’d like to see a little more what happened in Paris the past two or three days. I think we should get the man in.¹⁰

Secretary Kissinger: We should get him in and point out to him if the French Chairman continues to play the role of the intermediary, then it is obvious we have to reconsider our whole approach to the consumer conference because we had approached that on the basis of consumer solidarity, including the French.

Mr. Katz: I don’t think his question on the agenda is really objectionable. On the IEA I think it is.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, I want that pointed out.

Mr. Katz: O.K.

Secretary Kissinger: But I want our people to understand.

Mr. Katz: Yes, I understand.

Secretary Kissinger: But can you do that immediately?

Mr. Katz: Yes.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to energy.]

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, Lot 78D443, Box 3, Secretary’s Staff Meetings. Secret. Kissinger presided over the meeting, which was attended by all the principal officers of the Department or their designated alternates. A table of contents is not printed.
2. The preparatory producer-consumer conference opened in Paris on April 7, with Robinson heading the U.S. delegation. In his opening statement, he said: “Our purpose at this preparatory meeting is to organize the procedures for the conference that will build on the dialogue initiated at this meeting. Toward this end, we need to strike a balance between the immense scale and complexity of the world energy problem on the one hand and the constraint of realistic expectations for concrete results on the other.” Later, Robinson continued: “I feel strongly that the work program to be developed here should be concentrated on the specifics of energy and related matters, and not become diluted with parallel discussions of other issues, however important they may be.” For the full text of his statement, see Department of State Bulletin, May 12, 1975, pp. 619–621.
3. On the morning of April 11, the EC presented a draft agenda for the producer-consumer conference. In response, the group of OPEC/LDC countries—including Saudi Arabia, Iran, Algeria, Venezuela, Brazil, India, and Zaire—presented their own draft, which the U.S. delegation reported “merged and considerably softened the analytical and areas of cooperation sections of the EC agenda and then repeated earlier OPEC/LDC agenda points.” (Telegram 9291 from Paris, April 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750127–0803)
4. Giscard visited Algeria April 10–12. While he was there he made a statement “to the effect that France and Algeria have no significant differences on conference agenda.” (Telegram 9317 from Paris, April 13; ibid., D750129–0233)
5. The IEA Governing Board convened at 11:30 p.m. on April 11 at which time it reviewed a revised EC draft agenda. While the U.S., EC, and Japanese delegates “generally approved the document,” British, German, and Danish representatives “expressed some concern” that the new agenda “moved too far toward accommodating OPEC/LDC group.” Everyone agreed, however, that the industrialized countries “should stand on” the new EC draft and “not go beyond it,” and all of the delegates “expressed disappointment at apparent OPEC unwillingness to talk seriously about energy.” (Telegram 9291 from Paris, April 12; ibid.) By the afternoon of April 13, the “OPEC/LDC’s evidenced no intention to compromise by modifying their insistence that energy could only be treated either within overall rubric of raw materials or on parity with raw materials and problems of developing countries,” according to U.S. representatives. The U.S. delegation informed the Department that it “took view (as did Japanese) that draft not repeat not acceptable without substantial change,” adding that “it was agreed that three main requirements will be: A) to restore clear linkage to energy; B) to remove much of the detail on such issues as raw materials and development; and C) to avoid commitment to conclusions and recommendations under each of the headings [of the draft agenda].” (Telegram 9307 from Paris, April 13; ibid., D750128–1167)
6. April 12.
7. The U.S., EC, and Japanese delegations “jointly informed the chair that [the OPEC/LDC draft] did not constitute a serious reply to the working paper submitted to the chair by the three delegations on April 13.” (Telegram 9317 from Paris, April 13; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750129–0233) The OPEC/LDC draft was transmitted in telegram 9329 from Paris, April 14, and the U.S./EC/Japanese draft in telegram 9315 from Paris, April 14. (Both ibid., D750129–0426 and D750129–0426)
8. See Document 49.
9. April 15 or 16.
10. Sonnenfeldt met with Minister de la Gorce on April 15 to protest de Guiringaud’s role at the Prepcon. (Telegram 85231 to Paris, April 15; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D750130–0674)