Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

118. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 1, 1964.

316. Please deliver to Gromyko following message from President to Khrushchev:

Begin Verbatim Text:

Dear Mr. Chairman: I write with regard to the Soviet statement on the deteriorating situation in Laos which was handed to the Under Secretary of State on July 26.² You will have seen the United States response given to your Charge d’Affaires on July 30.³ While I believe that latter adequately covers the points of substance involved, I should like personally to express my concern over the suggestion in the Soviet statement that the USSR would be compelled to examine its role as Co-Chairman under the Geneva Agreements if its proposal for a conference is not accepted.

I realize that the task of the Co-Chairmen has been an onerous and largely thankless one. The same may be said of most activities which we carry out to keep the peace. I know the importance which you, Mr. Chairman, attach to this responsibility, and I recall your statement of July 8: “To insure stable peace, to rid mankind of the menace of thermonuclear war, peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems—these are the noble goals for which the Soviet Government is fighting resolutely in the international arena.”⁴ With regard to Laos, the Soviet Union together with the UK, has accepted, through the Geneva Agreements of 1962, a special responsibility with respect to those Agreements. It is a responsibility which I believe the whole world expects the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom to discharge, even though there may be frustrations at times.

As President Kennedy’s successor, I have a special duty to urge that the Soviet Union persevere in this task which is so important to the possibility of a peaceful solution of the problem. The understanding which you and President Kennedy reached at Vienna in June 1961 laid the basis for the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos. As you know, we have regarded this understanding as a demonstration that it is possible for the two of us, despite disagreements on some important questions, to cooperate to keep the peace in the mutual interest of both sides.

We have not been opposed in principle to a new conference on Laos. But I would remind you that there has not been the slightest hint or indication that Hanoi and Peiping would come to such a conference with the idea of giving full effect to the Agreements reached in 1962. This is why we have supported Prince Souvanna Phouma’s so-called “preconditions;” surely they constitute the most minimum indication that such a conference could meet with any prospect of success.

Finally, it seems to me that we should not reach a point where diplomacy admits there is nothing else to do. Discussions continue about the possibility of a meeting of Laotian leaders. We do not believe, further, that the Polish proposals should be abandoned. In other words, it is my view that we should make further attempts to bring about full compliance with the Geneva Agreements. If our joint efforts are to have any chance of success, it seems to me necessary that the Soviet Union continue to accept its responsibility as Co-Chairman.

In this most recent period, our two governments can derive encouragement from the fact that we have achieved two important agreements, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Geneva Agreements on Laos.⁵ Looking toward the future, it seems to me that it is of great importance that we demonstrate that such agreements can be effective and fully sustained.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

End of Verbatim Text.

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Confidential; Priority; Exdis; Verbatim Text. Drafted by Rusk; cleared by Trueheart, the White House, and Richard H. Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; and approved by Rusk.
2. See footnote 2, Document 114.
3. The text of the response is in circular telegram 186, June 30. The conversation between Rusk and Kornienko on July 30, when the Secretary handed the Soviet Charge the note, is in a memorandum of conversation, July 30. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS and POL 27–14 LAOS, respectively)
4. The source for this quote has not been identified.
5. For texts, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1963, pp. 1032–1037 and ibid., 1962, pp. 1075–1083, respectively.