Office of the Historian

137. Telegram From the Office of the Secretary of Defense to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (Sharp)1

Washington, October 7, 1964, 10:49 a.m.

DEF 9535. For your information General Phoumi’s discussions with Secretary McNamara and Asst Secretary McNaughton developed following proposal.2 Phoumi reiterated his well-known feeling that (using his own word) present “supple” policy—i.e., one that requires continued political accommodation with Pathet Lao in Government of National Union (1962 Geneva Agreements environment)—and recent pressure for military operations in Panhandle is not fully satisfactory. He clearly believes that stronger policy of military operations in northern Laos, stressing interdiction of Route 7, is called for.

This stronger policy could involve not only “occupation” by Lao forces of Nhommarath-Mahaxay area east of Thakhek if necessary, but, more importantly, he said, should require establishment of a “barrier” in the area east of Ban Ban across Route 7 in northern Laos. With this “barrier,” to be accomplished apparently by special forces type units, primarily the Meos and other tribes, using clandestine and subversive guerrilla style tactics presumably, Phoumi hopes to isolate the PL from NVN support via Route 7 and thus enable the Royal Lao Armed Forces to recover the Plaine des Jarres from the Pathet Lao. He felt the present military realities—e.g., weakened, demoralized state of the PL, the Lao T–28 air strike effectiveness, and growing combat capabilities of Lao special forces made this stronger policy feasible. He indicated Lao could reduce its regular armed forces in order to build up special forces.

According to Phoumi, under this stronger policy the RLG would continue to adhere openly to the provisions of the Geneva Agreements of 1962, but in practice would extend its control by this clandestine “occupation” over all Laos.

Phoumi was informed that the U.S. seeks to establish stability in Laos and to gain adherence to the 1962 Geneva Agreements. However, we would, of course, consider his proposals.3

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Laos, Vol. XI, Cables, 10/64. Secret. Drafted by Colonel F.E. Kramer, Assistant for Laos, Far Eastern Region, ISA, and approved by Blouin.↩
  2. Phoumi arrived in Washington the afternoon of October 3 and left the afternoon of October 5. Phoumi’s discussions with McNamara and McNaughton, October 5, are recorded in two memoranda of conversation, I–28447/64 and I–28448/64 respectively. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD/Admin Files: FRC 69 A 7425, Laos 091.118, 1964)↩
  3. In telegram ARMA CX–567, October 24th, the Army Attache, Colonel William Law, recommended that no action be taken on Phoumi’s plan of operations outlined above. Law noted that this was a “classic proposal” submitted by Phoumi several times in the past. It was “totally beyond the capability of FAR (or Neutralists) forces.” Rather, Phoumi sought to create a crisis to force SEATO and the United States to send military forces to his rescue. (Ibid.)↩