Office of the Historian

254. Telegram From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Wheeler) to the Commander in Chief, Pacific (McCain)1

Washington, November 7, 1968, 2223Z.

12931. Subject: Actions Against Cambodia (S).

1.
(TS) Based on CINCPAC/MACV recommendations on actions in or against Cambodia, we have had some preliminary meeting with the Department of State. Those proposals having to do with reconnaissance both air and ground, are being actively addressed and some have already been approved. However, those proposals involving overt offensive action against Cambodia carry important policy implications. In order to provide a basis for judgment and recognizing some difference between the CINCPAC/MACV assessment and that of the intelligence community in Washington, a special review of the intelligence was undertaken by Mr. James Graham from the Board of National Estimates. A copy of his findings is being forwarded separately by this channel by DIA.
2.
(TS) You will notice that there is general agreement on the extent of VC use of Cambodia for base areas, sanctuary, training, supply, command and control, etc. There is a difference of opinion on the extent to which arms and ammunition are imported through Cambodian ports and distributed with Cambodian complicity. The Washington intelligence community believes that the north-south route through Laos and Cambodia is still the principle and most reliable route for arms shipments. Owing to these differences, State and CIA wish to send Mr. Graham with CIA, State and DIA representatives to discuss the matter at [Page 556] CINCPAC and MACV. We think it would be useful to conduct such a review out there where all the intelligence is available. Proposals for the visit will be forthcoming subject to your agreement on timing and approach.
3.
(TS) It seems to me that we should be careful to put this review in its proper context as it relates to the policy questions involving actions against Cambodia. Most of the proposals which have been made by CINCPAC and MACV have to do with offensive action against base areas along the border. Decisions for or against these operations do not really depend on the outcome of the review proposed because there is already general agreement on the existence and importance of those base areas.
4.
(TS) The operations thus far proposed probably would not materially affect Cambodian traffic in arms, ammunition, food, clothing, medical supplies or other logistic support except at the delivery end into the base areas themselves. Therefore, the rationale for attacking the base areas is not directly dependent on the extent of Cambodian logistic support. Proposals to cut off that support would involve a range of actions well beyond any that have been proposed thus far with the exception of earlier proposals to close the port of Sihanoukville and other Gulf of Thailand ports.
5.
(TS) Therefore, it seems to us that there are two kinds of offensive action against Cambodia:
A.
Direct attack against base areas and enemy forces located in Cambodia.
B.
Political and military operations to neutralize the logistic system within Cambodia supporting those enemy forces.
6.
(TS) We are drawing this distinction in order to put the Graham visit and the findings which may flow from it in their proper context. In short, most of the proposals you have made will not be affected by the findings of the Graham group. On the other hand, any proposals which may be made for action against the logistic system, particularly that part involving arms and ammunition, would greatly depend upon the findings of the Graham group. In this connection we would have to ask ourselves whether or not the enemy could continue the war if the Cambodian logistic system could be effectively neutralized. This question deserves more attention both out there and back here.
7.
(U) I would appreciate your comments on this subject. Warm regards.
  1. Source: Center for Military History, Abrams Papers, Messages, 1754. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to Abrams.↩