Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

114. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, July 26, 1964, 3:17 p.m.

627. London should deliver following letter earliest Monday morning.

“Dear Rab:

I am writing to give you our reactions to the Soviet note on Laos² before you sit down with your staff prior to your departure Monday evening.³

We are not wholly surprised at the Soviet move. They have for some time shown themselves sensitive to the ChiCom and/PL objections to the various Polish proposals, and I am sure are strongly inclined to try to find an excuse to wash their hands of Laos. We would assume the Soviets are far less concerned about actually having a conference than they are with finding some means to withdraw from a difficult and deteriorating situation, and the timing of their move just before their talks with you seems to support this view. Although we have continually impressed on them the importance on US-Soviet relations of their following through on the Kennedy-Khrushchev undertakings going back to June of 1961, this has probably been a weakening factor in their thinking.

However, I am sure you would agree, that it is vital not to let them get away either with a call for a 14-nation conference without preconditions or with giving up their role as co-chairman. The unhelpful noises from Paris during the week simply underscore the latter point, and I am sure that you would agree that a Soviet withdrawal at this point would leave us with no negotiating track except for the increasingly mischievous initiatives of DeGaulle.

The obvious answer still seems to us to be to get some acceptable variant of the Polish proposals off the ground. On this the Soviet note is clearly weak and indeed contrary to the facts, as you are in a particularly strong position to bring home to them. Far from there being any objection by the Western powers to the Polish proposals (not stated in the note to us but clearly implied, and actually stated orally by the Soviet Charge in handing over the note), the objections have come wholly from the PL, with the ChiComs and Hanoi behind them, and you well recall that Trevelyan was prepared with our consent to be highly forthcoming on the wording of invitations under the original Polish proposal. The only possible Western action to which the Soviets could point would be our delay of a very few days in this late May period, and this was surely entirely reasonable in view of the novelty and implications of the proposals.

I would suggest that this be your main line with the Soviets, coupled with the strongest possible stress that for them to abandon their Co-Chairman role would be not only a drastic and unwarranted rejection of an obligation freely assumed but could very seriously increase the chances of the situation getting out of hand. I am sure you can ring the changes on this theme forcefully, and I would like your judgment on whether and when it would be useful for us to chime in with a forceful reply along the same lines. Our instinct would be to do so while you are still in Moscow, but to leave the opening guns to you.

I know that in any case you will leave the Soviets in no doubt whatever that we would not accept any 14-nation conference without the satisfaction of Souvanna Phouma’s preconditions, and I am sure you would be taking the position that you would not join as co-chairman in the issuing of any such invitations.

The Soviets may, however, seek to assert that such preconditions are invalid either because of the April events or because of the military operations of Souvanna Phouma, including his imminent offensive against the area of routes 13 and 7.

You can of course refute any arguments based on the April events, and the Soviets know well what we did at that time, and indeed how closely we worked with them as well as with you. Ambassador Hopson’s report on the Soviet Charge’s recent remarks at a dinner in support of Souvanna and his neutralist position, which did not include any reference to a conference,⁴ might also be referred to. You might well add that the Soviet refusal to participate in the Article 4 consultations makes their reference to the April events particularly specious.

On the military operation, you will have noted Souphanouvong’s protest of July 23⁵ and the Soviets might well latch onto this. I think Ambassador Hopson has been kept fully posted on all aspects of this action, and we have filled you in here on the degree of support we are giving and why we felt impelled to support the operation. For purposes of discussion with the Soviets, I should think the line to take would be that any operation now pending is a fully justified defensive measure to relieve the continuing PL pressure on Muong Soui, and that in any case the area involved—as Souphanouvong himself has stated—was jointly held in 1962 by the neutralists and NLHX, with the neutralists later driven out by the NLHX. We would hope you would stress above all that in any case the first blow was clearly struck by the PL May offensive in the Plaine des Jarres, and that PL withdrawal there would resolve the problem on the ground and prepare the way immediately, at least in this respect, for a wider conference.

I might add, but not for discussion with the Soviets, that if the present offensive should succeed, the way might be open for a territorial trade of mutual withdrawals or of both sides holding to what they then had. But it is surely premature to get into such possibilities. They might well arise during the course of any Polish-type discussions as part of some arrangement that would seek to restore the military and political situations, while of course also providing for fully effective ICC operations.

I realize that it will be an extremely difficult task for you to get the Soviets turned around during your stay in Moscow. They may come up with difficult counter-proposals, and it will certainly be necessary for us to keep in the closest possible touch with you. I am of course copying this message to Moscow so that Ambassador Kohler will be available to you at all times. It may also be useful for us to talk further prior to your departure for Moscow tomorrow and I shall be available if you wish to telephone me.

I am also repeating this message to Vientiane and instructing our Ambassador to urge Souvanna to adhere to his position and to make a strong reply to Souphanouvong’s protest.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk”

Rusk

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS. Secret; Limdis, Drafted by William Bundy; cleared in draft with Green, Trueheart, Barbis, and Sol Polansky of EUR/SOV; and approved by William Bundy. Also sent to Moscow and Vientiane, and repeated to Paris, Ottawa, New Delhi, Warsaw, Bangkok, Saigon, and CINCPAC for POLAD.
2. The Soviet note, July 26, stated that in the face of flagrant violations of the 1962 Geneva Accords, there must be a 14-nation conference on Laos or the Soviet Union would have to reconsider its role as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. The translation of the note is in circular telegram 160, July 26. (Ibid.) The memorandum of a July 26 conversation between Soviet Charge Georgi M. Kornienko and Ball, during which the note was delivered, is ibid.
3. July 27.
4. Not further identified.
5. To the Chairmen of the Geneva Conference, protesting against Operation Triangle. (Telegram 161 from Vientiane, July 23; Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)