Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs

323. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/15

New York, September 22, 1966, 5 p.m.

SECRETARYʼS DELEGATION TO THE TWENTY-FIRST SESSION OF THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY

New York, September–October 1966

SUBJECT

• Thai desire for security guarantee from U.S.

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.
  • The Secretary
  • William M. Owen, U.S. Delegation
• Thailand
  • H.E. Thanat Khoman, Foreign Minister of Thailand
  • H.E. Sukich Nimmanheminda, Thai Ambassador to the United States
  • Anand Panyarachun, Acting Thai Permanent Representative to the UN

After an initial discussion on other subjects, including Senator Fulbrightʼs desire to examine US relations with Thailand (separate Memcon),² Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman referred to his desire for a security guarantee from the United States. Thanat said that while Thailand was willing to make considerable effort to help in the Vietnam war, he did not think they should let decisions on their policy be made by “outside people.” If they were to run the risk of being involved, they must do so in “full conscience.” That was why they wished to have a reasonable guarantee if they ran the risk of attracting retaliation, which might very well come. They would like to know where they were going.

The Secretary replied on the first point that it had been his understanding that there was nothing the United States had done in Thailand that had not been discussed with the Thai Government and to which that Government had not given its full consent. Thanat responded that he was not aware that it had always been done explicitly, and added that it was a very grave matter. Thailand had a collective government; it was not only a case of the Prime Minister. Thanat had told the Prime Minister that while he for one was willing to take worthwhile risks to establish peace and stability in Southeast Asia, they must do it in full conscience, and not let the US planes go and bomb Vietnam, otherwise they would find themselves in war. The pressure in various quarters in Thailand, including the universities and colleges, was building up, and his concern was not only for the present government but for some future administration. This situation was not helped when some influential people abroad took the line that Thailand was not worth defending. Senator Fulbright, for example, had said in so many words that Thailand was not worth protecting or defending.

The Secretary noted that Senator Morse had said that Southeast Asia was not worth the life of a single US soldier, but it was evident that the US Congress did not agree with him. Thanat interjected that the case of Senator Fulbright was different since he was Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The Secretary asserted that he hoped that these matters could be resolved between governments and not by the various people Thanat had mentioned. Thanat responded that some people insulted the Thai nation. Thanat added that it was one thing for people of oneʼs own nationality or blood to make insulting comments, but it was quite another when such observations were made by people of other nationalities.

The Secretary then reverted to the matter of assurances and observed that Thanatʼs approach on the matter had caught him somewhat by surprise in the sense that the United States had made a vast commitment of its power and resources to the security of Southeast Asia. Thailand was a signatory to the SEATO Treaty, while South Vietnam was a protocol state. In reply to Thanatʼs assertion that the Secretary was a lawyer and that there was no guarantee in the Southeast Asia Treaty, the Secretary replied that the Treaty was costing us 100 men killed every week and that that was what the SEATO Treaty meant to us. Thanat responded that Thailand had no treaty, but that nevertheless, for example, when the United States supplied arms to India we received the support of Thailand. “My God,” he added, he came to the United States last year to tell the General Assembly of that support. The Secretary replied that he understood, and added that he had noticed that Michael Stewart had said on TV that if Thailand were attacked, Britain would meet its responsibilities. He had drawn a line between the British attitude toward Thailand and that toward South Vietnam. Stewart had said that they would retain forces in Southeast Asia. The Secretary said that he would see whether he could find a transcript of Stewartʼs statements for Thanat.

Thanat said he hoped the Secretary would put himself in his shoes as an official of a small nation who had a responsibility for the future of his small country. Large countries which are defeated in wars do not disappear, whereas small nations which were crushed simply vanished. He thought that Thailand deserved a guarantee. His country had shown its loyalty and he did not believe that he was asking for anything which was especially costly or unusual. The United States had such security agreements with the Philippines, Japan, Australia, and other countries. The Secretary responded that the United States had the same thing with Thailand. The Philippines was a special case because agreement came on the heels of the Japanese peace treaty.

Thanat then remarked that the Philippine agreement was not unusual. The Secretary responded that he did not know of anything he could say that he had not already said in the light of our constitutional system. It seemed to him that we have spoken in the clearest and most eloquent terms—with more than 175,000 American casualties in Asia since 1945—that we considered Thai security vital to the United States. Thanat then inquired whether it was so difficult to put it in words “in black and white,” to which the Secretary responded that he did not think we would want to take on a procedure as a result of which Congress would get on to us both. Thanat replied that the Secretary could do it and could work out something appropriate. The Secretary replied that he did not sign his joint statement with Thanat two or three years ago without checking with the Senate. Thanat replied that he understood that, but as one lawyer to another he would observe that the joint statement was not a legal document.

The Secretary stated that the heart of the matter was that as far as the SEATO Treaty was concerned it was ratified by the US Senate by a vote of 82 to one and that there could be nothing stronger than that. The history was that Secretary Dulles recalled that when the NATO Treaty was up for ratification Senator Taft and others had raised questions as to the automaticity of certain of its provisions. The SEATO Treaty had therefore been worded slightly differently, but there was no difference in substance. The heart of the matter was the question of will. France signed the NATO Treaty but DeGaulle was now demanding that all foreign forces be pulled out of France. It was a matter of keeping to oneʼs word. It was evident that in a number of cases DeGaulle was not doing that. He was of course in a fortunate position in that United States power was between him and Russia and between him and Communist China. Thanat replied that because of the NATO Treaty DeGaulle could afford to play a game like that. This confirmed Thanatʼs concern. If DeGaulle simply had a promise in words he could not do what he had been doing.

The Secretary responded that we were pretty simple people in the United States and he just did not see how it could be imagined that because of an internal debate with people like Fulbright we would fail to live up to our commitments under these great treaties. Thanat replied that when he suggested a guarantee he was not suggesting that the United States would not see it to its advantage to repulse aggression. As long as there were people like Fulbright and his group, however, it was unavoidable to give rise to doubts. The Secretary said that he understood, and that perhaps we could keep Ambassador Sukich better informed as to what the feeling was around the United States away from Washington. He noted, for example, that in an Oregon primary the candidate who campaigned against US policy in Vietnam was defeated by a vote on the order of two to one, even though Senator Morse had campaigned actively for him. Similarly, a candidate in Massachusetts who had opposed US Vietnam policies received less than one eighth of the votes cast.

Thanat said that he was trying to explain to the Secretary his position as a leader of a small country. The Secretary said he gathered from what Thanat had said that he was not necessarily talking about a formal treaty. Thanat agreed. The Secretary then proposed that they give the whole subject some further thought. Thanat then commented in a low voice to the Secretary that if it was not a formal treaty it would carry certain risks (this remark was not entirely clear to the reporting officer). The Secretary responded that in the background there had been the formal determination made continually by every President from Harry Truman on, with the National Security Council, composed of the Secretaries of State and Defense and other top officers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, affirming that the security of Southeast Asia was vital to the security of the United States. Truman first came to that conclusion and was subsequently joined by the UK and France in a similar tripartite conclusion. The difference between the UK and France and the United States, if one wishes to be rude, was that we are the United States and have tremendous national interests in our friends on the far side of the Pacific. We have asked our NATO allies never to choose between our friends in the Atlantic and the Pacific because both are vital to us. There were some who apparently thought it would be comfortable and pleasant if we were under the illusion that we could forget about Southeast Asia.

Thanat then asserted that not long ago some simple people in Thailand came to him and wanted the United States to leave. The Secretary asked if Thanat knew that if we could fight these people in Vietnam we could deliver more fire power today than we could deliver in any whole month during World War II, but the problem was to find them. Thanat stated that he was simply the small Foreign Minister of a small nation, but if they were to be derelict in doing their duty he would want to quit. The Secretary replied that he would amend that phrase to read “a great foreign minister of a country whose safety is vital to the security of the United States.” If Thanat wanted us to consider how we could make that as clear to everybody as he had just done, we would be prepared to do it. Thanat responded that Thailand had quite a few problems. They could not see how their picture here had been misrepresented. More and more they appeared as a satellite. He had told Alexis Johnson (at lunch earlier the same day) that some people looked on them as a prostitute. It could not occur to these people that because they cooperated with the United States and agreed with the same objectives, they could still be independ-ent. Some of these critics had asserted that this year the amount of aid given by the United States to Thailand was less than the preceding year. These words, whether true or not, got around. Thailand let the United States use military facilities and was accused of prostituting itself. That was not very pleasant.

The Secretary responded that he understood Thanatʼs feelings. It was not easy for us to prevent people from saying things of that kind. Incidentally, Senator Mansfield had been very helpful recently in speaking in support of Thailand. In response to Thanatʼs question whether that meant that Senator Mansfield was giving equal treatment to Thailand and Cambodia, the Secretary laughed and replied in the negative, saying that Mansfield was trying to balance some of the other views. The Secretary pointed out that he would be a little feverish and unattractive during this election campaign. We get that way every two years. He recalled that Khrushchev had remarked that it was very difficult to deal with us because we were always having one of our “damned elections”.

The conversation then turned to other topics (separate MemCons).³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL THAI–US. Secret; Nodis. No drafter is indicated on the source text, but it was approved in S on November 10.
2. Other memoranda of this conversation are ibid., Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83, Box 267.
3. One of which was Vietnam. (Memorandum of conversation, September 22; Department of State, Central Files, UN 3 GA) A complete set of Ruskʼs memoranda of conversation at the 21st General Assembly is ibid., S/S-International Conference Files: Lot 67 D 305, CF 83.