129. Telegram From the Mission in Geneva to the Department of State1
408. For Department only. For Ball from Acheson. Perhaps an explanation of the rationale of my No. 4012 may be helpful. It attempts to combine lures linked to responsibilities, and threats to the bloody-minded [Page 262] linked with clear support for a specific settlement which both the GOG and GOT would, I believe, accept if the pressure of their public and military for extreme demands could be balanced by really effective outside pressure for moderation.
To accomplish this, my plan begins by assuring the Turks that we start from the joint premises that revision of existing treaties requires consent of the signatories and not merely a mob vote in the UNGA (the Turks set great store by this), and that revision by agreement is desirable, a view with which the Turks also agree.
The second idea is to relax the tension in Cyprus, restore for the benefit of Turkish Cypriots order and the necessities of life, and subject Makarios to a restraint which may end in his removal, by entrusting the task to the GOG, which can be held responsible. In return for this GOG is offered a prize which it greatly desires—i.e., NATO undertaking (which dilutes U.S. part in it) to restrain the Turks from intervening as long as the GOG maintains, or does the best anyone can to maintain, order and minimum just treatment of all in Cyprus. This plan offers the best chance of accomplishing the result sought and permits the Turks to accept Greek action on behalf of all guarantors as an acknowledgement of the validity of the Treaty of Guarantee. NATO’s cover for the protection of Greek troops on this mission can be subsumed under Article 6 of NAT without unseemly stretching. Hence everyone gets something but has to pay for it and is threatened by trouble if assigned responsibility is refused or interference with others contemplated.
The proposal to make the Greeks responsible for preventing interference with the supply and rotation of the Turkish contingent is to end this unnecessary provocation and humiliation of Turkey by Makarios’ flaunting of his denunciation of the treaties. It also puts pressure on the Greeks to accept their role as peacekeeper since, if they do not and Turks are fired upon when performing a treaty function in no way connected with intervention, Makarios will have fired the first shot and even the Russians will be hard pressed to find aggression in the Turks forcing the relief of their authorized contingent.
All these proposals are studded with deferential salaams to the U.N. so that U Thant and Thimayya can gracefully accept aid which they should regard as a gift from Heaven.
Acheson as arbitrator is your idea.
The gloss on the President’s warning not to use NATO arms for unauthorized NATO purposes is to permit their use for authorized purposes on Cyprus. It also introduces a new reason for Sixth Fleet interposition, if desired, against improper intervention—i.e., blockade to permit search and seizure of unauthorized NATO weapons upon NATO, rather than purely American orders.
[Page 263]The last idea is merely to make things even. While bad boys will be prevented from fighting one another, good boys will be protected from attack or threat of force from USSR.