127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission in Geneva1

426. For Acheson from Under Secretary Ball. In reflecting on our recent spate of communications, I wonder if you would agree that the scenario now looks like this:

1.
Presidential letters as amended are going to Inonu and Papandreou today.2 Papandreou letter should be at hand for review of situation in which Sossides is presumably engaged in Athens.
2.
Hopefully UK will try to crank up Guarantor Powers’ action to prevent Cypriot military involvement with Soviet Union.
3.
Acheson to resume negotiations with Greeks as soon as Sossides returns—hopefully Monday or Tuesday.
4.
If after Sossides returns negotiations still look on brink of failure, we would advise Papandreou and Inonu that we regard NATO Foreign Ministers’ meeting as urgent next step.
5.
Depending on response of Papandreou and Inonu, we would call Foreign Ministers’ meeting at which we would make the points outlined in your teletype; namely,
(a)
demand no US equipment used by either side.
(b)
point regarding Section 5 NAT.
(c)
advance concurrence by other NATO members that Greece and Turkey should delegate you to arbitrate remaining unagreed elements of settlement.
6.
We would seek NATO support for Guarantor Powers démarche to Cyprus.
7.
We wish to give further thought to emphasis on London-Zurich treaties before deciding whether they should be raised in NATO.3

Rusk
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Flash; Exdis-TAG. Drafted and approved by Ball.
  2. See Document 126 and footnote 1 thereto.
  3. The National Security Council discussed Cyprus at its August 17 meeting. According to notes prepared by McCone, Ball reported that the Turks had confirmed the cease-fire, that a “real break” had taken place between Greece and Turkey, that Grivas felt betrayed by the Greek Government, that Acheson was encouraged by events, and that Turkey appeared “amenable” to a deal. (Central Intelligence Agency, DCI Files: Job 80–B01285A, Meetings with LBJ, 1964)