85. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
114. From Acheson. Met with Greek rep Nikolareisis for more than an hour this morning. I gave him fairly lengthy exposition of our informal ideas, prefacing my remarks by saying this should not be considered an “American plan” but rather suggests ways we would like to explore with all concerned. I spoke of the three Turkish requisites: national prestige, national security and welfare of Turkish-Cypriots. Also pointed out no solution could be pleasing to both sides and anything agreed upon in end likely to be displeasing to both. If this resulted in criticism directed at me or US Government, we were prepared to accept it.
As I had previously done with Turk, I spoke of possibility that sovereign base area on Cyprus, for example Karpas Peninsula, might meet minimum Turkish security requisites. Suggested this area should be large enough to provide sort of safe haven for Turk-Cypriots in times of communal disturbances.
I said it seemed to me that neither enosis by itself, nor double enosis nor federalism would necessarily solve problem of securing welfare Turk-Cypriots. Even under Turks own preferred solutions, there would undoubtedly still remain Turkish minorities in Greek-ruled part of island. I was inclined to dismiss double enosis or federalism in any case, I said, because I saw no way to impose these arrangements on hostile Greek-Cypriots.
Therefore, I had been thinking of arrangement within framework of some sort of enosis which would give Turk-Cypriots assurance that not only their lives but their property, business, and way of life would be safeguarded. This might be done through a special arrangement, under overall Greek sovereignty, which would take advantage of flexibility inherent in Greek administrative system. Perhaps one or two small areas on island, such as stretch north from Turkish quarter of Nicosia, might be designated as Eparchis and given local self-rule under Turkish Eparch who would, of course, be responsible to higher Greek authority. Another form of local self-rule could be devised for Turks in rest of island, also subject to overall Greek rule.
To ensure that Turks would feel confidence in arrangement of this kind, I considered it necessary that there be some international authority, possibly a UN commissioner of sort which had operated in Danzig and Saar between World Wars I and II, empowered to receive and investigate [Page 184] complaints and make recommendations for corrective action. In turn, there could be right of appeal to International Court of Justice.
Nikolareisis listened intently, took notes and asked number of questions. His only real comment was that he feared his government’s public position was pretty far from the sort of thing I had outlined. He pointed out that so far GOG talked publicly only about full independence with right of self-determination, not about enosis. I reminded him of my earlier comment that no solution would be fully agreeable to all parties. However, if Greece and Turkey could come to meeting of minds, we could then deal with the problem of how to get a solution accepted by Makarios and Cypriots generally. Jernegan suggested that at such time GOG should mobilize all its assets (propaganda and other) to create popular demand on island for enosis.
During our polite preliminary exchanges, Nikolareisis said that he had had a long talk yesterday with Mediator who had expressed pleasure at my presence here and had asked him to discuss matters with me. Nikolareisis asked that I get in touch with him whenever I wished. We agreed that each should feel free to talk to the other whenever he had anything to talk about, but I said I probably would want to give him time to report and get reaction from Athens on what I had said. He emphasized and I agreed that these talks should be kept extremely secret.
My impression is that Nikolareisis takes his function seriously and will do his best to convey our thoughts and relay those of GOG to us, but his attitude today certainly bears out previous word that he is not authorized at this point to negotiate. Real test will no doubt come when he gets Athens view on my remarks today. I certainly went rather farther in accepting enosis as good solution than, I believe, any of us has done previously. If anything will induce Papandreou to embark on meaningful dialogue, this should do it.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.↩