322. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs (Bundy) to
Secretary of State Rusk1
Washington, September 17, 1966.
SUBJECT
- Your 4:00 oʼclock Meeting with Secretary McNamara on Thai MAP2
I attach at clip a possible memorandum to the President. This summarizes
the arguments fully. My recommendation, of course, is that you stand
firm for the $60 million figure under your over-all power to determine
the ultimate figures of aid programs. Ambassador Johnson concurs, and
will be present for the discussion. He and I have gone over this issue
thoroughly over the past month.
On the question of the availability of funds, you should know that the
House Appropriations Committee yesterday cut the MAP program by $50 million. It cannot be excluded that this
cut will stand in the Senate or even be increased by one of the two
chambers. On the other hand, there is the possibility that the Senate,
which has normally been sympathetic to MAP in the appropriations, will keep the present full
figure, so that the eventual cut would be $25 million.
I have gone over the resulting MAP
situation with John McNaughton,
whose tentative judgment is that anticipated savings from the India and
Pakistan programs (approximately $100 million) will be largely canceled
out by additional requirements for Laos ($35 million), Korea ($12
million), the NATO Headquarters move
($12 million), and added sales
[Page 698]
requirements ($10 million). He appears to agree, however, that we can
find some money for a Thai increase above the presently projected
planning level of $35 million. However, sound planning requires that a
$60 million commitment to Thailand anticipate the possibility that it
would have to be handled in one of two ways:
- a.
- At the expense of cuts ranging from $15–25 million in other
major MAP programs. In the Far
East area, this would mean Korea and China. In
my own judgment, the importance of the Thai commitment is
such that we should be prepared to take such cuts if
necessary.
- b.
- Through moving the Thai and Laos MAP accounts in January to the anticipated DOD Supplemental. This is what was
done for Viet-Nam last January, and would provide flexibility
for increases in both programs without penalty to other MAP allocations. On the other hand,
McNaughton tells me
that the Services and the DOD
Comptroller would have serious difficulty with this, and also
that—although the DOD
Supplemental goes before the military committees—Senator
Fulbright would be in
a position to exert strong negative influence. In other words,
this is a hope (and in my judgment a sound way to proceed), but
it cannot be regarded as a certain fall-back.
All in all, this is a tough issue, but I do think it is not too much to
say that our whole relationship with the Thai, and their own
performance, would be drastically affected if we cannot come up with the
$60 million figure.
I have not attached to this memorandum the recent cables on Than-atʼs
pressure for a mutual security treaty. Since I talked to you Wednesday
night, Martin has been able to
persuade Thanom to hold off on
this. Nonetheless, it remains a threat, and fundamentally reflects the
“souring” in our relations that is described in the draft memorandum to
the President (underlying).
Tab A
Washington, September 16,
1966.
Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense
McNamara to
President Johnson3
SUBJECT
- Level of Thailand MAP Program
for 1967
Recommendation:
That you authorize informing the Thai Government that we will furnish
from FY ʼ67 funds in the MAP program designated items totalling
[Page 699]
$60 million. The
precise dollar amount would not be used, except in the general sense
of informing the Thai that the program was significantly greater
than last yearʼs total (which they know to have been $44 million).
In giving Ambassador Martin
this authority, he would be further instructed that we expect him to
persuade the Thai to undertake substantial further improvement in
their counterinsurgency performance.
Alternative A
Discussion:
- 1.
- The Departments of State and Defense have been unable to agree
on a level of MAP for Thailand
for 1967. Ambassador Martin has for a long time recommended a $70.7
million program with a firm commitment for two, and more
recently, three years. State has urged a minimum of $60 million
for 1967. Defense is unwilling to commit more than $44.3 million
and Secretary McNamara
will be submitting a separate statement on this issue.
- 2.
- I believe that a strong case exists for $60 million. This
would add to the $44.3 million program which Defense has
approved provision for additional helicopters, POL, full equipment for units that
have been raised to manpower levels we have urged on the Thai,
additional training and fighter planes, additional airfield
construction and the higher cost of ammunition.
- 3.
- Our relations with the Thai have until recently been unusually
good and cooperative. They have acceded to almost all our
requests in connection with our Air Force operations against
Laos and Vietnam. Moreover they have been intensifying their
efforts to develop a well-rounded counterinsurgency program.
They have more than doubled government expenditures since 1962.
Most of this increase will go to programs building against
subversion and insurgency, largely in economic and social
programs but also through improved police and armed forces. They
have been taking the lead in international forums in support of
US policy in Vietnam. They have played a dominant role in
initiating and promoting regional cooperation institutions in
Asia in the last year. Finally, Thanat was the first Asian leader to call for a
collective Asian initiative for a peaceful settlement in
Vietnam.
- 4.
- Some months ago we began to detect signs of irritation among
Thai leaders arising from our delay in supplying a Thai MAP figure, which they need for
their own forward planning. This irritation turned to anger when
a series of highly critical articles, some of them very
personal, appeared in the American press during the summer. The
Thai termed the articles “unfair,” “unjustified,” and “insulting
to the Thai nation,” and have sent us a protest note. When
Senator Fulbright
publicly called attention to these articles, raised questions
about the shaky validity
[Page 700]
of our commitment to Thailand and our presence there, and
announced his intention to hold Senate hearings, their concern
took on a new dimension. Ambassador Martinʼs recent cables indicate the atmos-phere
among top Thai leaders is souring, and that Foreign Minister
Thanat in particular
has become so concerned as to suggest the need for a new
bilateral mutual security treaty to define our relations.
- 5.
- I believe that a $60 million program is entirely warranted on
grounds of the usefulness of the equipment itself. Unlike the
possibly excessive program of the 1961–63 period, which led to
criticism of Thai maintenance and utilization, there is no
question that all the items in the $60 million program can be
effectively utilized.4 It can be argued that $7–10 million of
this figure relates to conventional forces that would not be the
best possible force structure for counterinsurgency;
nonetheless, I believe we must recognize that the Thai continue
to fear a possible conventional threat, and that—pursuant to
your letter to Prime Minister Thanom of June 19645—we have
entered into bilateral planning for joint conventional action in
case of need. Above all, I believe that the political aspects of
our whole relationship with the Thai, and their present role and
importance in the area, should be over-riding. Last yearʼs aid
was $44 million. Since that time the Thai have been under
increased communist pressure; they have sent small units to
engage in military action in South Vietnam with us and our
allies; and they are continuing their secret military operations
in support of Souvanna
Phouma in Laos. In the light of this and para 3
above they expect a larger military assistance program this
year. Our mission in Bangkok believes they now can effectively
use even a larger amount.
- 6.
- I do not think it necessary to make a commitment beyond one
year, although I recognize that this would go further to
alleviate Thai anxieties. Moreover, Secretary McNamara and I are in full
agreement that any MAP
commitment should be accompanied by the strongest possible
instructions to Ambassador Martin to push the Thai to remedy significant
continuing defects in their military and counterinsurgency
organization and performance. Although this has been
significantly improved in the past year—which Ambassador
Martin attributes to
our making a similar commitment in August of 1965—there is no
doubt that they have further to go.
Alternative B
(In the event that the two Secretaries are able to agree on a $60
million or other figure, language of the discussion would be
tailored accordingly, drawing on the above.)
