Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos¹

Washington, October 7, 1964, 7:24 p.m.

313. Ref: Deptel 275² to Vientiane and Vientiane’s 545, 550, 568 and 581.³ Joint State-Defense message.

You are authorized to urge the RLG to begin air attacks against Viet Cong infiltration routes and facilities in the Laos Panhandle by RLAF T–28 aircraft as soon as possible. Such strikes should be spread out over a period of several weeks, and targets should be limited to those deemed suitable for attack by T–28s and listed Para. 8 Vientiane’s 581, excluding Mu Gia pass⁴ and any target which Lao will not hit without U.S. air cover or fire support since decision this matter not yet made.

You are further authorized to inform Lao that Yankee Team suppressive fire strikes against certain difficult targets in Panhandle, interspersing with further T–28 strikes, are part of the over-all concept and are to be anticipated later but that such US strikes are not authorized at this time.

Report soonest proposed schedule of strikes and, upon implementation, all actual commitments of RLG T–28s, including targets attacked, results achieved, and enemy opposition. Also give us any views in addition to those in Vientiane’s 581 as to any targets which are deemed too difficult for RLG air strikes and on which US suppressive strikes desired.

FYI: Highest levels have not authorized Yankee Team strikes at this time against Route 7 targets. Since we wish to avoid the impression that we are taking first step in escalation, we inclined defer decision on Route 7 strikes until we have strong evidence Hanoi’s preparation for new attack in PDJ, some of which might come from RLAF operations over the Route. End FYI. You may inform RLG, however, that US will fly additional recce over Route 7 to keep current on use being made of the Route by the PL and to identify Route 7 targets and air defenses. The subject of possible decision to conduct strikes on Route 7 being given study in Washington.

FYI: Cross border ground operations not authorized at this time. End FYI.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Top Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted by Forrestal; cleared in substance with Rusk, William Bundy, McGeorge Bundy, and in draft with McNaughton; and approved by Forrestal and Rusk. Repeated to CINCPAC, Saigon for COMUSMACV, and Bangkok.
2. In telegram 275 to Vientiane, September 25, the Department of State asked the Embassy to explore with the RLG its willingness to conduct T–28 strikes in the Laos corridor as soon as possible. The objective of the operation was primarily psychological: putting increased pressure on North Vietnam and indicating U.S. seriousness. (Ibid.)
3. In these telegrams, September 30, October 1, 3, 6, the Embassy reported on its consultations with the RLG on air strikes in the corridor, suggested consideration in Washington of air strikes to interdict Route 7, the principal PL/NVN supply route to the Plain of Jars, and provided a target list for the strikes in the corridor. (Ibid., POL 27 LAOS, and ibid., POL 27 VIET S)
4. In telegram 330 to Vientiane, October 13, the Department explained that the two Mu Gia Pass targets were “too close to North Vietnam for this stage of the scenario.” (Ibid.)