Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

91. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Dominican Republic¹

Washington, May 23, 1965, 5:01 p.m.

1208. Embtel 1925.² For Bundy and Vance.

1. If Guzman does not have either the power or will to arrange for departure of three rebel leaders in headquarters group and is unwilling even to try to achieve this it is obvious that he would not deal adequately with those leaders and other dangerous elements once his government was formed.³ This would cast in doubt the efficacy of any safeguards we might write into an understanding with him.

2. Under these circumstances we believe you should continue to insist on the original plan for paid overseas vacations for the three rebel leaders. Anything less would be impossible to explain and justify to Congress and American people. We would not regard expulsion of Gonzales, Pena Tavares, and Garcia German as a substitute. If agreed safeguards work they would be thrown out or interned anyway.

3. In addition we believe we must insist on the following safeguards:

a. Identified communists⁴ will be promptly taken into custody and deported or interned.

b. Measures will be taken for the identification of other communists, whether in civilian or military life. When identified those communists will be immediately placed under surveillance and if at anytime evidence develops of a plot or threat to security of government they will be immediately deported or interned.

4. We would prefer that you or Mora or other appropriate emissary maintain contact with Imbert and proceed with exploratory talks with him without awaiting conclusion of final agreement with Guzman. However, if you feel strongly that approach to Imbert is not advisable before a final conference with Guzman you may delay such approach until tomorrow.

5. Although it is obviously desirable that Imbert accept agreed cabinet list we are prepared to consider one or more alternative suggestions (excluding Imbert himself) if he finds any names on list totally objectionable. This means we are prepared to consider addition of up to two or three pro-Imbert people who are not Trujillistas.

6. We recognize that these instructions may increase difficulty of reaching a final understanding but we are not prepared to accept a deal that does not fully satisfy our requirements. If your efforts to reach an understanding should in fact meet a dead end we would propose that Mora bring to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers the details of what each side is prepared to accept. Brazilian, Argentinian, Ecuadorian and hopefully other ministers plan to arrive in Washington on May 27.⁵ We would expect Mora to make clear to Ministers that United States has carried the Ball as far as possible pending the development of OAS arrangements to assume responsibility for establishing government. With the creation of the Inter-American Force and the meeting of the Foreign Ministers the OAS should now carry on from there.

Rusk

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Flash; Exdis. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to the White House.
2. Document 90.
3. On May 23 at 2:02 p.m. Ball read a draft of this telegram over the telephone to President Johnson for his approval. At this point in the text, the President commented: “Iʼd make it [the first sentence] stronger than that; Iʼd say that if he doesnʼt have the will or the power, or the desire to even agree to do it, it is obvious that weʼd have a pig in a poke and that he wouldnʼt do it later. Therefore, we couldnʼt survive at home. Iʼd let Bundy know that heʼs coming back to a bunch of—that heʼs coming in to the lionʼs den. Heʼs down there enjoying himself but he better realize that heʼs going to be facing Dick Russell and Bill Fulbright and all of them will want to know why we put the Communists in charge. If Guzman doesnʼt have the will or the desire, or wonʼt even agree to get rid of them after he takes power then obviously he wouldnʼt get rid of others that need to go. And in this situation we could not survive.… I want to shake him [Bundy] up a little bit.” (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and George Ball, Tape F65.39, Side A, PNO 1)
4. During the same telephone conversation Ball read to the President a phrase that included a specific reference to the identification of “Communists totaling in the order of 20” who would be promptly deported. President Johnson objected to this. He said, “Iʼd just cut out the 20. Why do you want to deport 20 and leave 40” I donʼt care about 3 or 20. Iʼm interested in Communists per se.” Ball said “okay,” he would change the text.
5. Brazilian Foreign Minister Juracy M. Magalhaes proposed that Foreign Ministers attend the already ongoing Tenth Meeting on May 27 to take stock of the situation in the Dominican Republic and to decide what further steps were necessary.