Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

79. Telegram From the Consulate in Hong Kong to the Department of State¹

Hong Kong, February 13, 1966, 0850Z.

1489. From Ambassador Brown. Ref: Def 3869 (0 120017Z) to Hong Kong.² Korean Troops for RVN.

1) In absence opportunity consult with General Beach, I have no basis for comment on military necessity additional ten thousand ROK troops envisaged in reftel.

2) I am however, horrified at thought of now suddenly asking ROKG for even more troops.

3) We asked for a small medical unit and got it (a few hundred). We asked for a much larger non-combat unit and got it (2000 men). We then asked for a combat division and got it (20,000 men). After an embarrassingly short interval we asked for a further combat brigade and division, and we seem to have it (about 30,000 men). Now, before we have even given the Koreans a chance to solidify their decision on the last brigade and division, we are contemplating asking them for ten thousand more.

4) When will this end?

5) If I were a Korean, such a request would seem to take Korea much too much for granted, and to try to impose far too great a burden on her. This would mean almost 60,000 Korean troops in SVN, two to three times as great a proportion of their population as we, the only other substantial contributor, are providing.

6) In the absence of a fuller and better rationale than I have yet seen for such a request, I would strongly recommend against it. Quite aside from the merits, such a piecemeal approach is most unfortunate.³

7) It may well be that if “rounding out” is necessary, the Koreans will ask for it later themselves as General Choi did for the extra regiment he wants. This would be OK and much better than a request by us.

Rice

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Seoul, COMUSKOREA, Saigon, and CINCPAC.
2. Not found, but telegram 833 to Seoul, February 11, also sent to Hong Kong for Brown, advised that the message from McNamara to Beach discussed a “requirement of 10,376 ROK forces to support and service ROK contingent already in SVN plus additional contingent on which ROKG now acting.” It also instructed that the Koreans were not to be informed of the need for additional troops. (Ibid.)
3. The Embassy and Beach were also opposed to asking the Koreans for 10,000 additional troops. The Embassy noted that a “new request will lead Koreans to assume that US has open-ended requirement for Korean troops in RVN. ROKG will feel correspondingly justified in making open-ended demands on U.S. We seem to be taking their willingness to commit large numbers of young men for granted so long as we are willing to defray expenses.” The Embassy also pointed out that a new request could jeopardize the ROK commitment to send a division and a brigade promptly to Vietnam. (Telegram 869 from Seoul, February 14; ibid.)