260. Editorial Note
At the end of July 1967 Saudi Oil Minister Yamani traveled secretly to New York to meet with executives from Aramco’s parent companies. “Aramco emphasizes meeting highly sensitive and Yamani anxious avoid any publicity,” the Embassy reported in telegram 274, July 22. When word of the impending visit leaked to a business publication, Aramco officials denied the story. (Johnson Library, National Security File, NSC Special Committee Files, Economic [1 of 2])
Three days after the August 1 meeting with Yamani in the New York area, an Aramco executive told a Department official in Washington [Page 467] that the meeting had been devoted to “oil not politics.” (Telegram 16312 to Jidda, August 4; ibid.) But Yamani did make an impassioned appeal to the oil companies to protect their own business interests and the position of both the United States and the moderate Arab nations: “Yamani told companies Arab/Israel struggle is cover for regional conflict between ‘socialist’ and conservative Arab states. At May Baghdad oil meeting, Yamani surprised find Syria and Lebanon represented. He had considered playing for time by suggesting Jordan and Sudan also be invited but in the end had felt unable to do so. Original intention meeting had been to provide for ‘nationalization and confiscation’ oil industry even in event Arabs won expected war. SAG efforts alone resulted in more moderate resolution.” (Telegram 18475 to Jidda, August 9; ibid.)
Yamani also said that the representatives of Arab states had discussed the U.S. position of support for the integrity and independence of all area states and had concluded that “effort should be made reduce USG to second rate power’ so that significance our [U.S.] commitment to Israel would be lessened.” (Ibid.)