Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

80. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the White House¹

Seoul, February 23, 1966, 0945Z.

230945Z. Eyes Only for the President from the Vice President.

1. I have just concluded a twenty hour visit to Korea with gratifying results.² In my discussions today with Prime Minister and President³ they informed me that the President had communicated yesterday to the Cabinet and the leaders of the Government Party (DRP) his decision to deploy an additional army division and brigade to Vietnam. After my departure this will be announced publicly and a bill be introduced in the National Assembly authorizing the government to take this action.

2. Last night (February 22) I attended a dinner given by the Prime Minister in my honor along with Governor Harriman, Ambassador Brown, Ambassador Hand and Mr. Valenti. In addition to the Foreign Minister, Minister of National Defense and other government officials, the Prime Minister had invited prominent members of the government and opposition parties. After dinner the party leaders asked me a number of pointed questions of our purposes and prospects in Vietnam. I informed them about the Honolulu Conference and about our current strategy in Vietnam. I assured them of our determination to keep South Vietnam free and to fight to win against Communist aggression there. The Prime Minister assured me today that these discussions with the leaders of both parties in the National Assembly will be of great assistance to the government in winning both public and National Assembly approval for the deployment of additional forces.

3. The bill authorizing the additional forces is now being drafted in the Ministry of National Defense and after approval by the National Security Council will be submitted to the National Assembly within a few days. The Government leaders appear to have no doubt that the measure will be passed very quickly. Governor Harriman and I both urged on the ROKG officials the greatest possible speed in the deployment of additional forces in order to help General Westmoreland in his current campaigns against VC centers of strength.

4. The ROK leaders emphasized to me that their support for US actions in Vietnam was not only a matter of moral obligation but also of Korean self-interest in assuring the common defense against Communist aggression. Not unexpectedly Foreign Minister Yi asked pointed questions about our conditions for a negotiated settlement in South Vietnam and voiced desire for ROKG participation in any future summit conferences of the Honolulu type about Vietnam. He gave three reasons for his government’s desire to be represented in future conferences: (a) the already heavy commitments of the ROKG in VN; (b) the experience the ROKG could contribute in negotiating as well as fighting with the Communists; and (c) the promotion of the ROKG’s prestige internationally, which would be helpful not only to the ROK, but to US as well. I responded on this point by saying that I thought this was constructive and helpful suggestion and that I would recommend to you that it be given most serious consideration.

5. I met with President Pak this morning. Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of National Defense and Foreign Affairs and Chief Presidential Secretary were present. [Here follows Pak’s report of his discussions with officials in Thailand, Malaysia, and Taiwan.]

9. Pak said that the opposition statements in the US particularly from Members of Congress, were important reasons why there was a somewhat “dubious” attitude toward the US and a feeling that the US policy was “unclear”, not only in the three countries he visited, but also rather widely in Korea. The statements led “some of the people”, he said, to believe that in due course the US would pull out of VN without a firm result. He characterized as “irresponsible” statement about neutralization of SVN, negotiations with the VC, or putting VC into a coalition government. Pak vigorously underlined a statement that “it would be the greatest mistake the US could make” if the US failed to achieve its objectives in VN.

10. I personally reassured Pak as well as his Ministers separately that negotiations would take place only with Hanoi and that the VC could be conceivably represented only if Hanoi invited them to sit as members of their delegation; that we had no intention of telling the Vietnamese who to put into their cabinet; that President Johnson’s position was supported by an overwhelming majority both of the people and of the leadership. I told him we hoped we could avoid any direct conflict with the ChiComs because we think it would endanger the peace of the world and might lead to a world war, but if the Chinese moved against US with massive forces the Chinese would have to suffer the consequences. I made it very clear that the policies we pursue are designed not to bring China into the struggle, however.

11. I [garble—again?] reassured the President of our strong commitment to protect their national security in the event of an attack from the North and thanked him for the leadership that he was exerting and in particular for their commitment in SVN. We agreed at the conclusion that there would be no announcement as I left about any troop despatch, that we would merely have a general statement covering the general subject of the conversation.

12. Pak looks more relaxed and confident than when I saw him two months ago. He obviously feels reassured about the strength of our commitment and is willing to back that feeling by the despatch of troops over rather considerable opposition in his own country.

13. I expressed appreciation for Pak’s understanding and support of our policy and for his sending Korean troops to SVN, and promised him that we would keep him fully informed about our plans and actions. We considered Korea as an ally and equal and proposed to treat her as such.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 7 US/HUMPHREY. Top Secret; Flash;Nodis.
2. Vice President Humphrey, in Asia to consult with various heads of state, briefly visited Seoul in response to a request made by the Korean Prime Minister to Brown. Brown endorsed the suggestion, stating that the visit would enhance Pak’s prestige and authority at home and strengthen support for sending troops to Vietnam. (Telegram 849 from Seoul, February 10; ibid.)
3. Telegram 942 from Seoul, February 24, also contains a summary of Humphrey’s visit. (Ibid.) Memoranda of four conversations between Humphrey and Korean officials on February 22 and 23 were transmitted in airgram A–338 from Seoul, March 2. (Ibid.)