Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXV, South Asia

425. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson¹

Washington, March 16, 1967.

SUBJECT

• Military Supply Policy for Pakistan and India

As a follow-up to our “Tuesday luncheon” of Monday, March 13, Nick and Secretary Rusk would like to send out the attached telegram explaining the full military supply package for both India and Pakistan.² It is their understanding that on Monday the total package was agreed to. It is my recollection, however, that you agreed only to the spares for Pakistan, because of Gene Locke’s change of plans.

Proceeding with spares for Pakistan is necessary to fulfill our understandings with Ayub. But the South Asia specialists, as well as the Secretary, believe that to do something only for Pakistan at this time would be a mistake. We must balance this with meaningful steps in India particularly when we’re also working on the Indians to sign the NPT. Secretary Rusk believes the total package should be approved and acted on, though the exact timing of each component should be left to the discretion of those closest to the problems on the subcontinent, depending upon progress made toward arms limitation.

In addition to the spares for Pakistan, Secretary Rusk recommends the following as part of our overall effort to limit arms expenditures on the subcontinent:

(a) withdraw the MAAG and USMSMI missions in Pakistan and India to dramatize that we are not, repeat not, returning to our earlier relationship with Pakistan. Adequate follow-on supervision could be provided through the military Attaché’s office;

(b) discourage the sale by third countries to India and Pakistan of equipment produced with U.S. technology, co-produced with us, or produced in the U.S.;

(c) re-institute training slots for key Indian and Pakistani military personnel;

(d) disperse remaining obligated ’67 credit sales funds only where these will contribute to U.S. security interests, e.g. for Star Sapphire ground radar in India or to support the general policy on arms limitation;

(e) permit credit sales on non-lethal items for both countries only on a case-by-case basis, depending on progress toward arms limitation, up to but no higher than $75 million for FY 68, a figure which would be not a target but an absolute ceiling and would not be communicated to either country.

They argue that only if State has such chips to play in both countries will we have a real hope of getting commitments to limit arms. A piece-meal approach won’t do; the whole must be available as part of the talk from the beginning.

State and DOD agree on this balanced package. But Tom Hughes in INR, like Chet, worries about the Indian reaction and Dave Linebaugh in S/P thinks we are counting on getting too much from the Pakistanis for what is too small and too late.

Nick is confident that the problem on the Hill is entirely manageable, although there have not been advance soundings because of the classification problem.

In my view, we are not likely to get a more balanced or carefully thought-out package. As Secretary Rusk says in the attached recommendation³ to you, “I believe the problem was thoroughly reviewed, taking into account all the relevant points of view held within the Government.” I think we should go ahead.⁴

Walt

Approve whole package

See me⁵

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Pakistan, Vol. IX, Memos, 5/68–11/68. Secret. A handwritten note in the margin reads, “Rec’d 11:35 a.”
2. As ultimately approved, the telegram was sent to New Delhi and Rawalpindi on March 31 as telegram 166539, Document 431.
3. Reference is to an advance copy of a March 17 memorandum from Rusk to the President, sent to endorse the attached recommendations of the Senior Interdepartmental Group concerning military supply policy toward Indian and Pakistan. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, India, Vol IX, Memos and Miscellaneous, 3–7/67)
4. Rostow added a handwritten postscript that reads: “Given your letter to Ayub, this should ideally move forward very soon.”
5. Johnson checked this option and added the following handwritten note: “Let’s talk about this on plane going out.” His reference was to an impending trip to Guam to meet with officials of the South Vietnamese Government on March 19–20.