Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

82. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, March 18, 1966, 0745Z.

1039. Troops for RVN. Ref: [A.] Deptel 971;² B. HongKong’s 1489 to Department.³

1. Reftel A requests comments on proposal for “low key” approach to Korean military in Vietnam on the subject of approximately 10,000 additional Korean logistical and supply forces.

2. I believe that any US effort to push the ROKG for additional forces would be most untimely and could have unfortunate consequences for us here. Even if such approach were in “low key” and were made in SVN, it would, of course, immediately become known to ROK Government, which will just be emerging from highly difficult struggle to obtain Assembly approval for despatch additional brigade and division and which has through MND in past few days given categoric assurances that no more than a total of 40,000 troops will be deployed to SVN. This struggle, the exacerbation of relationships with us which has unfortunately accompanied it, and the strains which it has generated within the DRP as well as between government and opposition, will render atmosphere towards even hint of suggestion by US for further Korean contribution most unpropitious. US already being criticized for too much pressure.

3. We must remember that we have already pressed Koreans hard and to them unacceptably fast (Ref B). We must understand that Korea is not an inexhaustible source of supply for troops for SVN, that people’s emotions are deeply involved, that there is substantial national anxiety about extent to which Korea has already gone. We must allow time for these emotions and this concern to settle. We must give Korean people time to catch their breath after two crucial and close decisions involving Korean lives and security. We should let them choose their own time and pace for requesting any reinforcements.

4. That General Chae, COMROKFV, at least, is thinking along the lines of Ref A indicated by the fact that he has proposed, with COMUSMACV concurrence, a force structure for the deployment of the division and RCT of approximately 30,000—about 8,000 above current plan. Most of these are logistic forces similar to those included in the 10,000 man proposal. COMUSMACV representatives now meeting in Korea express a strong desire for the additional logistic package proposed by General Chae, but recognize the attendant problems on the Korean scene and are working toward agreement on the 22,500 man force structure. Gen Rhee, CG Field Support Command, ROKFV, is now negotiating package with MND, JCS and ROKA. He has pressed for the 30,000 man force, but is understood to have scaled his requirement down to the 26,000–27,000 level. Apparently MND and ROK JCS show no sympathy for any increase above 22,500. We should, for the time being at least, let the ROKs work this one out for themselves, and avoid any implication of US stimulus or pressure for this move.

5. In the event of a ROK proposal for an increase over the 22,500 man dispatch, some additional quid pro quo would be required. As a minimum, MND is expected to request replacement of military personnel with US funded civilians since the ROK military contend they are already faced with serious problem of insufficient manpower to support the planned expansion.

6. I therefore consider that any further US approach on this subject at this time would be adverse to US interest, and recommend against. However, if the MND with President Pak’s approval should later make such a proposal, the US could then safely support it.

7. I cannot too strongly emphasize how unfortunate it would be for our interests in this country if even a hint that we were considering the possibility of further Korean troops should ever get into the press in Washington, Saigon, or Seoul.

8. General Beach concurs.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Priority;Limdis. Repeated to the Department of Defense, COMUSMACV, CINCPAC also for POLAD, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
2. Telegram 971 to Seoul, March 16. (Ibid.)
3. Document 79.