120. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
260. 1. At meeting with Papandreou and Costopoulos yesterday, I went over same general ground touched on in Sunday night meeting concerning Geneva conversations,2 but in more detail. I again stressed that US Govt considered it essential we drive swiftly toward basic long-term solution; pointing to deadly serious prospects in event of failure; that Acheson considered Turks had moved very considerable distance from their original demands for partition or federation, but that we did not consider GOG had moved much from position of six weeks ago; that, while Acheson and Nikolareizis were on best of terms, Acheson did not feel latter had sufficient authority to move things forward, that there was too much tendency to explore in principle, and that there was apparently some failure of communications between Nikolareizis and Athens as witnessed by Nikolareizis’ reported acceptance by Papandreou of Acheson’s minorities proposal and GOG subsequent apparent reversal. The situation was much too dangerous to drift any longer in this way. We must get down to cases and work out practical arrangements this week. I suggested that Greeks were in way of obtaining large part of what they want provided they make reasonable concessions to meet Turks on questions of minority protection and military security which to them are very real. After going over main points of Acheson’s memo for his August 10 talk with Nikolareizis,3 the draft Defense Board “treaty” was translated to Papandreou by his son who had joined meeting.
2. Papandreou acknowledged that Nikolareizis’ instructions had been to explore possible solution which was reason he had not been able be more forthcoming, but he agreed on need to move on urgently. His initial reaction to the Defense Board concept was that it was something for future, and that we should concentrate on key issues (a) treatment of minorities and (b) question of base. I replied that I was sure Acheson was not wedded to Defense Board concept as end in itself, but considered it as a proven and reasonable means for handling problems before us, adding that getting down to key issues was just what Acheson had been seeking to do and was pressing Greeks for now.
3. On base question, Papandreou clearly indicated acceptance of lease arrangement, ruling out concept of transformation of British bases [Page 247] as too complicated, etc. I urged that he react quickly to Acheson’s proposals on this, adding that the twenty square kilometer suggestion was much too small to be considered. (He then discussed privately in Greek with Costopoulos size of present British bases.) When I alluded to Karpas Peninsula, Costopoulos asked what would happen to inhabitants. I said all this was matter for negotiation. (Incidentally, I am told British base areas include previously existing villages.)
4. On minority rights, Papandreou made much the same noises as in past, agreeing to provide solid bill of human rights with UN supervision and rights of appeal to Hague Court. He said he would consider anything which did not smack either of federation or cantonments. Referring to my comments re Nikolareizis’ transmission of his views, he said there had surely been mistake—“possibly Nikolareizis was being too agreeable.” Papandreou said that Acheson memo on minorities although entitled enosis was in substance partition and federation. This was impossible for Cypriot people to accept and recent events did not make it easier. He said USG must remember that, even when Makarios is out of picture, the Cypriot people will have strong ideas which cannot be dismissed. He stressed point that often US fails to distinguish between Makarios and the will of the mass of people of island.
5. Conversation ended by his asking for copy of Defense Board treaty, saying that Sossides was expected back from Geneva in evening and that he would talk with him with view to pressing forward constructively. I shall follow up.
6. I also talked to King Constantine in general terms about urgent need for agreed solution which would take fully into consideration Turkey’s military requirements and prestige, as well as protection of minorities rights. He agreed except concerning Turkey’s argument re need of base for its military security. This was outmoded military concept, but he did agree that Turkey needed something for prestige reasons provided there was no disguised partition or federation. I said it was most important for GOG to be more flexible and forthcoming in Geneva talks, and he undertook to help in this direction. When I suggested that it might prove helpful in final analysis to get major opposition leadership committed to anything government agrees to, the King replied he was satisfied he could bring this about.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis-TAG. Received at 10:30 a.m. and repeated to USUN, Ankara, London, and Geneva for Acheson. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.↩
- See Document 117.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 121.↩