158. Memorandum From Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson1

SUBJECT

  • Developments With Respect to Laos

I. The Communist Buildup in Laos

A review of all available intelligence leads to the conclusion there has been a significant reinforcement of the North Vietnamese forces in the Plaine des Jarres and the Panhandle (see map).2 Although a reinforcement of this type tends to occur each year at the end of the rainy season, it has extended farther to the south than heretofore and probably exceeds the totals observed in previous years.

Prior to the end of the rainy season, there were an estimated 7–8 North Vietnamese battalions, and a total of 5–6,000 North Vietnamese troops present in Laos. Although precise information is still lacking, it is believed that the recently introduced elements may have increased the number of North Vietnamese units to 14–16 battalions and overall personnel strength to 9–11, 000. Pathet Lao strength has remained relatively constant at some 20,000 men. This recent reinforcement, although it provides improved defenses for key installations and infiltration routes, also gives the Communists a capability to move sharply, and with little or no warning, against targets in Laos and South Vietnam should they decide on retaliation for increased pressures brought to bear on them by the U.S.

II. Soviet Draft Message on Laos

The 19 January Soviet note was sent to the British in the form of a draft message from the Geneva cochairman to the U.S. and the three Laotian factions.3 It provides further evidence of Moscow’s concern that U.S. air strikes in Laos may call forth Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese counteractions leading, in turn, to a dangerous military escalation. Following previous practice, the Soviets published their draft without waiting for a British response.

In addition to expressing support for the Pathet Lao’s routine call on 17 December for a new Geneva conference, the Soviet draft urges the [Page 319] leaders of all three Laotian “political forces” to refrain from actions which would aggravate the situation. This might be an oblique warning to the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese to avoid moves which might provoke greater U.S. intervention.

Moscow’s attempts to inhibit the actions of both sides in the Laos conflict may have been prompted by a belief that the North Vietnamese and Chinese are developing a public justification for renewed offensive action in Laos. Propaganda and official statements over the past month have at least implied that Hanoi and Peiping would regard U.S. air strikes against “liberated areas” in Laos as a move to “extend the war to all of Indochina”.

On the other hand, Moscow has written to the North Vietnamese and Chinese Foreign Ministers supporting their recent protests against U.S. actions in “involving troops of its South Korean puppets in the aggressive war against the South Vietnamese people.” Gromyko stated that the USSR, “will render every support and assistance” to the people of Vietnam.

III. Free World Press Reaction to Recent Events

The shooting down of two American jets in Laos on January 13 was given moderate press coverage in most areas of the non-Communist world, accompanied by very light, scattered comments in a few countries.

A definite change in U.S. military and political policy was seen by the London Times and Rome’s Messaggero. The Times said this was “the first official indication that the bombing of Viet Cong supply lines had begun.” The Times headline over the story said “First Evidence of New Policy.”

Messaggero said the action “suggests a radical change in the political and military course followed until now by the Johnson administration.” This course, the paper says, “is a serious warning to North Vietnam about U.S. determination to react strongly to a move or less direct intervention of North Vietnam in the war in South Vietnam.”

A sharp change in tactics was also seen by the West German press. The Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung viewed the American air attacks as a development of new tactics in an effort to stop Communist reinforcements and supplies.

Le Monde, Paris, reviewed developments and added, “even though the State Department neither confirms nor clearly denies that the air force has been making photographs or conducting air attacks, it has admitted implicitly that a new phase of intervention has been underway for some time.”

In the Far East, reports are available only from Thai newspapers which have carried official comment and editorials. Prime Minister Thanom [Page 320] approved the U.S. air action and said “if supplies and reinforcements can be prevented from reaching the Viet Cong, it might greatly facilitate the suppression of the Communist guerrillas in South Vietnam.”

No comment has yet been received from other countries in the Far East or from Africa and Latin America.

CLC
McGeorge Bundy4
  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XIII, Memos, 12/64–1/65. Top Secret.
  2. Attached, but not printed.
  3. As reported in telegram 2084 from Moscow, January 20. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27–14 LAOS)
  4. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.