Office of the Historian

65. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State1

Seoul, December 28, 1965, 0730Z.

656. Troops for Vietnam.

1.
The Prime Minister told me evening December 27 that he had just come from meeting with President, DPM, Minister of National Defense, Foreign Minister and Yi Hu-rak, in which requirements from U.S. necessary to make possible reinforcement Korean troops in Vietnam were formulated. Memorandum will be prepared and handed to me in next day or two by Foreign Minister, who will conduct subsequent negotiations. Prime Minister will check on progress of discussions after Vice President’s visit.
2.
I said that I recognized certain things would have to be done by U.S. and the sooner we received the memorandum the better. I repeated that the basis upon which we were proceeding was no impairment of Korean security and no economic burden for Korea.2 The PriMin said that he and the President wanted very much to be helpful, but they had problems with Korean Assembly and public.
3.
I asked if President was still thinking of time table which PriMin had outlined (Embtel 627).3 He replied that President had not decided on time table and could not do so until he saw what arrangements could be made with U.S.
4.
PriMin said President was thinking of asking Assembly for authorization in general terms to increase or decrease troops in South Vietnam without specifying numbers.
5.

PriMin added that Foreign Minister had assured the President that he would be “a very tough bargainer” in these negotiations.

Comment.

6.
Additional troops issue has thus now become matter of formal inter-government negotiation, including economic and political, as well as purely military matters. ROKs are reserving commitment until they see what they can get. MND strategy will doubtless be to get as broad commitments from U.S. as possible before getting down to military [Page 138] details, and Yi Tong-won will doubtless try to maintain reputation of “giant killer” which he has built up in negotiations with Japanese.
7.
I anticipate rather confused situation, for a while at least, in view personalities involved and Yi Tong-won’s ignorance of matters economic and military. We will just have to play this by ear and will know more when we see the memorandum. It will be real advantage to us if ROKG makes opening gambit.
8.
In any event it appears that things are moving seriously on the Korean side.
Brown
  1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Department of Defense, and Saigon.↩
  2. Proposals exchanged by the Department of State, the Country Team in Seoul, and COMUSKOREA examining the needs and costs involved in accomplishing those goals are ibid.↩
  3. Document 63.↩