Study of U.S. Policy Toward Latin American Military Forces
In response to your memorandum of October 26, 1964 on the above
subject,22.
Document 25. I am forwarding
herewith a study prepared in the Department of Defense proposing a new strategy for dealing with
Latin American military forces.33. Dated
February 25; attached but not printed.
The basic recommendations of the study are: (1) to initiate in FY 67 a gradual, selective and controlled
phasedown of MAP matériel grants
extending over two three-year periods: (a) FY 67–69— maintenance, overhaul items; (b) FY 69–71—investment items, and (2)
concurrently to place increasing emphasis on credit sales, local defense
production and better budgetary planning and programming by Latin
American military establishments in a major effort to bring their forces
more into line with domestic resources and with a realistic appraisal of
the security threat. The proposal would include provision of matériel
grants for emergency purposes to meet foreign exchange inadequacies or
for political reasons on an ad hoc basis when specifically
justified.
The views of the Department of State, AID
and the JCS have been sought and fully
considered in drawing up this paper. However, it has not been possible
to reconcile the differing views with the result that not all of the
conclusions and recommendations of the study are concurred in by other
agencies.
The principal objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are: (1) to the
threat analysis, which they believe understates the insurgency problem,
and (2) to the relatively minor military importance the study attaches
to the future anti-submarine warfare requirements in South American
waters. An extract of their views is enclosed as a separate
memorandum.44. Undated; attached but not
printed.
The views of the Department of State are also enclosed in a separate
memorandum.55. Reference is to a letter from
Vaughn to McNaughton, March 29, attached but
not printed. While the Department of State accepts most of
the conclusions of the study, they reject the above basic action
recommendations. They acknowledge that the proposals are sound in
principle and desirable of attainment, but believe that action should be
delayed until some indefinite time in the future. Their fundamental
reason is that to embark on such a course of action would be disruptive
of U.S. influence in these countries and might tend to alienate the
military forces on whom the Alliance for Progress must depend to
maintain stability in the area.
In the light of these comments, I recommend that the new strategy
proposed in this study be regarded as a long-term goal, but one which
must be approached without a rigid time frame. Under our present MAP
guidance we have been undertaking:
(1) A systematic effort to induce Latin American MAP recipients, to the extent feasible, to gradually assume
the maintenance burden, e.g. spare parts and overhaul, now being borne
by the MAP, and (2) The development of
integrated grant-credit packages of military assistance designed to
provide maximum leverage in (a) holding down external military
procurement of the Latin American armed forces to agreed upon levels and
(b) directing their procurement toward realistic security
requirements.
I believe that our best course of action is to continue these efforts,
concentrating on prudent management of the MAP rather than upon the initiation of a new strategy.