Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

110. Note From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, July 14, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Operation “Triangle” in Laos

This is the code name for the operation against Routes 13 and 7 that we have undertaken to support with airlift. The present status is that the Group Mobile from the south has finally been put down in Muong Soui and it is now estimated that the operation may get underway on the 19th or 20th. This is a delay of about 12 days from the original schedule, and is due principally to rain making the Muong Soui airstrip unuseable, for considerable periods.

Mac [Bundy] called me today to say that he had accumulated a number of worries about the operation, and thought it might be a useful subject for discussion at your lunch today.² I had had the same feeling for several days and last night sent the attached³ to Len [Unger] highlighting two points of worry:

1. A story out of Vientiane that virtually described the operation in full and above all did not relate it at all to the defense of Muong Soui—which we had all agreed was an important element. The article doubtless told the Communists nothing they did not already know, but it also underscored the difficulty of maintaining the “defensive” rationale in face of the fact that the Communists have been conspicuously lying low at Muong Soui and it has not been possible to point to any specific action there, although they are certainly grouped and perhaps even massed in position to attack.

2. The King told Len he estimated PL/VM strength in the area of the operation considerably higher than the 3 PL battalions we had estimated.

Based on these two points, we flagged to Len the possible necessity for caution in carrying out the operation. We have not had their reply to the second point.

In addition, to these two points, there are the following:

3. As a result of the delay, the Communists have had even more time to figure out their next move and deploy for it. In a sense, this does not change our assumptions at the time we approved the operation, but it does underscore this concern. Our best guess is that they would respond by attacking Muong Soui and, although the Thai have moved significant artillery and 200 men to assist there, I would suppose that it remained true that Muong Soui could not be held against a determined attack. We also remain concerned about a possible threat to Attopeu in view of the withdrawal of the Group Mobile, even though it has been replaced by other units that are less good.

4. We have informed the Canadians and British quite fully about the operation, and the French have picked it up in Vientiane from the Lao. The Indians also apparently know about it, and their Ambassador is sympathetic. Thus we have done some insulating against diplomatic reactions, but the French we have regarded as not open to much persuasion. In these exchanges, the only demurring voice has been that of the Canadians, who expressed the fear that the operation would hit the Communists on a particularly sensitive nerve because of the association of the Route 13/7 road junction with their 1961 success, and that the Communists would immediately attack Muong Soui with plausible justification. Despite this worry—which we do not share on the first point—[1–1/2 lines of source text not declassified]. The French, however, will certainly blame it at once on Souvanna and on us and re-double all their pressures.

5. There have been recurring reports of personal differences among the various Lao generals. We did not assume that there would be perfect coordination, but the picture between the lines sounds rather worse than our expectations.

The net of all this does not point, in my judgment, to any change in our basic decision to support the operation.⁴ Even a limited success would lift morale and could create much better and more defensible government-held areas. On the other hand, what we may well want to consider is whether we should move fairly strongly to urge caution on Souvanna and perhaps on the individual key military leaders. If they restrict our attempted advances, which would be the likely result from a military standpoint in any event, they will not weaken the defense of Muong Soui significantly. If, however, they get possessed with a “gung-ho” spirit, the forces could end up all over the place to very little purpose and leave Muong Soui more weakly defended. Until we have Unger’s judgment, I would not urge a decision on this, but I do think that you could join in what Mac may suggest, i.e., a medium-level hard look at the whole thing tomorrow morning.⁵

William P. Bundy ⁶

1. Source: Department of State, Bundy Files: Lot 85 D 240, WPB Chron, July/Dec 1964. Secret.
2. Lunch with President Johnson, McNamara, and McGeorge Bundy, 2 to 4:20 p.m. (Johnson Library, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.
3. Telegram 40 to Vientiane, July 13. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 LAOS)
4. In a July 14 memorandum to Bundy Green agreed with the views expressed by Bundy, but thought that the Pathet Lao were unlikely to attack Muong Soui because their traditional pattern of aggression was to bite and digest. The recent mammoth bite of the Plain of Jars required considerable digestion. Furthermore bad weather and T–28 attacks had “fouled up” Pathet Lao offensive capacity. Green feared that the Pathet Lao would not attack, but rather use the FAR operation to charge that the United States and Thailand were breaking the Geneva Accords by supporting Operation Triangle. (Ibid., POL 31–1 LAOS–US)
5. The meeting apparently took place at 3:30 p.m., July 15, see Document 111.
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.