Office of the Historian

266. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, March 26, 1969.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

—Tour d’Horizon with President Soeharto: During Ambassador Green’s farewell call, President Soeharto made a number of remarks indicative of his present thinking:2

a.
He thought that the USSR provided the principal pressure point on Hanoi for a settlement of the war, but Indonesia has no present leverage with the USSR.
b.
A resumption of bombing of North Vietnam might increase Hanoi’s interest in a negotiated settlement. (Ambassador Green commented that he has never heard him come out so openly for bombing.)3
c.
He was very much aware of the relationship of Vietnam to Indonesia’s own security.
d.
He is concerned at a resurgence of Communist activity in Indonesia, and blames the Chinese Communists.
e.
He underlined the importance of Indonesian cooperation with its neighbors and stated flatly that Indonesian forces would if necessary take a forward defense posture. If there were aggression against Malaysia, and Malaysia requested help, Indonesia would send forces. (Ambassador Green observes that Soeharto and the military take a more relaxed view as to the requirements of “non-alignment” than do Malik and the Foreign Office.)
f.
President Soeharto reiterated his interest in visiting the US, and Ambassador Green said that he was confident that a visit would be welcome, and that the Indonesian Ambassador was in touch with our Government on the question.4
[Page 567]

Despite the shibboleths of non-alignment, President Soeharto’s views seem to be running very close to ours on most of the key questions of Southeast Asia security. (Tab B)5

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 4, President’s Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword.↩
  2. Green’s farewell call on President Suharto was reported in telegram 1724 from Djakarta, March 23. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL US)↩
  3. Nixon wrote the following comment next to this paragraph: “ K. Note! He may be right (on psychology).”↩
  4. A marginal note in Nixon’s handwriting next to this sentence reads, “K as soon as possible. Summer or Fall.”↩
  5. Attached at Tab B but not printed is telegram 1724 from Djakarta, March 23.↩