Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

278. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, April 9, 1968, 1005Z.

4118. For Assistant Secretary Battle. Summary: Prompted by his concerns re Persian Gulf security in future, Washington delays, and his profound shock at President’s decision not to seek re-election, the Shah is anxious for a yes or no from USG re his five-year military program. Two temporizing alternatives are suggested in absence of greenlight from IRG.

1. Alam called me in evening eighth (for third time in five days) to convey Shah’s anxiety re our military credit program. Alam spoke from notes taken at Shah’s direction.

2. Alam said Shah still concerned re delay in Samii’s visit to Washington and New York. My previous endeavors to counsel patience have only had limited effect.

3. According to Alam, Shah wishes to know as soon as possible whether he can count on US for his military needs in next five-year period. Shah reiterated he wished to retain US orientation as far as Iranian military is concerned. He is buying arms, not seeking grant assistance. He has committed himself not to acquire sophisticated weapons elsewhere, but he must know whether he can rely on U.S., not just for one year, but for implementation his five-year program. (My impression was that he may have had some info from Ansary indicating USG present thinking concentrating on FY68 tranche.)

4. Alam went on to say that Kosygin offered provide any of Iran’s military needs, whether planes, tanks or ships, and Russians prepared to make firm unlimited commitment through 1975. Of course, Shah had ignored this Soviet ploy.

5. Recalling Alam’s report to us on Shah-Kosygin talk (Tehran 4039),² I noted Alam had not mentioned arms as having been discussed, even though I had asked specifically re that subject. Alam surmised that Kosygin had made pitch to Hoveyda.

6. Obviously detecting some annoyance on my part at what appeared to be crude intimidation, Alam assured me Shah’s mentioning Soviet offers was not an attempt at “bullying.” Alam did, however, followup this part of conversation with Shah-suggested disclosure re probable Moscow visit in July (Tehran 4116).³

7. In concluding discussion re military, Alam noted Shah will certainly discuss this subject with President Johnson in June. He went on to say how devoted Shah is to President and cited how Shah was affected by President’s cautions against excessive ($800 million) arms expenditures in most recent communication this subject.⁴

8. Comment: Although reaction to a pitch of this kind is always visceral, one must resist saying “go ahead deal with Russians” and try to understand Shah’s present deeply felt dilemma. I need not repeat our analysis (Tehran 3869)⁵ here, but points made remain valid. Announcement of British withdrawal from Persian Gulf has plunged Shah into profound preoccupation with Iran’s role in preserving security and stability of that area, in the face of radical Arab adventurism and historic Russian aims.

9. On top of that has been added an equally profound factor which it is impossible to overestimate. The Shah probably more than any other world leader has been shaken by the President’s announcement not to seek re-election. He considers President true personal friend in whom he has utmost confidence. He cannot envision any successor so well disposed to maintenance of Iranian-US relations, including in field of military cooperation. On contrary, he despairs that successor President may curtail arms cooperation which is core of current US-Iranian relationship.

10. It is because of this uncertainty, coupled with fact that Shah has already been waiting for some six months for answer to his question, that Shah will insist on reasonably clear statement of US intentions over next five year period. Without it, he is fully capable of taking undesirable steps. It was my hope (Tehran 3869) that we could convince our IRG colleagues of importance of favorable decision, at same time assuring them that no one knows better than Shah that we have adequate loop-holes to curtail our military cooperation any time Shah misbehaves or we run into Congressional troubles.

11. Since there has been no greenlight yet received here pursuant to two recent IRG meetings, I would suggest either of following actions:

A. Arrange for early visit of Mehdi Samii to Washington to discuss commercial credit in general and preliminary terms.

B. Letter from President to Shah referring to Shah’s démarches to me, counselling patience, assuring Shah that five-year program is receiving close and expeditious attention, expressing hope for an affirmative response before June and indicating President looks forward to discussing this and other subjects with Shah in June.⁶

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL IRAN–US. Secret; Priority; Noforn; Limdis.
2. Dated April 3. (Ibid., POL IRAN-U.S.S.R.)
3. Dated April 9. (Ibid., POL 7 IRAN)
4. Document 254.
5. Document 273.
6. In telegram 4125 from Tehran, April 10, Meyer reported that for the moment, the Shah’s temperature regarding the military credit program had subsided a bit. (Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 U.S.-IRAN)