151. Editorial Note
On October 1, 1963, representatives of the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency met to discuss issues involving Ghana [Page 213] and the Congo. Among those attending were G. McMurtrie Godley, Director of the Department of State Office of Central African Affairs; Glenn Fields, Chief of the Africa Division in CIA’s Directorate of Plans; and [name not declassified] of CIA’s Africa Division. According to a memorandum of the meeting prepared on October 3 by Alfred Wellborn of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Godley asked [name not declassified] how President’s Kasavubu’s closure of the Congolese Parliament affected the Agency’s political action program in the Congo. “Mr. [name not declassified] observed that the Agency had been pursuing the policy of bolstering the [text not declassified] and of endeavoring to develop an effective political organization to support Prime Minister Adoula. It had found that the Congolese would not follow the Agency’s suggestions on how to go about building a political organization but were handling matters their own way and were apparently not doing badly. For the moment the funds authorized by the Special Group for political action were sufficient. If there were to be elections later on more might be required.” [name not declassified] also noted that the Agency had been worrying that Belgian funds—both governmental and private—were going to support Anany and other more conservative Congolese and that U.S. and Belgian efforts might be cancelling each other to a certain extent, but a recent development was expected to provided adequate safeguards against that. (Department of State Files, INR/IL Historical Files, AF Meetings, 1963)
In an October 4 memorandum, Fields reported on the covert political action program in the Congo to Deputy Director for Plans Richard Helms. Special emphasis, Fields noted, had been placed “on assisting the Adoula group in the formation of a national party mechanism, initially to enable them to succeed in the upcoming national elections.” Ancillary expenses in support of the Adoula group included the “funding of General Mobutu as Army Chief of Staff to help him to insure the loyalty of vital units of the CNA.” Fields told Helms that he had reviewed the status and direction of the program with the Department of State on October 1. “They stated they were in full accord with our activities, asked if we needed further authority, and said we were on the right track.” Fields also advised Helms that it was “probable we will hit a financial snag sometime after 1 January. National elections will be held and undoubtedly there will be requests both from the Department and the Congolese for intensive covert action support beyond funds presently programmed.” (Central Intelligence Agency Files, Job 78–00435R, DDO/ISS Files, Box 2, Folder 6, [cryptonym not declassified] Operations)