285. Memorandum From John W. Foster of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant (Rostow)1
SUBJECT
- The Situation in the Persian Gulf
One problem you might like to begin thinking about again as we prepare for the Shah’s visit (June 12) is the situation in the Persian Gulf. It’s bound to come up.
As you know, both the Shah and Faisal understand that they must cooperate to prevent outside interference in the Persian—or “Arab”—Gulf. The two rulers have much in common—especially a dislike for Nasser—and, aside from dividing valuable underwater oil concessions which could be worked out, no specific bilateral problems in the Gulf.
There is a basic conflict, however, between the Iranian assumption that Iran has the mission of controlling the Gulf, and the Saudi assumption that Saudi Arabia is responsible for everything on the Arabian peninsula. This has led to Saudi support for the Arab sheikhdoms on the Gulf and the sheikhs do have conflicting claims with Iran.
The nine British protectorates in the Gulf recently formed a Federation of Arab Amirates. So far the organization has not found workable machinery, but the nine rulers keep holding meetings in an effort to create a viable confederation. Apparently they are going to get King Faisal’s blessing. The trouble is that the Shah claims part of their territory.
Iran has a longstanding claim to Bahrain, one of the nine Amirates. The Saudis have tried to play down Bahraini participation, and the Shah says he won’t push his claim if he isn’t challenged directly on it. But as the amirs organize, the challenge becomes clearer. The news of the FAA’s latest meetings has led the Shah to consider the cancellation of a proposed November visit to Saudi Arabia. (You will remember that the Shah “postponed” his visit last January after a Saudi-Bahraini communique spoke of the “Arab character” of the Gulf.)
The other territorial disagreement hasn’t yet become a major problem, but could be as serious. Iran claims some islands in Hormuz Strait (the Tunbs and Abu Musa) which leads from the Gulf to the Arabian Sea. As long as the British held the Islands, the Shah was content to let the claim lie dormant. He is now afraid that if the Arabs get the islands, it will only be a matter of time before Nasser establishes a naval base there [Page 514] and blockades Iran. His fears may be groundless, but for him this is a real danger.
Hopefully, the Shah and Faisal will let their common interest overcome minor territorial disputes, but it won’t be easy. Our policy is to stay out of the middle but to keep reminding both of them that the best way to keep Nasser and the Russians out is to work together. State has been back and forth over this problem and decided that our main effort should be gradually to expand our representation in the Gulf to make our views heard but generally not to think in terms of major US programs.
- Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Iran, Memos & Miscellaneous, Vol. II, 1/66–1/69. Secret.↩