414. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Congo1
2357. Ref: Leopoldville’s 3484 to Dept, info Brussels 2025 (also rptd London).2 Dept shares your concern over reports Kasavubu may be planning shift Prime Ministers as open split now could undermine pacification campaign and, as Embassy points out, raise spectre of renewed Katanga secession.
Of utmost importance in dealing with this threat that USG and GOB take same line. Initial step, therefore, should be for you to coordinate approach with De Kerchove and possibly Mason if you believe HMG can play useful role. In Dept’s view, best strategy at this time is to stress to all concerned paramount need for unity, avoiding discussion of personalities. Binza group could be told that any split in moderate forces could turn clock back to the chaos of the post-independence years and complicate efforts of friends of GDRC to be of assistance. Pacification effort plus diplomatic campaign with other Africans now going well. With rebels quarreling in Cairo, this no time to let political feuding break out Leo.
Since reports so far not yet definitive, Dept believes you should avoid any implied threats re USG commitments to GDRC. Also believe [Page 599] it inadvisable slam door on future contingencies involving Binza group by stating flatly we see no alternative to continuation Kasavubu–Tshombe cooperation. Best approach would be emphasize that present GDRC has met with success and deserves loyal support of all moderates during critical transition period, particularly now that elections under way.
In addition to approach to Binza group and Kasavubu, if latter grants appointment, you may wish raise subject again with Tshombe. You could re-emphasize to him our support of GDRC and our hope that his cooperation with Kasavubu would continue. At same time we feel it appropriate point out that Binza group (you may wish include Adoula) represents significant power faction which it dangerous ignore indefinitely. Now that his personal popularity has reached new peak through success in northeast and through favorable initial start in elections, Tshombe may wish again consider possibility broadening his government, if only by filling ministerial vacancies as they occur (Munongo?). A broader government could give added boost to his campaign win African support. Would be particularly valuable if inclusion of member of Binza group could be used as lever to get Adoula return Leopoldville.
Dept leaves possible approach to Tshombe along these lines to your discretion. It should not be made if you believe it would further complicate situation by raising suspicion in Tshombe’s mind that USG backing Binza group.3
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 THE CONGO. Secret; Immediate; Limdis. Drafted by Frank C. Carlucci in AF/CWG; cleared by Davis, McIlvaine, Judd, Williams, and Fredericks; and approved by McElhiney. Repeated to Brussels and London.↩
- In telegram 3484 from Leopoldville, April 10, Blake reported that the Embassy was very worried about assertions by Ndele, Nedaka, and Bomboko that Kasavubu was thinking of replacing Tshombe with Ileo as Prime Minister at the end of the month. (Ibid.)↩
- In telegram 3518 from Leopoldville, April 16, Blake reported that he mentioned these rumors to Tshombe and told him that the Embassy was concerned about the need for unity among moderate political factions in the Congo. Tshombe said he thought this was very helpful, adding that all reports that Kasavubu wanted to dismiss him seemed to come from Bomboko and that he had discussed this with Bomboko the previous evening, hoping to “lance the boil.” Blake said he intended to emphasize the U.S. desire to see national unity maintained when he saw Kasavubu on April 17. (Ibid.)↩