Office of the Historian

135. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece1

Washington, August 20,1964, 1:18 p.m.

327. For Ambassador from Ball. The President now directs you to go ahead immediately with delivery of the Acheson letter as contained in Geneva’s 97 to you.2 In making your approach please have these points in mind:

1.
If we cannot put this deal over right now the chances of success at a later date are slight. The interjection of the Soviet Union into this already tangled web of affairs will make the task almost hopeless.
2.
Acheson’s solution is not a bargaining position. It is his decision that this is the minimum that can be given to the Turks without an explosion in Turkey which would have disastrous consequences for everyone. You must make this point sufficiently emphatic in order to overcome the mercantile instincts of your clients.
3.
Time is really of the essence. That means now. We are talking in terms of a deal within 48 hours.
4.
There are real advantages in a Greek decision today. The presence of Garoufoulias on the Island3 should be helpful in making this work. Kyprianou has not yet left for Moscow. Any delay will change the picture to everyone’s disadvantage.
5.
It is not for us to tell the Greeks how to bring about instant enosis. You can say to the GOG that we have deliberately avoided any direct involvement with Grivas since we do not wish to interfere in the measures they may deem necessary to achieve the results.
6.
Obviously this is not a deal Papandreou can carry off by himself. The King and military must also be aboard. Presumably the King will wish to have the ERE in line. A Greek national decision seems to us essential if we are to force this down the throat of the Turks which in any event will be very difficult.
7.
If you find any disposition to further haggling you can tell the Greeks that we are putting this deal up to the Turks at the same time and we do not propose to haggle with them either.
8.
What we are offering the Greeks after tremendous endeavors on our part is the possibility of avoiding a Communist take-over of the Island. Moreover, it is the opportunity to avoid setting in train a whole series of different events which in combination could result in the extension of Communist power over a very much larger area. This is a major decision directly affecting the future position of Greece itself. You cannot say this too emphatically.
9.
From the time of Papandreou’s visit here the Greeks have continually asked us what solution we propose. We have invested enormous time and effort in reaching this decision. This is it.
10.
Yours is an epic assignment. We appreciate the difficulties but very large concerns hang on your success.

Good luck.

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball. Repeated to Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson.↩
  2. Document 134.↩
  3. Garoufalias visited Cyprus on August 21.↩