Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, January 19, 1965, 7:08 p.m.

616. Barrel Roll. Joint State-Defense message. Ref Vientiane AIRA CX–01070, Bangkok’s 921, Vientiane’s 1081,² CINCPAC 182111Z and Vientiane’s 868 to CINCPAC.³

In view recent developments connection Barrel Roll Ten and conversations with General Ma on this subject, following are current guidelines for future Barrel Roll missions:

1. In order continue signal given by Barrel Roll, program will continue with both daylight and night missions.

2. In addition informing PriMin Souvanna in general terms on character of continuing program, future actions will be closely coordinated with General Ma.

3. On an urgent basis Vientiane should prepare an updated current list of secondary targets for both daylight and night missions,⁴ obtain General Ma’s approval, and provide to all concerned.

4. As indicated in CINCPAC 182111Z and agreed to by Vientiane’s 868 to CINCPAC:

(A) US day and night Barrel Roll missions in Laos south of Route 9 confined to area east of Muong Phine and east of Route 23;

(B) Route 23 south of Route 9 and all area to west of Route 23 south of Route 9 reserved for RLAF air operations;

(C) No restrictions to north of Route 9 except as prescribed for each mission;

(D) COMUSMACV will continue to act as coordinating authority for Barrel Roll and Yankee Team missions to ensure routes and targets of all operations in Laos have concurrence AmAmb Vientiane.

5. Targets of opportunity are defined as military vehicular and troop movements and active AA spotted on or near roads designated for recce in Barrel Roll mission being flown.

6. Until further notice, campfires, if spotted, should not be attacked.

7. For immediate future avoid areas of heavy AA concentration in order to minimize risk of loss of aircraft.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 VIET S. Top Secret; Immediate; Limdis; Barrel Roll. Drafted by Cleland and Barbis; cleared by Trueheart, McGeorge Bundy, in draft with McNaughton, and in substance with Admiral Mustin of J–3 of the JCS; and approved by Unger. Also sent to Saigon, and repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC, the White House, DOD for JCS, and CIA.
2. These telegrams, January 15, 17, and 18 respectively, concerned the accidental bombing on January 15 of the friendly Kha village of Bang Tang Vai in Savannakhet province by aircraft engaged in Barrel Roll Ten. Five villagers and five soldiers suffered minor shrapnel wounds; five houses and seven graineries were destroyed. General Ma, the head of the Royal Lao Air Force, was extremely upset about the attack. Sullivan met with him to assure him that it was an accident and to issue an apology. Sullivan also ordered AID representatives to the village to make fast and generous restitution for damages. Ma insisted, as reported in telegram 1081 from Vientiane, that future Barrel Roll operations be limited by the restrictions outlined in subparagraphs 4(A), 4(B), 4(C) and paragraph 5 below. (All ibid.)
3. These telegrams, both January 18, proposed new procedures and guidelines for Barrel Roll operations and indicated the Embassy in Vientiane’s approval of the guidelines. (Ibid.)
4. In telegram 619 to Vientiane, January 20, the Department of State emphasized that telegram 616 presented general policy guidelines. Night Barrel Roll operations were still under review in Washington and no night operations with secondary targets would be authorized without further consultation with the Embassy in Vientiane and without Souvanna’s and Ma’s general approval. (Ibid.)