117. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State1
247. I delivered President Johnson’s letter to Papandreou at seven thirty this evening.2 Costopoulos and Anschuetz also present. Papandreou said he found the text excellent and was prepared to publish it.
Papandreou launched into a long analysis of the situation in Cyprus. GOG had an agreement with Makarios and Grivas that they were to indulge in no military operations except with the approval of the Greek Government. Both Makarios and Grivas violated that agreement. Makarios had probably planned the operation in the Mansoura area for some time, and Grivas was dragged along because he was attracted by the military advantages of eliminating the Turkish beachhead there. GOG had transmitted three messages to Cyprus with regard to fighting in this area. First was a telegraphic message Saturday morning August 7, the second a telephone call and last night the written message which was published (Embtel 235 to Department).3 Last message was public repudiation of Makarios. Makarios’ actions have demonstrated that it will be impossible to have a common or parallel policy with him.
Papandreou stated that Grivas had been offended by his messages and had said he would resign (Grivas tender of resignation confirmed by [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]).
Papandreou said that in light Makarios-Grivas action the Turks were right in staging their demonstration yesterday. Today with cease-fire of the Greek Cypriots, the situation is reversed and the Turkish attack without justification. If Turks will guarantee to discontinue their attacks, Greek Government will accept responsibility for maintaining cease-fire. (When asked if he could ensure this, he replied he believed he could.) Tonight may be a terrible night in Cyprus because the Cypriots consider they are abandoned. And it is reported that Georgatsis might organize some activity against Turk Cypriots. The only activity which the Greeks have taken today was what he called the theatrical demonstration of four planes which flew over Cyprus to reassure the Greek Cypriots.
If it is possible to obtain Turkish assurances to desist, both sides should accept authority of UNFICYP. Moreover, appeal of Chairman [Page 243] Security Council4 provides an additional basis for insisting upon a cease-fire. With a cease-fire Papandreou said it would be possible to move promptly toward a basic solution of the problem.
I seized on this to emphasize US conviction necessary to reach settlement all issues with Turks in shortest possible time.
I covered briefly my discussion with Acheson in Geneva. I took general line agreed with Acheson and will follow up tomorrow at another meeting with Prime Minister scheduled for noon.
It was clear to me that Papandreou prepared to accept some sort of lease arrangement although question of size, etc. will still pose problems. I believe he fully understands urgent need for agreed solution. As he was very tired and clearly showed strain of recent days, I told him that I would wait until our meeting tomorrow for full discussion.
I hope Geneva will send revisions of draft agreement in time for tomorrow’s meeting.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis-TAG. Received at 7:31 p.m. and repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, Geneva for Acheson, London, USUN, and Paris.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 116.↩
- Dated August 8. (Department of State, Central Files, POL 23–8 CYP)↩
- On August 9, the President of the U.N. Security Council appealed to Turkey to end the use of military force.↩