49. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Tactics for Producer/Consumer PrepCon
PARTICIPANTS
- The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- The Honorable Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
- The Honorable Charles W. Robinson, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
- The Honorable Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
- The Honorable Thomas O. Enders, Assistant Secretary of State
- Mr. Robert Hormats, NSC Senior Staff Member
- Mr. Samuel W. Lewis, Deputy Director, S/P
- Mr. Lawrence R. Raicht, Deputy Director, EB/ORF/FSE
Robinson: Rather than sending you four cables, we have put together a single paper to go over with you.2 We have four additional questions requiring your decision. The issues are:
— How much we should aim to settle at the Prepcon, and whether we should go along with a request for a second preparatory meeting;
— How to play the representation issue with the Algerians and Europeans;
— What kind of press play we should aim for; and
— Our representation.
Kissinger: I think the more Prepcons we have, the better. As you know, I have never been eager for a conference with the producers.
Enders: We are concerned about having more than one Prepcon. It could become a continuing meeting which would eclipse the IEA and slide into substantive matters. We want to avoid this, but if we can’t settle everything at this meeting there may be a push for a second prepcon.
Kissinger: Who wants another meeting?
Enders: The Europeans do to settle whether they will come as one or nine after the UK referendum on the EC.
Robinson: I believe that’s scheduled for May.
[Page 166]Enders: The EC can not make up its mind whether they will be represented as one or separately. The smaller countries don’t want to be left out and the UK has made clear that it expects to have its own seat. The other EC countries hope that after the British referendum, the UK will be able to agree to a single EC representative.
Kissinger: We certainly don’t need a meeting just for that.
Robinson: Yes, but we should be aware of this problem.
Enders: On the first issue, the question is how much we want to close out at this meeting.
Kissinger: Before we get to that, who the hell represents us at the conference?
Robinson: That’s covered in the 4th question. You have agreed we should avoid substantive issues. We’ve outlined 3 alternatives on representation on page 6. Myself, initially, with Tom to replace me, or Tom, or Jules Katz as the representative, to emphasize our intention to keep the prepcon strictly on procedural issues.
Kissinger: How long is this meeting going to last?
Robinson: There has been talk of a 2 week meeting.
Enders: I would guess about 1 week.
Kissinger: Well, I already told the Saudis that you (to Robinson) would be our representative, so I think you will have to do it. Who are the Saudis sending?
Robinson: It could be Prince Saud, or possibly Yamani after the King’s death this morning.3
Kissinger: I think Saud was scheduled to be there, not Yamani.
Robinson: That’s true, but there may be a change as a result of this morning’s events.
Kissinger: Well, I think you (to Robinson) should be there.
Robinson: I agree, I think it would give me some continuity in my dealings with producer countries. I talked to Shultz about this and he agrees too.
Kissinger: What is this question you have raised in here about the US commitment to the IEA?
Enders: It’s essentially playback I got at the last Governing Board meeting4 from several European delegations, from events in the Middle East.
Kissinger: From whom?
[Page 167]Enders: I don’t know from whom in the Middle East, but several delegations asked me if we had flipped our strategy.
Kissinger: Who?
Enders: The German delegation, the British, and Davignon all raised it.
Kissinger: Yes, and each of them are dealing separately with the producers on this.
Enders: Yes, that’s true.
Kissinger: We are the only IEA virgins.
Enders: Well, we have to stick with them in the IEA.
Kissinger: First, we must protect ourselves against their treachery. I am convinced that we can expect the same kind of thing to develop in the conference with the producers as occurred during the European Security Conference.5
However, the IEA is a major effort to achieve consumer solidarity and we are not going to jettison it now.
Enders: I made that clear at the Governing Board meeting. I see my role at the prepcon basically as keeping the Europeans under control.
Kissinger: OK, but I want to maintain the option of going the bilateral route if they get unruly. We must not be the last to do bilaterals.
When is the conference?
Robinson: It’s scheduled to start April 7.
Kissinger: When are you going to Moscow?
Robinson: Tonight.
Kissinger: You’re coming back before the conference, aren’t you?
Robinson: Yes, I’ll be back at the end of the week.
Kissinger: Then we can meet again before the conference.
Were you planning to go to Jordan during your Middle East trip?
Robinson: No, I wasn’t.
Kissinger: Well, I may want you to go there and to Saudi Arabia. I think in light of today’s events we should show the flag there.
Enders: The next issue is, should we leave any of the procedural questions open at the prepcon?
Kissinger: I want the IEA to have the same status at the meeting as OPEC.
Enders: It does, in fact IEA is better positioned. It has been invited, OPEC has not.
[Page 168]Kissinger: What about a rotating chairmanship? I am attracted to that idea.
Enders: I think it’s fine; it is not effective, but it would solve a lot of the political problems.
Hormats: But how do we solve who chairs within each of the 3 groups: LDCs, Producers, and Consumers?
Kissinger: I think we stick strictly to the Martinique formula.
Enders: That’s exactly what I told the French. They agreed.
Kissinger: Don’t the French think the formal conference is going to be in Paris?
Enders: Yes.
Kissinger: Well, I assumed it would be in Paris from the beginning but I would prefer Vienna.
How about Geneva?
Enders: That would be better; it might also enable you to do both the Producer/Consumer conference and the Arab/Israeli meeting.
Robinson: The French would never accept New York.
Kissinger: OK, I think we should go for Geneva.
Hormats: I wonder whether we should insist on unanimity.
Kissinger: What other options are there?
Enders: The other option is a UN-type of consensus. You recall the problems we had with that at the General Assembly Special Session.
Kissinger: The problem with unanimity is that it would give everybody a veto.
You know, I never felt this conference was needed. If everyone has a veto, I don’t see what can come out of it.
Enders: I agree the unanimity approach would give everyone a veto, but I think we need this. Essentially, this means that either the Algerians or we could block decisions.
Kissinger: I don’t believe the Algerians are looking for a confrontation.
Enders: Yes, but the Algerians don’t want the conference to succeed. They are using it for the same reason we are, to build LDC solidarity.
Kissinger: Do we want it to succeed?
Enders: The Algerian objective is really to expand the dialogue to include all raw materials. We must avoid that.
Kissinger: What about the press play? What are you talking about here?
Enders: The Algerians will have all of their speeches in the press immediately. They will try to dominate the producer/LDC side. How do you want us to play it; should we deadpan?
[Page 169]Kissinger: I think you should give a briefing every day, but be matter of fact and cool with the press. Make it clear that we are not there to discuss substance, only procedure.
Robinson: I think that gives us the guidance we need on that. The rest of the recommendations are in line with the ones I got in my conversations with George Shultz.
Kissinger: I would give a thoughtful procedural speech. Let the Algerians dominate the substance but don’t debate them. The art here is to look positive without getting carried away by your rhetoric.
Robinson: That’s pretty much in line with our thoughts.
Lord: Are you clear on the representation issue? The 12/6/66 formula?
Robinson: 12 consumers gets hung up with the UK representation issue.
Kissinger: Suppose all 9 of the EC come.
Enders: That means the conference will get substantially larger, but we may want that to happen.
Kissinger: I’m convinced that the French will do the same thing at this conference as they did at the European Security Conference, and I want to take out some insurance against that.
Robinson: Where do you want me to go on my trip to the Middle East?
Kissinger: I think you should visit Iran, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
Robinson: OK, we can talk about that later.
The meeting ended at 4:05 P.M.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry Kissinger, Lot 91D414, Box 10, Classified External Memoranda of Conversations, January–April 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Raicht on March 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Conference Room.↩
- The paper, “Producer/Consumer Prepcon—Tactics,” is actually an action memorandum that required decisions from Kissinger. (Ibid., Box 1, Nodis—Miscellaneous Documents and Telegrams)↩
- King Faisal was assassinated on March 25. Faisal’s brother, Khalid, succeeded him as King of Saudi Arabia.↩
- See Document 48.↩
- The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the last meeting of which took place in December 1974.↩
- Twelve oil-consuming countries, six oil-producing countries, and six LDCs.↩