84. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1

76. 1. I had long talk with FonMin Costopoulos yesterday on Cyprus situation.2 Reviewing Washington talks, he said Greek side had been struck and disappointed by rigidity of US position. Greeks had hoped for some substantive response to Papandreou’s proposals for a solution and were surprised that President and Washington officials “concentrated only on procedure without touching on substance.” They had feeling of great pressure exerted to force face-to-face talks with Turks, whereas they had cautioned us ahead of time they would not do so under existing circumstances, and they wanted our ideas as to a substantive solution.

2. For my part, I explained again great disappointment in Washington over what appeared to us to be most rigid position of PriMin, going over much of ground covered in talks and stressing what to me seemed to be “unconditional surrender” nature of Papandreou’s position.

3. During talk, Costopoulos acknowledged that there had been no pressure in Washington for Papandreou-Inonu meeting. (This has also been acknowledged by Andreas Papandreou in conversation with Embassy officer.)

4. Geneva talks. Although Costopoulos personally believes that Greco-Turkish talks could prove useful, he said that Papandreou still adamant against bilateral talks with the Turks so long as Turkish threat continues. “If either Turkey or the United States will remove that threat, such bilateral talks can be held.”

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5. I then questioned Costopoulos about Nicolareizis’ instructions, saying I hoped very much that they were broad enough to permit frank discussions with Acheson. He replied that Nicolareizis’ instructions included authorization to talk to Acheson, to exchange views with him and to report, but not to engage in “negotiations.” Constopoulos said he would want to keep in closest touch with me as things developed in Geneva. We trust that Dept and Acheson will keep us fully informed to permit us to attempt to stimulate appropriate responses from GOG.

6. Grivas. Costopoulos believes Grivas is gaining control of irregular forces on island, and he observed that there had been no marked reaction either from the Turks or British about his presence there. He added that it was important to remember that Grivas is main hope against Communists and that Makarios had had to go along so far.

7. FonMin stated that there was no question of Grivas and Makarios acting together to establish enosis.

8. Greek troops. Costopoulos asserted figures about presence Greek troops in Cyprus greatly exaggerated. He admitted that some non-coms had gone to Cyprus in past months in effort gain control of irregulars (this stated to us some time ago by Papandreou). In addition, some 800 Greek soldiers of Cypriot extraction had gone to island—“lets call them deserters.” Only others were about one thousand Greek-Cypriot students who recently returned to island as part of Grivas’ following.

9. FonMin expressed irritation over Canadian criticism of Greeks, when Turks have infiltrated many more into Cyprus.

10. Suggested approach to solution. Costopoulos said that in conversation with de Gaulle, Greeks had taken same line as in Washington. But idea was developed during talks of some sort of “regionalism” on island—“something like Alsace.” Costopoulos was vague as to who suggested this, but gave the impression it came from the Greek side. He was explicit in saying that de Gaulle supported this idea. I probed to find what exactly was intended by suggestion, but Costopoulos was not clear as to practical workings. His explanation was to effect that an arrangement might be worked out which would ensure Cypriot sovereignty of whole island (subject to later enosis), full protection of minorities and some “Alsatian-type regionalism” which was neither partition nor federalism. Although I am not at all certain as to the implications of this suggestion, it seems to me to be well worth exploration.

11. Costopolous repeated that territorial concessions were out of question, “except possibly something like Kastellorizon.”

Recommend Dept pass foregoing Ankara and Acheson.

Labouisse
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Priority; Exdis.
  2. Labouisse met with King Constantine the same day for discussions on Cyprus. He reported on this meeting in telegram 75 from Athens, July 12. (Ibid.)