104. Telegram From the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State1
650. For General Taylor. Ref: Deptel 509.2 Threat of insurgency in Iran is in latent rather than active stage. Thus, our efforts and those of GOI are directed as much towards prevention as towards improving capability to deal with insurgency if it occurs. Overall US objective in Iran (preservation this country from domination by elements inimical to US interests) is at present best served by furthering progress already made in economic, social and political development while recognizing that Shah represents vital element of stability. Thus, our unremitting efforts are directed toward development and implementation number courses of action many of which have counter-insurgency implications.
GOI authorities, from Shah down through military, security, and police echelons, are all aware of importance counter-insurgency operations, [Page 184] and GOI has improved its posture by launching own programs in fields of health and sanitation, literacy, land reform, vocational training and civic action. Since inauguration civic action programs in Iran (1962) there has been noteworthy change in public image of Iranian military and gendarmerie and attitude of general public toward gendarmerie and military has altered visibly for better; similar changes have taken place in attitude military toward civilian population. Civic action thus has played material role in decline of insurgency threat and pacification of tribes.
Greatest danger to stability, as brought out by events of this year, comes from small groups of fanatics who might assassinate Shah but who have no significant capability for insurgency themselves. (Embassy’s A–105)3 Second major problem, in my opinion, is narrowness of base of regime. (Embassy’s A–281)4 However, this is not insurgency problem but tied to personality of Shah. In short while due attention is given by Country Team to potential insurgency threats from tribes, mullahs, and dissatisfied urban elements, Iran in my judgment is a situation where further refinement of counter-insurgency programs is less important than encouraging well-conceived economic development and broader based institutionalized government.
Am satisfied with progress being made in Iranian counter-insurgency preparations and at moment I see no major problems. This is why in our last progress report on IDP I recommended that Iran be taken off special group list requiring periodic review. As reported in Embassy’s A–281 current situation here better than it has been for some time.
However, in our regular and continuing process of analysis Iranian political environment we are, of course, constantly alert to any signs of increase in counter-insurgency threat or its potential. I am fully aware of advantages for prompt attention at highest levels USG which special group provides and would seek assistance promptly this channel should changing conditions here seem to justify.
I regard our IDP as adequate and geared to Iran’s present requirements. I consider that I have authority to utilize all resources of US agencies within mission to insure efficient execution of US responsibilities under IDP. Country Team fully effective in counter-insurgency field and there are no conflicts between US agencies regarding roles and missions. I believe attitude of local authorities towards insurgency threat is healthy one. GOI appears to be increasingly aware of importance of counter-insurgency programs and local authorities are susceptible to advice on that score.
[Page 185]With regard to our ability to evaluate local conditions in sufficient time to take preventive action against a subversive threat, our sources appear to be adequate. [2 lines of source text not declassified] US and GOI interests in this field are almost identical and I consider GOI sources as reasonably satisfactory. Embassy, Consulates, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] have certain capabilities in this field, [1 line of source text not declassified].
In general, I am satisfied with level of training of my staff in counter-insurgency theory and practice. However, since Iran poses problem like many other countries where we are endeavoring strengthen economic and social fundamentals of regime over long run against possible insurgent or subversive forces, suggest training courses stress particularly appropriate utilization positive techniques aimed at encouragement of constructive evolutionary forces. Officers all agencies should be trained accordingly to approach whole issue with constructive mentality rather than as simple matter fire-fighting after open conflagration has commenced.