Office of the Historian

263. Telegram From the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler)1

Honolulu, December 29, 1968, 0649Z.

MAC 17667. Effects of Neutralization of Cambodia (S). A. JCS 12931/072223Z Nov 68 (EO).2

1.
In reference (A) you posed the very pertinent question of whether the enemy could continue the war if the Cambodian logistic system could be effectively neutralized. Our reply has been withheld until the Graham group completed its trip and exchanged information with my people and those at MACV.
2.
If the Cambodian logistic system could be effectively neutralized, it would be extremely difficult for the enemy to compensate for the loss of this source of materiel. Thus, it is unlikely he would be able to conduct and sustain major combat operations in the southern part of the country. I do not believe he could continue the war in III and IV CTZ at a level of intensity higher than sporadic mainforce attacks and guerrilla operations if the system were neutralized.
3.
It is estimated that about 60 percent of the enemyʼs external logistic requirements in SVN transit Cambodia. Of the approximate 105 STPD total external requirements, about 65 STPD are supplied from Cambodia. Food constitutes almost 60 STPD and is produced in Cambodia. It is doubtful if the enemyʼs alternate LOCs—overland via Laos and SVN or by SEA infiltration—could make up this loss in view of our current air interdiction program in Laos and present Market Time operations. Our records indicate that since the first of the year enemy truck traffic in Laos has provided only minimal quantities of supplies as far south as the tri-border area.
4.
The enemy has planned to store in various base and other storage areas in Cambodia as much as six monthsʼ reserve, or about 7,000 tons of various classes of supplies. If he were denied these secure storage areas, he would be forced to attempt to cache his materiel requirements in SVN and Laos. They would then be susceptible to loss by destruction or capture.
5.
Since last year Cambodia has been playing an ever increasing role in the enemy logistic system for support of its forces in SVN. A considerable expansion of storage and support facilities has been noted particularly in the Nam Lyr and “Parrot Beak” area. In addition, new road [Page 571] construction activity has been detected in areas of probable enemy control including numerous new motorable border crossings into SVN. I believe that the enemy was forced to place greater reliance on Cambodia because of our interdiction efforts which prevented the movement of sufficient quantities of materiel to the tri-border area. Denial of the Cambodian logistic base would have significant adverse effects on his military capability in the southern part of SVN.
6.
Very respectfully and warm regards.
  1. Source: Center for Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, 2104. Top Secret. Repeated to Abrams, CINCPACFLT Admiral Hyland, CINCPACAF General Nazzaro, and Lieutenant General Hutchin of CINCPAC Admin.↩
  2. Document 254.↩