134. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Embassy in Greece1
97. For Ambassador from Acheson. Ball asked me in telecon this a.m.2 to send to you and him the following letter from me to Prime Minister Papandreou to be delivered by you, upon receipt of clearance from Washington, to Prime Minister and the King.
[Page 270]Begin letter:
My Dear Prime Minister:
May I begin this letter by expressing deepest appreciation of the help you have given to our work here in Geneva by your own constant attention and thought and by permitting Mr. Sossides to join in our efforts.
Today the President has informed me of the urgency which he believes imminent Soviet involvement in the Cyprus problem has imparted to our work, and because of it has asked me to let you know our joint view that only a little while is left in which a settlement can be made and to give you my own views, which he has endorsed, of the general nature of the settlement which seems to me possible and fair. I know from our conversations with Mr. Sossides that you are impressed as we are here of the danger, which the Russian moves have intensified, that Cyprus will fall under Communist influence and of the far-reaching effects which this will have upon the political and power situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. I am sure we agree that the danger gives Turkey and Greece a common interest far transcending the exact lines on a map to be drawn in reaching an agreement. The problems presented to both sides in reaching a settlement are political and it is from that point of view that I approach them.
I am prepared to apply the utmost pressure and persuasion to get the Turks to give up any claim for sovereign territory on Cyprus, to reduce the dimensions of their requirements for a military base on the Karpas Peninsula and to settle the rights of minorities along the lines which I have discussed with Mr. Sossides and which I can translate into a draft to be available tomorrow. Specifically, I would urge the Turks to limit their plan to a lease for 50 years for that part of the Karpas Peninsula running from its northeasterly end to a line drawn north and south just west of Komi Kebir. I am persuaded from the study which I have made of the situation with the aid of military advisers that there is a sound military justification for such a base in the defense of the approaches to the Turkish mainland and in the defense of the base itself from surprise attack. It is quite possible that to draw the western line of this area as I have suggested would present a political problem to you at this time. This problem could be avoided by leaving the line undrawn, to be supplied after military study by the Supreme Allied Commander for Europe, with the assurance by the Government of Greece that if the line should be drawn as indicated it would be accepted. Indeed, the willingness of the Government of Greece to enter into such a settlement might be indicated to me without entering into any present direct commitment to the Government of Turkey. With this assurance I would do my best, and believe I could succeed, in obtaining the agreement of the Government of Turkey not to intervene to prevent or to demand prior intergovernmental [Page 271] agreement before the achievement of enosis between Greece and Cyprus.
Without something of this sort the Turks would surely believe themselves to be faced with having their treaty rights almost contemptuously destroyed and themselves faced with the alternatives of unconditional enosis or unconditional independence for a Cyprus under Communist domination.
What I have suggested will present the gravest difficulties for the leaders of both Greece and Turkey and for the peoples they lead. But I am confident that, in the face of imminent common peril, each nation can find unity at home in support of solutions which look beyond momentary controversy to the fundamental security and welfare of great Hellenic and Turkish states and support abroad by the grand alliance of free states against interference with their execution.
May I request, my dear Prime Minister, the early return to Geneva of Mr. Sossides to help us to this solution.
(Add whatever polite closure is appropriate.)3
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-Tag. Also sent to the Department of State, where it was received at 10:44 a.m., and repeated to London and Ankara. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, and USUN. The source text is the Department of State copy.↩
- A transcript of the teleconference is ibid., Ball Papers: Lot 74 D 272, Telephone Conversations, Cyprus Situation.↩
- In telegram 141 from Athens to Geneva, Labouisse reported that Acheson’s letter to Papandreou had produced an “awkward personality situation” because of its failure to refer to the more senior Nikolareisis. (Ibid., Central Files, POL 27 CYP)↩