Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

285. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

• Situation in North Laos

Background

The Lao Government forces have suffered a number of serious reverses in North Laos. Relying on numerical superiority and new firepower, including 130 m.m. cannon and much AAA, the North Vietnamese have pushed the Lao and Thai irregulars off the Plain of Jars. Friendly losses have been substantial.

Part of Hanoi’s success has been attributable to unseasonably bad weather which has minimized the effectiveness of our air power. This weather is now reported to be reverting to its normal dry season pattern which should make our air more effective. Thus far all requests for air support are being met, and the USAF has the capability of surging its sortie rate to a level substantially above the present one for at least a month.

Nonetheless the North Vietnamese are now in a position either to move south against the line defending the Meo stronghold at Long Tieng south of the Plain of Jars or to move west of the plain towards the strategic junctions of routes 7 and 13. If they move against Long Tieng, they may be able to take and hold it for at least the duration of the dry season and in the process perhaps eliminate the Meo as a fighting force. If they seize the route 7/13 junction, they would be in position to move their forces by truck toward the Vientiane Plain and the Mekong River. Accomplishment of either purpose would further upset the political/military balance in Laos and intensify pressures in the Vientiane government to accommodate to Hanoi’s political/military demands, namely an end to U.S. involvement in Laos with particular emphasis on a countrywide bombing halt.

Issues for Decision

Against this background, two issues have arisen requiring your decision:

• —First, the strategic issue of the level and nature of our response to these North Vietnamese attacks.
• —Second, a domestic U.S. political issue of how to fashion our response in light of a legislative ceiling of $350 M for FY–72 expenditures in Laos. Expenditures already programmed for the fiscal year are likely to exceed the $350 M ceiling, and any additional corrective steps in light of the present situation will certainly result in an overrun.

The Strategic Options

We already have taken steps to replace equipment lost on the Plain and bring available reinforcements into the area. Maximum U.S. air support, both tactical and B–52’s, is being brought to bear and will continue (fortunately, this cost is excluded from the congressional ceiling).

At a WSAG meeting on December 23,² the Laos situation was discussed and three general strategic options were developed for your consideration:

• Option 1: The High Option: This would involve taking steps to reinforce the line defending Long Tieng as well as placing significant infantry and artillery forces in a position to defend against encroachments on the junction of routes 7 and 13. This option could conceivably involve asking the Thai to provide regular forces since resources are not otherwise immediately available to achieve these dual military objectives.

  Advantages: This option would have a confidence building impact on the Lao and a correspondingly discouraging impact on Hanoi which would see that it cannot expect its advances to go unchallenged. It could also help frustrate Hanoi’s efforts to mount a successful political/military campaign prior to your China visit.

  Disadvantages: Shortage of local manpower resources is the principal disadvantage. The Thai could be asked to provide regular forces but, because of congressional restrictions, they would have to bear the cost of their expendable supplies and troop pay themselves. With PL–480 off-set possibilities exhausted and supporting assistance funds already near rock-bottom, it would be difficult to find a suitable quid pro quo to offer the Thai for stationing a regiment or two in North Laos. Also because of legislative provisions, you would have to sign a Presidential Determination permitting the Thai to use their U.S.-supplied equipment in Laos.

• Option 2: Strong Defense of the Long Tieng Line: This option would involve pursuing essentially our present strategy of defending Long Tieng while doing what we can to defend the narrow defile on route 7 west of Muong Soui primarily with artillery. It would bring to bear the maximum available Thai and Lao irregular forces to deny the Meo stronghold at Long Tieng to the enemy. We would count heavily on air to interdict the lengthened NVA supply lines resulting from the NVA move to the west.

  Advantages: This option can probably be pursued without additional manpower resources. If Long Tieng holds through the dry season, it will deny Hanoi an important psychological victory and probably keep the Meo intact as a fighting force near the Plain of Jars for another year.

  Disadvantages: This option leaves the Route 7/13 junction more exposed than does option 1 and takes the risk that Hanoi will divert its advance to that direction. Nor can we be certain yet whether the available friendly forces can hold Long Tieng if the NVA mounts a determined drive. But, in view of the terrain barrier, they probably can prevent the NVA from breaking through in this area to the lowlands.

• Option 3: Diversion of Resources to Routes 7/13 from the Long Tieng Line: This option would involve trying to do something on the ground in both areas, without augmenting manpower resources. In effect it would involve thinning the defenses of the Long Tieng line to make a stronger defense to the north, leaving only enough forces before Long Tieng to fight a guerrilla action.

  Advantages: This option would emphasize what may be the militarily more significant of the two areas in question. (Route 13 connects the royal capital of Luang Prabang with the administrative capital of Vientiane.)

  Disadvantages: Moving resources away from the Long Tieng defense line would dishearten the Meo, which could mean their disintegration as an effective fighting force, since Long Tieng is a symbol of their ultimate hope to settle some day on the Plain of Jars. Rather than pursuing a token or guerrilla defense of the Long Tieng area, they could well choose to relocate entirely to some other area such as western Laos.

My Views on Options. I believe the psychological effect of losing Long Tieng would be severe. We have devoted substantial resources to its successful defense over the past two years and, apart from its importance to the Meo, the fact that it has been in friendly hands during this time has had a favorable impact on the attitudes of Lao leadership in Vientiane. Moreover, there is no evidence yet that the NVA will move towards the junction of routes 7 and 13. They may, but they have not in previous years.

We are also constrained by manpower shortages. Manpower resources are, at this stage in any event, simply inadequate to assure a strong defense of both the Long Tieng line and the 7/13 junction. Therefore, we should dispose the bulk of our effort against the known threat to Long Tieng and protect the possible axis of attack along route 7 with whatever artillery we can muster (e.g., option 2).

I further believe this is the choice which leaves us the greatest flexibility to move to other options if necessary. Meanwhile, we can also take soundings with the Thai to see what they may be prepared to provide by way of additional forces should the situation deteriorate further and to build a reserve.

Financial Limitations: Whichever of the three options you prefer, we undoubtedly will surpass the congressionally imposed $350 M FY–72 ceiling, barring unforeseen developments on the negotiating front. Viewed in these terms, we could, of course, decide to do only what we can within the prescribed financial limits. This would inhibit our ability to take the measures required under any of the options. The choice, therefore, appears to be one of deciding (1) whether we should select a course designed to meet the situation on the ground or (2) fall short of these requirements because of the potential domestic political costs.

A request for a ceiling increase risks the charge that the war is being broadened. But when Senators Symington and Stennis set the $350 M ceiling for our FY–72 Laos expenditures, they did so with the understanding that this was what the Administration required. (This was the total of the budget estimates submitted several months earlier.) The current unprecedented offensive and the clear shift in North Vietnamese strategy has obviously changed the situation, and an effective case can be made for the need for ceiling flexibility.

Firm estimates of the cost are simply not available yet. The best estimates, however, are that even without the recent losses we would overrun the ceiling by as much as $30 M, to which we would now have to add about $5 M for replacement of equipment lost. Little, if any, additional cost beyond the above $35 M would result from adopting Options 2 or 3. But, assuming the manpower resources required by Option 1 can be obtained, this option would cost about $50 M more (about 8 additional battalions).

There are two ways we might overcome the ceiling problem. The language of the law requires that material be costed at fair market value or not less than one-third of its acquisition cost. We could approach Stennis for an interpretation which would allow us to charge the ammunition (over 60% of the total cost of our program) at one-third, thus saving us nearly $100 M. With such an interpretation we would not need to request a ceiling increase. If Stennis is unwilling to do this, we could then go forward with a request for a higher authorization—no additional appropriation is needed.

Recommendations:³

That you approve Option 2 as outlined above.

_____Approve _____Disapprove, Prefer Option I (High Option)

_____Disapprove, Prefer Option III

In regard to the financial limitations that you approve an approach to Stennis as described above and, failing his consent, a request to Congress to raise the ceiling.

_____ Approve _____Disapprove

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–84, WSAG Meetings, Laos 1/3/72. Top Secret. Sent for action. Printed from an unsigned copy, which is attached as Tab A to a January 2 memorandum from Holdridge and Kennedy to Kissinger, briefing him for a WSAG meeting scheduled for January 3.
2. See Document 283.
3. None of the approve or disapprove options is signed by the President. In their January 2 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge and Kennedy stated that Nixon had approved option 1 and that the members of the WSAG had been notified of this decision. Additionally, they noted that Nixon approved the approach to Stennis and that Kissinger would meet with him. No record of this Kissinger–Stennis discussion has been found.