Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIX, Part 1, Korea

64. Telegram From the Embassy in Korea to the Department of State¹

Seoul, December 24, 1965.

645. Ref: Embtel 643.²

1. By previous arrangement I remained after the President’s interview with Senator Symington and General Beach reported reftel. I said to the President that the PriMin had raised with me on Dec 22 the matter of an additional Korean division and brigade for SVN, which I had broached to the President on Dec 16. The PM had said that the President wished to send these forces if necessary arrangements for preserving Korea’s security and satisfying Korean public opinion could be made. He had also said that the President felt if this was to be done it were best that it be done quickly, perhaps even before he left for his trip to Southeast Asia. Since this was so important a question, I wished to confirm that this was indeed the President’s view and if so to ask him how to proceed further.

2. The President said the PM had told him of our talk and had correctly reflected his views. If additional troops were to be sent it was best that they should be sent when they were needed and not after long, drawn-out delays. To make this possible, many things would have to be done by his govt and a number of things by the US.

3. I said that I recognized this and repeated that our request had been made on the basis that the physical security of Korea would not thereby be impaired and that no additional economic burden would thereby be imposed. The President nodded. I realized that this would involve a number of practical arrangements which would have to be worked out. The PM was leaving for Manila on the 28th and would not be back until the first. How would the President contemplate that we should get on with necessary arrangements?

4. The President said that the PM had doubtless issued the necessary instructions to the MND and perhaps we should get in touch with him. I said that at any time the Minister of National Defense notified us that he was ready to talk, we would be prepared to do so. I therefore suggested the MND inform General Beach as soon as he was ready to begin discussion. General Beach was prepared to respond immediately and the sooner we received this word from the MND the better. The President agreed that we should proceed in this fashion.

5. I told the President that this action on his part would be deeply appreciated in [garble—US?] and closed discussion with a heartfelt “Thank you,” to which he responded with a shy and friendly “Merry Christmas.”

6. Comment: The entire second part of this interview lasted less than ten minutes. The President was calm, sober and laconic. Indeed, it struck me as remarkable that a matter of such moment should be dealt with so calmly.

7. It is unmistakably clear, however, from what the President said and from the PM’s earlier comments that they have genuine concern, both about the physical security of Korea and about what the Korean people will think about that security. It is important to them (and I think to us, also) that they secure the necessary Assembly approval, not by just a bare majority or a straight party vote after bitter debate and genuine doubts, but with the reasonable support and consensus of a satisfied public opinion. Indeed, as a conscientious President he could take no other position and it is doubly important for him personally with an election coming up.

8. The next move is up to the ROK, and I tried to arrange it that way because I think it is better psychologically for MND to be coming to us, particularly since I have twice established with the President the fundamental basis upon which we approach this negotiation. We know that MND has established a secret noforn task force to consider this matter. If General Beach does not hear from MND in a few days I will raise the matter again, but will apply the needle, not to MND, but to the Blue House or to the PM.

9. I am aware of General Westmoreland’s and CINCPAC’s strong desire for the arrival of any new ROK contingents before the dates of July and October contained in my original proposal to the President. I suggest, however, that we do not raise this question yet, but in the light of the President’s and PM’s stated feelings that this matter should be dealt with promptly, bring up the need for earlier deployment at the negotiating level when discussions have developed an agreed basis upon which the troops can be sent.

Brown

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 27–3 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis. No time of transmission appears on the telegram. Repeated to the Department of Defense, CINCPAC, and Saigon and passed to the White House.
2. Telegram 643 from Seoul, December 24, summarized the discussion of ROK troops in Vietnam between U.S. Senator Stuart Symington and Pak. Pak expressed his satisfaction with the treatment and support given his troops and mentioned in general terms the possibility of additional ROK units being sent to Vietnam. Since the discussion of that issue was nonspecific, Brown indicated his belief that no “compromise of secrecy with respect to our larger request was involved in the President’s remarks.” Nevertheless, Symington was cautioned that the topic “should be handled as a matter of the highest classification.” (Ibid.)