Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVIII, Laos

109. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Harriman) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, July 11, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Circular Telegram on Laos

I see no useful purpose to be served in the attached proposed circular telegram on Laos.² All it will do is confuse some recipients and discourage others.

The telegram is negative, and shows little understanding of what we have been fighting for in the last several years.

Our position is substantially better than it was two years ago: We have lost practically no territory, in spite of the May 16 advance, from what the RLG controlled in 1962. We are not supporting the neutralists and the conservatives, whereas before we were in the intolerable position of supporting only an unpopular right wing.

Our objective must not only be to support Souvanna,³ but to try to strengthen the neutralist position in Laos, including Kong Le. We should make more effective the activity in the villages and elsewhere to popularize this government and to discredit the communists.

Furthermore, we have so far held the Mekong Valley from Viet-Cong control, and to a considerable extent protected Thailand from the subversive incursions that we were gravely concerned would make Thailand another guerrilla battlefield. Our stimulation of activities in Thailand has improved the situation.

I agree that Souvanna must be induced to remain at all costs, but some action must be taken to develop a neutralist political force within the country as a matter of basic policy.

I have consistently believed that the corridor should be closed from SVN rather than from Laos, and believe that Saigon should be encouraged to increase this activity.⁴

I think it is an idle thought that the Pathet Lao will conform to a neutralist solution under its present leadership.⁵ Souphanouvong might have been willing to do so some years ago, if we had had sense enough to pursue neutralist policies at that time. Today, however, he has been pushed aside by several Hanoi-dominated aggressive personalities.

I am glad I have read this telegram because it brought to the surface so many points that ought to be given deeper consideration.

I suggest that we have a good tough review of where we are and where we are going, to which we should bring in as well as your people, Mike Forrestal, Jorden, Chet Cooper, INR and CIA.

W. Averell Harriman ⁶

1. Source: Library of Congress Manuscript Division, Harriman Papers, Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, Laos 2. Secret; Personal.
2. The attached circular telegram, drafted by Neubert on July 10, has a note in Harriman’s hand indicating it was not sent. The telegram’s main theme was that South Vietnam, not Laos, was the key to preventing “further communist encroachment in SEA,” and that a neutral and independent Laos could only be achieved after the defeat of the insurgency in South Vietnam.
3. The draft telegram stated, “Our ability to keep our options open in Laos is going to depend first of all upon political situation among non-communists in Vientiane. Critical factor here is Souvanna himself.”
4. The draft telegram stated that, with Souvanna’s recent collaboration, the United States was in a position in Laos “to place additional military pressure on North Vietnamese use of southern Laos corridor.”
5. The draft telegram stated that while avoiding a “Geneva-type Conference,” the United States “must exploit all available opportunities (tripartite discussions, variations on Polish proposal, UN discussion, diplomatic contacts, public statements) to make clear our continued support of 1962 Geneva settlement, to emphasize communist intransigence, and to strengthen Souvanna’s position.”
6. Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.