Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXII, Iran

105. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State¹

Tehran, November 12, 1965, 0950Z.

715. Iran Military Build-up.

1. Build-up Urgent. In discussion with Eximbank President Linder and me 11th, Shah stressed once again that successful economic development of Iran is useless unless Iran has adequate military security. Reiterating many points made previously and those disclosed by FinMin Amuzegar 3 days ago, Shah made clear that in wake of Pak-Indian crisis and procurement by Iraq of new MIGs and British aircraft he considers augmentation his military establishment an urgent necessity. His fears center particularly on vulnerability of Khuzistan and Kharg Island to surprise attack. He said he realized US and Iran have agreement on military program but new facts require additional $200,000,000 expenditures envisaged in request made this week and approved by parliament.

2. US-Iran Cooperation. Pointing to cooperative aspects of US-Iranian military relationship, I said I felt we had formulated effective program for Iran’s military security as envisaged in our respective agreements, latest being that of July 1964. If there were certain weaknesses which required amendment it struck me they should be worked out by ARMISH/MAAG Chief Jablonsky and Iranian top military.

3. Alleged Delays. Shah said problem is delay. He said he had been waiting two months for paperwork to be completed re second tranche including determination of interest rate. It not possible with urgency facing him militarily to countenance such delays. I assured him that delay of second tranche paperwork in no way deliberate nor with ulterior motive. Meanwhile, as General Jablonsky has already assured him, we been meeting time schedule for our commitments with remarkable success.

4. Anti-aircraft needs. Shah stressed his anxiety over lack of air defense. He asserted that U.S.G. itself considered certain anti-aircraft guns obsolete and pursuant to U.S. advice Iran disposed of them. Now, however, he realizes that he needs such guns or others to defend his defenseless installations. I noted that General Jablonsky had told him a week ago in their monthly meeting that whole question of anti-aircraft weaponry is under review in US as result of Viet Nam and some definitive decisions expected in December. As he did to Jablonsky, Shah said he would wait until December before he makes any final decisions re this equipment. In talking with me, however, he prefaced his statement emphatically with the word “maybe”.

5. Unhappiness re Hawks. When I suggested that in long-range program Hawk missiles were to play a key role in Iran’s air defense, Shah virtually exploded in complaining we are limiting him to one battalion. He said it impossible to fragment one battalion and try to defend each of his installations with only one or two Hawk launchers. In addition to his irritation over fact that Iraqis, Egyptians and others have more and faster planes, Shah voiced his unhappiness that Egypt already has eight SAM sites and that both his neighbors Iraq and Afghanistan have such Russian equipment.

6. Decision re $200,000,000 is Firm. Stating he wanted no misunderstanding, Shah said “It has been decided” that additional $200,000,000 worth of urgent military equipment will be obtained. He said he hoped bulk of it would be available from U.S. At same time he gave indication that Iran will be shopping other places and said some military training for Iranians is already planned for Germany.

7. Inadequate Human Resources. I took occasion once again to point out inadequacy of trained human resources in Iran Armed Forces. I said I concerned at prospect of Iran importing more highly technical equipment, when already some supplies not being handled properly. Shah acknowledged this deficiency but asked for examples. This prompted further emphasis on my part that his military and General Jablonsky should be in close consultation.²

Meyer

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 19–8 US–IRAN. Confidential. Repeated to CINCSTRIKE, London, Bonn, Baghdad, Ankara, and Karachi.
2. Telegram 591 to Tehran, November 13, noting that any substantial increase in defense expenditures would have a long-range impact on economic development, asked for the Embassy’s judgment regarding the Shah’s motivations and whether he would seriously contemplate proceeding with a procurement program even if it jeopardized Iran’s MAP relationship with the United States. (Ibid.)